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ABSTRACT
Our daily digital life is full of algorithmically selected content such as social media feeds,
recommendations and personalized search results. These algorithms curate everyday online content
by prioritizing, classifying, associating, and filtering information. However, while these algorithms
have great power to shape users’ experiences, users are often unaware of their operation, or even
presence. While this opacity partly stems from protecting intellectual property and preventing
malicious users from gaming the system, it is also designed to provide users with seamless,
effortless system interactions. However, this opacity can result in misinformed behavior among
users, particularly when there is no clear feedback mechanism for users to understand the effects of
their own actions on an algorithmic system. The increasing prevalence and power of these opaque
algorithms coupled with their sometimes biased and discriminatory decisions raises questions about
how knowledgeable users are and should be about the existence, operation and possible impacts of
these algorithms.
This dissertation draws on human-computer interaction, social computing and data mining
techniques to investigate users’ behavior around opaque algorithmic systems and create new designs
that communicate opaque algorithmic processes to users and provide them with a more informed,
satisfying, and engaging interaction. In doing so, I add new angles to the old idea of understanding
the interaction between users and automation by investigating and designing around algorithm
sensemaking and algorithm transparency.
Specifically, this dissertation makes three contributions. First, it investigates how users currently
interact with opaque algorithmic socio-technical systems and what is missing in this interaction. I
show that when an algorithmic system is opaque, users try to add “seams,” visible hints disclosing
aspects of automation operations, into the system manually to increase the visibility of the algo-
rithm and its potential impacts on other users (such as bias). In doing so, users also take stances
(defending or questioning) towards an algorithm’s existence, opacity in existence, operation, and
opacity in operation. These findings lead to the next part of this dissertation in which I present two
seamful designs, ReVeal (on Yelp) and FeedVis (on Facebook), to demonstrate how we can redesign
current opaque algorithmic systems by adding transparency into the existence of algorithms. I
report on the extensive lack of awareness about the presence of opaque algorithms in algorithmic
socio-technical systems. I then illustrate that a seamful design can help users to have a more
informed and engaging interaction with the system by developing theories about how an algorithm
might work. Finally, I take a step further and expose users to the operation of opaque algorithms. I
show that users do not need full transparency in ad curation process in order to have a satisfactory
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experience. For example, in the case of opaque behavioral advertising algorithms, what users need
is an interpretable, non-creepy explanation with a link to their identity. I then evaluate the impacts
of different levels of transparency on users’ perception of algorithmic decisions and show that
while increasing transparency about how an algorithm (here a review filtering algorithm) makes a
decision can improve users’ understandability of the decision, it cannot change users’ agreement or
disagreement with the decision. The findings of this dissertation present a future for algorithmic
socio-technical systems in which adding a right level of transparency into algorithmic processes
provide a more informed, satisfying, and adaptive interaction between users and the system.
* The author of this dissertation is also known as Motahhare Eslami.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Algorithms play a vital role in curating online information: they tell us what to read, what
to watch, what to buy, and even whom to date. In doing so, they exert power to shape users’
experiences and even their perception of the world [1]. However, while powerful, these algorithms
are usually hidden in black boxes. While this opacity partly stems from protecting intellectual
property and preventing malicious users from gaming the system, it is also a choice designed to
provide users with seamless, effortless system interactions [2, 3]. This black box nature, however,
prevents users from understanding the details of algorithmic systems’ functionality or even their
existence. Whether users’ understanding is correct or not, their perceived knowledge about an
algorithm can affect their behavior. For instance, believing that posts with commercial keywords
were ranked higher by the Facebook News Feed algorithm, some teenagers added product names
to their posts in an attempt to manipulate the algorithm and increase their posts’ visibility [4].
However, with no way to know if their knowledge of such invisible algorithms is correct, users
cannot be sure of the results of their actions.
Users’ lack of awareness about hidden algorithmic processes can also result in misinformed
behavior. A clear example of this can be seen in Morris’s study of social network use by new
mothers. She questioned the common complaint that new mothers exclusively posted photos of
their babies. She found that the Facebook News Feed curation algorithm created this misperception
because it prioritizes posts that receive likes and comments – photos of babies often received
attention from a large audience. Because users lack knowledge about the News Feed algorithm, they
may have an inaccurate picture of how their and others actions influence their personal feeds [5].
Such misinformed behavior can be of a greater concern when an opaque algorithmic system might
introduce bias to users’ interaction with the system. Algorithms might bring bias into a system due
to their probabilistic nature, imperfect human logic used in their development, or nonrepresentative
input or training data from biased individuals [1, 6]. Such bias, regardless of its source, might result
in unintended consequences with negative impacts, like an image tagging algorithm labeling images
of Black people with tags such as “ape” [7], and arguments over whether the Chicagos police crime
prediction algorithm is racist [8]. These biases, along with the opaque nature of algorithmic systems,
can reinforce users’ misinformed behavior, and even affect the system as a whole.
The opacity of algorithmic socio-technical systems along with their power in shaping users’
experiences raise questions about how knowledgeable users are and should be about these algorithms.
To address these questions, this dissertation will shed light on how users interact with opaque
algorithmic socio-technical systems, and how we can redesign these systems to provide users with
a more transparent interaction. I show that communicating pivotal algorithmic process cues in the
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interface can build a more informed, satisfying, and engaging interaction between user and system.
1.1 ALGORITHMIC SOCIO-TECHNICAL SYSTEMS
This dissertation is about algorithms and how users interact with them. But what is an algorithm?
While it might look like a modern term, algorithm is actually quite an old word. Its roots come
back to the name of the Persian mathematician and the father of algebra, “Muammad ibn Musa
Al-Khwarizmi” (c.780– c.850), Latinized as “Algorithmi” in the 12th Century. In his work, Al-
Khwarizmi described mathematical methods of addition, subtraction, multiplication and division
using numbers which led to the definition of the algorithm as “the specific step-by-step method of
performing written elementary arithmetic.” The development of programming languages in the
20th century (such as Algol 58 that stands for ALGOrithmic Language) evolved the definition of an
algorithm to “a set of defined steps that if followed in the correct order will computationally process
input (instructions and/or data) to produce a desired outcome” [9].
With this definition, I consider an “algorithmic sociotechnical system” a system that employs
algorithms to guide and curate the interaction between users and the system. Research attention has
recently turned to these algorithms as influential parts of daily digital life. Many researchers have
considered curation algorithms and argued that their effects are important while their operation
is opaque [10, 11]. For example, search algorithms structure the online information available
to a society, and may function as a gatekeeper by shaping the politics of search in finding the
best information in the easiest way [12, 13]. Recommender algorithms are omnipresent online —
recommending movies, music, books and other product, and are explicitly designed to influence
users’ behavior. These algorithms spawned a variety of studies on their performance such as the
Netflix prize competition [14]. In another example, scientific journal rankings have been found to
produce unwarranted perceptions of the importance of some articles over others [15].
In this dissertation, I particularly focus on a series of algorithmic sociotechnical systems that their
power, and opacity, have raised several concerns over recent years. These systems include online
reviewing platforms, social media, and online advertising. The reason that I focus on these different
types of algorithmic systems rather than one specific system is to gain a better understanding of
algorithmic impacts in general, and whether users’ behavior around opaque algorithms generalize. I
found that users behave around opaque algorithms in many similar ways: they try to make sense of
opaque algorithms by developing theories about how algorithms work, they feel helpless when they
don’t have control over algorithmic impacts, and while they demand more transparency, they do not
necessarily desire full transparency.
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1.2 ORIGIN
When I started exploring opaque algorithms back in 2012, there were few studies about users’
knowledge of opaque algorithmic processes, and how these algorithmic processes might affect
users’ behavior. On the contrary, I was often asked why it even mattered. The example I often heard
was “cars”: we don’t know how our car engines work, but we still drive them, and we’re fine. So
why do users need to know anything about the internals of opaque algorithmic systems that they’re
dealing with daily? And honestly, this sounded pretty reasonable to me. However, observing the
significant impact of algorithms on users’ everyday life in various scenarios made me think that
algorithms might be different than cars (I explain how they differ at the end of this dissertation).
Below, I describe the very first scenario that lays the foundation of this dissertation.
1.2.1 Following What Algorithms Create
The first observation that motivated me to study users’ interaction with opaque algorithmic
system resulted from an early project in my PhD – which is not actually in this dissertation, but
deserves to be recognized as an origin. In this project, I aimed to evaluate the state-of-the art
clustering algorithms in creating social network groups. So I built a tool, GroupMe, that applied
three clustering algorithms to a user’s Facebook friendship network to create groups of friends
(Figure 1.1). These algorithms used the same input (user’s friendship network structure) to create
groups of friends automatically. GroupMe then allowed users to modify these groups by making or
deleting groups, and moving friends between groups [16].
To evaluate the performance of these three algorithms, I asked 18 Facebook users to use GroupMe
to modify the grouping generated by each algorithm and create their ideal “desired grouping”. This
process resulted in three desired groupings for each user. My original goal was simply to compare
an algorithm’s generated grouping with a user’s desired grouping after modifying the algorithm’s
outputs to understand which algorithm performed best. However, I noticed something else on the
way: I also did a comparison between the three desired groupings a user created out of each of the
clustering algorithms’ outputs. I expected these groupings to be quite similar because they were
supposed to be the same user’s groups, just made in different ways. I, however, found something
different: there was a 14% difference on average between the same user’s final desired groupings.
That is, a user’s desired grouping differed depending on the algorithmic grouping the user modified.
But what was the reason? Were our users too lazy to modify each algorithm’s groupings to the
point that they became similar? Or might there be other reasons?
I investigated the differences between the sets of groups users created from different algorithms,
along with the discussions they had about these groups. I found that the reason behind this major
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Figure 1.1: A Snapshot of GroupMe: A Facebook Group Detection Application
difference was following what algorithms create: users stated that if an algorithm did not find
a specific group, they might have not created it themselves, but when a group was created, they
usually liked it, and kept it. This showed that the choice of using a different algorithm in creating a
user’s groups could shape a users experience. This could be particularly sensitive because these
groups are usually used for privacy settings and sharing information with specific friends. But were
users aware of the significant impact that the choice of an algorithm could have on their experience?
This question inspired me to start thinking about users’ awareness of such algorithmic impacts, and
how this awareness or lack of awareness could actually affect their behavior.
1.3 CONTRIBUTIONS
This dissertation makes the following specific contributions:
1. Algorithm Sensemaking in the Wild: Understanding User Behavior around Algorithms
As the first step towards building a more informed interaction between users and algorithmic
socio-technical systems, I investigated users’ current interaction with opaque algorithms
to understand what is missing in this interaction. In Chapter 3, via an algorithm auditing
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practice, I characterized the bias of an opaque algorithm (Booking.com’s rating algorithm)
and studied how aware users were of this bias, and if aware, how they perceived and managed
it. I found that those users who were aware of this bias oriented towards and adapted their
behavior around it: they tried to look into the algorithms black box, correct the bias, and
demonstrate a trust breakdown with the platform. Through all these actions, what users were
doing was adding “seams” – visible hints disclosing aspects of automation operations – into
the system manually to increase the visibility of the algorithm and its potential impacts to
other users.
In Chapter 4, I followed up on this finding to understand where users usually see a need to add
seams in opaque algorithmic systems. I analyzed hundreds of users’ discussions about another
opaque algorithm (Yelp review filtering algorithm) and its potential biases. I found that users
questioned or defended this algorithm in four different aspects: the algorithm’s a) existence,
b) opacity in existence, c) operation, and d) opacity in operation. Users’ stances on these
aspects depended on their engagement with and personal gain from the algorithm. However,
regardless of their engagement with and personal gain from the algorithm, no user defended
the opacity in the algorithm’s existence; that is, all users argued that an algorithm’s existence
should be transparent to users. In addition, while users had no visibility into the algorithm’s
operation, they still developed “folk theories,” those non-authoritative conceptions of the
world that develop among non-professionals and circulate informally, about the algorithm’s
operation and acted on those theories. These findings laid the foundation of the rest of the
dissertation in which I built and evaluated designs which added transparency into opaque
algorithms’ existence and operation.
2. Designing around Algorithm Sensemaking: Adding Visibility into Algorithm’s Existence
I built and evaluated seamful designs which added transparency into the existence of opaque
algorithms in socio-technical systems. First, in Chapter 4, I present ReVeal (Review Revealer)
which reveals the presence of a review filtering algorithm on Yelp. The results of an interview
study showed that adding transparency into the algorithm’s existence changed users’ attitudes
towards the algorithm: users reported their intention to either write for the algorithm in future
reviews or leave the platform. In Chapter 5, I then took a step further and developed FeedVis
which disclosed the presence of Facebook News Feed curation algorithm in two different
aspects: content and friends. In particular, Feedvis discloses what I call “the algorithm
outputs”: the differences in users’ News Feeds when they have been curated by the algorithm
and when they have not. I uncovered an extensive lack of awareness about the presence of
algorithmic feed curation which was associated with users’ lack of active engagement with
their Facebook News Feed. A long term evaluation showed that algorithmic awareness led
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users to more engagement with Facebook and bolstered overall feelings of control on the
site. ReVeal and FeedVis are first applications I know of to put the presence of an opaque
algorithm at the heart of their design.
In addition to building seamful designs, in Chapter 6, I investigate the interplay between
seamful designs and folk theories by evaluating users’ theories about how Facebook News
Feed curation might work before, during, and after being exposed to the algorithm’s existence
via Feedvis. The findings showed that incorporating intentional seams into the feed helped
users who were unaware of the algorithms existence develop theories similar to users who
were aware of the algorithms presence. This rapid similarity suggests that providing extra
visibility into an algorithm could help users rapidly develop new and predictable conceptual
understandings of an algorithmic system.
3. Designing around Algorithm Transparency: Adding Visibility into Algorithm’s Operation
In the final piece of this dissertation, I take a step further than revealing the presence of an
opaque algorithm in socio-technical systems and expose users to the operation of the algorithm
as well. Specifically, in Chapter 7, I investigate the current transparency mechanisms as well
as users’ desired level of transparency about how online behavioral advertising algorithms
work. I show that users preferred interpretable, non-creepy explanations about why an ad
is presented, along with a recognizable link to their identity – all with enough transparency.
The results also showed that exposing users to their algorithmically-derived attributes led to
algorithm disillusionment: users found that advertising algorithms they thought were perfect
were far from it.
Finally, in Chapter 8, I take a closer look at the value of algorithm transparency by evaluating
the impact of different levels of transparency on users’ perceptions of algorithmic decisions.
The results show that while increasing transparency about how an algorithm made a review
filtering decision improved users’ understandability of the decision, it still could not change
users’ agreement or disagreement with the decision.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
In this Chapter, I first explore users’ interaction with invisible processes in general, and opaque
algorithms in particular. This section lays the foundation of the work I present in Chapter 3 &
4. Second, I review the concept of seamful design and folk theories in the literature which guide
my work in Chapter 4, 5, and 6 about adding seams into algorithms’ existence and the interplay
between seamful design and folk theories. Finally, I visit the literature about algorithm transparency,
particularly adding visibility into algorithms’ operation. This section informs my work in Chapters
7 & 8. At the end of each section, I describe how this dissertation extends that line of work and
adds to what we already know about each area.
2.1 INTERACTION WITH THE INVISIBLE
In this section, I review the literature about users’ interaction with invisible processes, and opaque
algorithmic systems in particular. One of the consequences of opacity in algorithmic systems is
introducing bias to users’ experience without them knowing about such biases. Here, I specifically
look at those algorithmic systems that their opacity has raised concerns about the bias they might
introduce to users interaction with the system. I discuss the practices researchers and regular users
use to understand such opaque algorithmic systems, and what this dissertation adds to this line of
research.
Many areas of research have examined invisible processes and how people perceive and react
to them. Cognitive science and human factors researchers study the mental models people create
when they interact with machines and technology [17]. Designers develop new ideas by enacting
probes that reveal interactions with hidden and uncertain aspects of people’s lives [18]. Related
efforts exist in architecture and urban planning, where architects create new spaces based on the
study of how people perceive and navigate landscapes [19]. In another example, time and motion
studies observe people conducting a task and extract any hidden patterns to find the most productive
way to complete it [20]. Studies dealing with hidden or invisible components of daily life have also
addressed some aspects of social media. The invisibility of audiences in online environments has
prompted research into the imagined audience [21], including quantifying how perceived audiences




Algorithms are one of the opaque and invisible parts of our everyday online life which their
opacity makes understanding them quite challenging. Most algorithmic decision-making systems
do not communicate their inner workings to users [23], resulting in information asymmetry—a
disparity in what is visible to different parties to a system [24]. As Burrell discusses, this information
asymmetry and opacity stems from 1) corporate secrecy geared to prevent malicious users from
gaming the system, 2) the limited technical literacy of regular users of these systems, and 3)
the complexity of understanding an algorithm in action, even by its own developers [3]. In this
dissertation, I explore and design around two types of opacity in algorithmic platforms: a) Opacity
in existence (when the presence of an algorithm is hidden from users), and b) opacity in operation
(when users know about the presence of an algorithm, but they still do not have information about
how the algorithm works).
2.1.2 Algorithm Bias
The opacity of socio-technical algorithmic systems has raised concerns about the bias they might
introduce to users’ interaction with the system. Here, I adapt the bias definition from the Oxford
dictionary to define algorithm bias: “Inclination or prejudice for or against one or a group of
stakeholders in a system, especially in a way considered to be unfair.” While this dissertation is
not about algorithm bias in particular, I use it as an inseparable part of algorithmic systems to
understand how researchers and users behave around opaque algorithms that might be biased.
Researchers have paid particular attention to algorithms when outputs are unexpected or when
the risk exists that the algorithm might promote antisocial political, economic, geographic, racial,
or other discrimination. Invisible algorithms in health care, credit scoring and stock trading have
aroused interest in recent years [25, 26]. Researchers have looked at dynamic pricing and the
possibility of reinforcing biases against rural and poorer areas, which tend to have less competition,
thereby “diminish[ing] the Internet’s role as an equalizer” [27]. Algorithms that select personalized
advertisements have been found to unevenly distribute arrest record ads by race [28]. Controversy
over Twitter Trends and accusations of algorithmic censorship of the tag #occupywallstreet through-
out the Occupy Wall Street protests led to questions of whether a sorting algorithm can be wrong or
unethical under some conditions [29, 30]. Some researchers have even studied unexpected results
in the filtering of autocompletion text, finding some algorithms explicitly attempt to make moral
judgements, such as removing terms deemed to be related to child pornography [31].
Such examples of algorithm bias have raised questions about opacity in algorithmic systems
and accordingly efforts to interrogate these algorithmic systems. While algorithmic opacity can
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provide users with a seamless and effortless system experience, sometimes it can actually facilitate
algorithmic decisions that are biased or deceptive. For example, the opacity of the Uber rating
algorithm led drivers to accuse Uber of deception – manipulating drivers’ ratings in order to extract
additional fees [32]. They particularly argued that the nature of the algorithmic opacity made it
harder to detect the biased outcomes of the algorithm. Accordingly, opaque algorithmic decision
making has gathered considerable attention from legal scholars [33, 34]. These issues, along with
efforts in addressing them, have started a line of practice in algorithmic systems called “algorithm
audits” to interrogate algorithms [11]. In the next section, I describe the existing practices in
algorithm audits, and how this dissertation adds to this line of work by detecting and quantifying
bias in a rating algorithmic system.
2.1.3 Auditing Algorithms: Techniques and Challenges
In algorithm audits, researchers employ different techniques inspired by traditional audit studies
(such as field experiments to detect realtors’ racial discrimination in choosing which homes to
present to clients) to understand biases or illegal behaviors an algorithm might introduce to a system
[11]. The potential risks of biased algorithms have also prompted governments to call for regulation
of algorithmic systems in an attempt to increase algorithmic transparency and prevent discrimination
via algorithms [35, 36]. The black box nature of algorithms, however, makes auditing them difficult.
Therefore, many algorithm audits are designed to detect algorithm bias “from the outside.” Here, I
categorize these techniques, depending on whether an audit is performed within one platform or
across two or more platforms.
Within-Platform Audits
In within-platform audit techniques, researchers issue queries as inputs to an algorithmic system
and analyze the outputs. For example, Sweeney searched more than 2000 racially-associated
personal names online and found that ads suggesting arrest were 25% more likely to appear for
Black-identifying names [28]. Researchers also use scraping to audit, writing a script to conduct
such processes automatically and at scale [11]. Investigating the potential biases of online maps in
representing international borders [37] and exploring the sources of political bias in social media
search [38] are some examples.
Generating or collecting inputs to feed an algorithmic system is challenging, however, particularly
if the input of an algorithm is a real user’s profile. To overcome this challenge, some studies use
a “sock puppet” technique [11], in which researchers create fake users’ profiles as inputs to an
algorithm to analyze its outputs and investigate bias. Examples of this type of audit include creating
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browser agents as simulated users to detect gender bias in online advertising [39], understanding the
Uber surge pricing algorithm by emulating Uber accounts [40], discovering racial discrimination
against Black users on Airbnb via creating multiple accounts [41], and building browser agents
with different genders and races to investigate online housing discrimination [42]. Some have used
this technique to understand which specific input data in a real user’s profile maps to outputs (e.g.,
ads and recommendations) by associating shadow and real user accounts and comparing the outputs
[43].
Scraping and sock puppet audit techniques may be difficult or even illegal to use under a
platform’s terms of service (ToS). As ToS are included in the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(CFAA), violations may be labeled a federal crime. Therefore, some researchers recruit real
users (similar to traditional audits) to use an algorithmic system to analyze the outputs and detect
potential biases. This method, the “crowdsourced audit” [11], has been used by researchers to
examine personalization algorithms in Google search [44, 45] and e-commerce websites [46]. While
effective, it is difficult to implement at scale.
Cross-Platform Audits
The main goal of within-platform audits is to see if an algorithm behaves differently across some
categories of inputs when it should not (e.g., showing more arrest records for Black people or higher
prices for users in poor neighborhoods). But what if an algorithmic system biases all its inputs?
Detecting such biases is difficult with a within-platform audit. Auditing across platforms allows
the detection of bias that skews all inputs, by comparing outputs of an algorithmic system with the
outputs of other systems that have a similar intent.
However, while previous work compared different algorithmic systems’ outputs around the
same input, the goal was not to audit the algorithms. For example, Muddiman compared search
engines’ results for the 2008 U.S. presidential candidates to gain a holistic insight into how search
engines organize political information during campaigns, but not to detect potential biases in these
algorithmic systems. [47]). Recently, however, some journalists have started to use cross-platform
audit techniques to detect bias in algorithmic platforms. An example is finding that Fandango’s
rating algorithm skewed their movie ratings upwards in comparison to other movie rating platforms
[48]. Inspired by such journalistic investigations, In this dissertation, I use use a cross-platform
audit to investigate potential bias in online rating systems.
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2.1.4 Users’ Behavior around (Biased) Algorithms
Detecting an algorithm’s bias is the first step toward understanding its impacts. However,
detection alone is not enough. Understanding whether users are aware of algorithmic biases and
how they perform around such biases is important for perceiving the possible effects of algorithmic
bias not only on the platform but also on users’ experiences. In some cases, the significance of an
algorithm’s bias can be truly understood by analyzing users’ behavior around it. For example, the
“Up Next” YouTube algorithm that recommends additional videos appeared benign at first glance.
However, an incident catalyzed by the “Reply Girls”, highlighted how it could be biased. This group
of users speculated that this algorithm prioritized videos labeled replies to a video in the “Up Next”
list. By uploading sexually suggestive videos as replies to popular videos, they increased their view
number and, as a result, their ad sharing revenue. Many YouTube users began campaigning against
the “Reply Girls” via Youtube channels, and YouTube modified its algorithm to resolve this issue
[49]. This algorithmic bias, however, may not have been addressed if the audience did not detect it
and react against it.
While users’ understanding of an algorithmic system and its potential biases shape their behavior,
there is still little understanding about users’ behavior around biased or misleading algorithms.
In this dissertation, I seek to improve this understanding by analyzing how users understand and
manage the bias of two opaque algorithmic rating systems, and how adding transparency to a
potentially biased algorithm might change users’ behavior.
2.1.5 This Work
This dissertation extends the described line of work by detecting potential bias in two opaque
algorithmic systems and then understanding users’ behavior around these systems. While the
existing work mainly focuses on detecting and mitigating algorithmic biases, I go one step further
and try to understand how users actually behave and participate around opaque and potentially
biased algorithms. This understanding builds a foundation for the rest of this dissertation: it
informs the design practices I use to build a more transparent interaction between users and opaque
algorithmic systems.
Specifically, the work presented in Chapter 3 investigates users’ behavior around a black-boxed
hotel rating algorithm that skews low review scores upwards and gives low-to-medium quality
hotels a better image that they actually have. The findings show that users manually tried to increase
the visibility of the system, making other users aware of an opaque and biased rating algorithm. In
Chapter 4, I use this finding to explore where users see a need for increasing visibility of an opaque
algorithm, and how this visibility affects their attitudes towards the system.
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2.2 SEAMFUL DESIGN
After understanding users’ behavior around opaque algorithmic systems, and where they see
a need for visibility, in Chapter 4 & 5, I try to apply these findings as design guidelines to re-
design existing opaque algorithmic systems. As the first step, I started looking at the literature
about opacity in design in general. I found that algorithm opacity is not a new design artifact; in
fact, it has its roots in “seamlessness,” a general design practice in Human-Computer Interaction.
This practice imagines a successful interaction to be one where a user experiences “metaphoric
direct manipulation” [2] of something without any awareness of mediation. In seamless design,
“technology is hidden” [50] which is arguably an approved policy in the computing industry.
However, while seamlessness can sometimes indicate a successful design that provides users with
an effortless interaction with a system, some commentators have considered the logical opposite of it:
“seamful” designs that emphasize mechanism [51]. A seamful design makes system infrastructure
elements visible when the user actively chooses to understand or modify that system. Such design
emphasizes experience and reflection, inviting the user to explore and discover connections in
the system through manipulation, comparison, and feedback [52, 2]. Consider the case of 802.11
wireless networks: A seamless interface states that the building “has wireless,” gives all access
points the same name, and hides all details of their implementation – even hiding the access points
themselves above a drop ceiling. In contrast, a seamful interface would convey the patchwork of
wireless signals and access points while highlighting signal strength and the boundaries of different
networks.
The seamful approach helps users get the most out of the system and can help them understand
why it does not work in some cases [2]. Seamful design can transform perceived flaws into a
revelatory experience. Wikipedia, for example, can be criticized for its “bare-bones” aesthetic
that varies little from most wire-frames, but it can also be praised for making its functionality
visible and promoting user education about them, manifesting some of the principles of seamful
design. However, little research has established the benefits or effectiveness of seamful design in
algorithmic systems. In this dissertation, I describe the tools I have built that add seams to some
opaque algorithmic sociotechnical systems. I show that these seamful designs can help users to
have a more informed, yet engaging and satisfying interaction with a system.
2.2.1 Folk Theories
To evaluate the impacts of the seamful designs I built, I needed to examine users’ understanding
of an algorithmic system, with and without a seamful design. Because whether a system is opaque or
not, users still try to make sense of it by building theories about how the system works [53]. These
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theories, sometimes called “folk theories,” are those non-authoritative conceptions of the world that
develop among non-professionals and circulate informally. Technological systems exist in tension
with folk theories because designers try to reduce the uncertainty of their users by enrolling them
in a specific understanding of what the system is, and sometimes, how it works [54]. Although a
system’s documentation, advertising, aesthetics, and interface may strive to convey the producer’s
canonical view of a technological artifact [55], users also develop or acquire their own “folk” or
non-professional perspectives via first-hand experience and social interactions [53].
The theories developed by users may differ substantially from the institutionalized, professionally
legitimated conceptions held by experts and system designers. One definition of successful interface
design has been that an effective interface produces alignment between the conceptual model
held by a technology’s producer and its user [17, 56]. In contrast, more recent work assumes
that producers and users require fundamentally different conceptions of a system. In this view,
technologies should strive to provide a theory of the system that is useful, although not necessarily
aligned with “expert” views, and appropriate to the task at hand [57]. Interestingly, folk theories
that explicitly disagree with expert descriptions have been found to be superior to authoritative
knowledge in some circumstances [53, 58].
For example, in his studies of home heating thermostats, Kempton discovered two folk theories:
(1) The Feedback Theory, where the thermostat behaves as a sensor and a switch and turns on/off
to maintain a target temperature, and (2) The Valve Theory, where the thermostat controls a level
of heat flow (like a water valve in a sink). While technical experts consider the feedback theory
essentially correct, up to half of Kempton’s participants found the valve theory to be functional and
produced advantages. Folk theories have been studied in a wide spectrum of areas. Here, I highlight
sample cases below that investigate reasoning about the invisible, using a) sketching and b) analogy.
• Sketching: To uncover underlying perceptual features in urban space, Lynch, an urban
planner, asked local participants to draw a map or sketch of a space for a foreigner. He
discovered that these often fragmented mental maps revealed participants’ personal histories
and socio-economic conditions of the space. His findings are at the core of good urban design
[19].
Poole et al. asked users to sketch the layout of their home computer network and an ideal
network and confirmed that people, even some experts, lack the mental models or theories
to easily manage their home networks [59]. The authors suggested the use of shared visual-
izations across stakeholders of a system, a tactic that highlights the potential utility of the
present study. In a related study, Friedman et al. investigated conceptions of Web security,
finding that the theories of the more expert participants were no more reliable than those of
anyone else [60]. Friedman et al. also conclude that new visualizations are critical to make
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sense of network security.
• Analogy: A wide range of prior studies demonstrated when moving from familiar to unfamiliar
domains, analogies from the familiar often help people structure the unfamiliar [61]. Poole et
al. elicited folk theories from people that were unfamiliar with Radio Frequency Identification
(RFID) technology [62]. One folk theory suggested that RFID might work in a way analogous
to Global Positioning Systems (GPS), such that satellites would continuously track RFID tags.
These folk theories could be barriers to adoption; in this case, because participants feared
being tracked by the government.
Users also use analogy to make sense of social media feeds. For example, Gillespie argued in
Culture Digitally that people develop expectations about feeds by analogizing them to older
media and information systems such as “the telephone network” vs. “the newspaper editor”
[63]. In another study, people were found to conceptualize the overall goal of Facebook News
Feed in very distinct ways, some seeing analogies to paparazzi, others to personal shoppers
or even spies [64].
Theories of Algorithm Operation
While many philosophers provide processes for reflecting and seeking truth in the intangible
physical and metaphysical (e.g., physics, religion) [65, 66, 67], here I focus more specifically on
explorations of black-boxed algorithmic systems. While the operation of algorithms in sociotechni-
cal systems is typically opaque to users, users often develop and sometimes share theories about
how these curation algorithms work in order to plan their behavior. Engineers who design computer
systems may not find a user’s folk theory to match their own understanding of a system, but a folk
theory can affect users’ behavior [53] and even shape the evolution of the system as a whole [57]. x
For example, coming back to the “Reply Girls” example on Youtube, in 2012 there was speculation
within YouTube’s user community that YouTube’s “Up Next” recommendation algorithm gave
significant weight to uploaded videos that were flagged as a “reply” made to another video. A
group that became known as “Reply Girls,” acted on this theory and uploaded irrelevant videos
with sexually suggestive thumbnails, then flagged them as replies to popular videos. Although
the internal operation of YouTube’s recommendation algorithm was never known by the users,
the Reply Girls identified this flag as the reason they earned more clicks and upwards of tens of
thousands of dollars in ad sharing revenue. Many YouTube users participated in campaigns against
the “Reply Girls,” and YouTube reportedly “tweaked” its algorithm to dissuade such behavior [49].
In other examples, Bernstein et al. explored Facebook users’ imagined audience [22], discovering
that people used information in the interface such as friend count, likes, and comments to develop
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folk theories to estimate the relationship between these indicators and the size of their audience.
Users underestimated their audience by a multiple of four. Burke et al. discuss how feedback and
distribution on feeds affected newcomers contributions; a newcomer who received a comment on a
photo was more likely to contribute more photos [68]. Hogan further emphasizes the importance of
understanding mediated relationships in feeds to better participate in them [69].
While this line of work addresses the importance of users’ folk theories in shaping their behavior,
little is known about whether and how providing seams into an opaque algorithmic system would
affect the folk theories users create and use. In this dissertation, I fill this gap by uncovering and
codifying folk theories of opaque algorithms when a seamful design adds visibility into them.
2.2.2 This Work
This dissertation takes a new step in the (admittedly short) line of work on “seamfulness:” it
builds seamful designs around opaque algorithmic systems and evaluates how adding visibility into
the presence of opaque algorithms affects users’ attitudes towards and interaction with the system.
Specifically, the design presented in Chapter 4, ReVeal, discloses the presence of the Yelp review
filtering algorithm to users, resulting in changing users’ attitudes towards the system: some stated
that they would write for the algorithm to make sure their reviews would not be filtered in the future.
Others, however, argued that they would leave the system due to the lack of transparency about the
presence of a filtering at work. In Chapter 5, I take a further step in evaluating seamful design in
opaque algorithmic systems: I present FeedVis, a tool that adds visibility into Facebook News Feed
curation algorithm by showing users the difference between their News Feeds when they have been
curated by the algorithm and when they have not. I study users’ reactions to this disclosure, and
how their behavior might change in long term. ReVeal and FeedVis are first applications I know of
to put the presence of an opaque algorithm at the heart of their design.
In this dissertation, I also extend the existing work on “folk theories” in two ways. First, in
Chapter 4, I extract users’ folk theories about how an opaque algorithm works to understand how
these theories might affect users’ behavior. Then, in Chapter 6, I fill the gaps in the interplay
between seamful design and folk theories by investigating users’ folk theories about an opaque
algorithm before, during, and after being exposed to a seamful design.
2.3 ALGORITHM TRANSPARENCY
In the last piece of my dissertation, I go beyond adding transparency into opaque algorithms’
existence, and investigate the impacts of adding transparency into algorithms’ operation. In this
section, I review the literature about algorithm transparency, its challenges and types.
15
During recent years, the opacity of algorithmic sociotechnical systems, along with their power in
shaping users’ experiences, have resulted in calls from researchers, activists, and even governments
for “process communication” to satisfy a user’s “right to explanation” of hidden computation that
affects them [6, 1, 70, 71, 72, 35, 36]. Designs and recommendations have been developed to reveal
the power of algorithms to predict people’s interests and to affect their online life [73, 74]. For
example, designers at Ubisoft, a video game company, recently offered personalized inferences that
can be made from Facebook profiles as a promotional device for a surveillance-themed game [75].
Communicating more information about an algorithmic process can improve interaction. For
example, recommender systems incorporating explanations produced more user acceptance of,
confidence in and trust in recommendations than those without explanations [76, 77, 78, 79]. But
explanations come in different forms, from justifying the motivations behind a system without
disclosing how the algorithmic decision is made to detailing the steps an algorithm takes to produce
a recommendation [80]. Increased process communication has also been recommended for social
matching systems [81], team formation tools [82], and algorithmic journalism [83] to build informed
and trustworthy interactions between users and systems.
Transparency in algorithmic systems comes in different forms, such as visual cues and expla-
nations, with the goal of adding visibility to who made a decision and how. The who mechanism
reveals that who is the operator (human, algorithm, or maybe both) that makes a decision while the
how mechanism assumes that users already are aware of who made a decision, and focuses on the
operation, i.e., how the decision was made . Below, I review the literature on adding transparency
into who makes a decision and how the decision is made and explain how my work adds to this
growing literature.
2.3.1 Transparency about Who (The Operator)
Adding transparency into who makes a decision in algorithmic systems is currently considered
critical, particularly when it is not clear to users if they are consuming algorithmic output. In
addition to making the operator of a decision transparent, previous work sometimes adds “why”
(also known as “black-box”) explanations as well to justify the motivations behind the presence of
an algorithm as an operator, even though there is still no explanation about the algorithm’s operation
in particular [80, 84].
In a series of studies, researchers conducted controlled experiments to understand how revealing
humans or algorithms as decision-makers in a system changes users’ perceptions of a decision. For
example, Lee found that with tasks that require mechanical skills, users perceived algorithmic and
human-made decisions as equally fair and trustworthy, and with similar emotions. In human-based
tasks, on the other hand, users perceived algorithmic decisions less fair and trustworthy with more
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negative emotions than human decisions [85]. Jakesch et al. compared users’ trust when they are
told that an Airbnb host’s profile is written by an algorithm or a human [86]. The results showed
that users trusted profiles that were revealed to be written by a human or an algorithm equally.
However, when users were exposed to a mixed set of algorithmic- and human-written profiles
without knowing which was which, they trusted those profiles that they thought might be written
by an algorithm less. In another study, however, researchers found that lay users generally accept
algorithmic decisions more than human decisions [87]. To understand these sets of mixed findings
better, in this dissertation, I evaluate conditions where humans and algorithms work together to
make a decision, in addition to conditions where only algorithms or humans are the decision-makers.
2.3.2 Transparency about How (The Operation)
Adding transparency into an algorithm’s operation, or adding “How” (“white-box”) explanations
[80], is usually a more complex and challenging process than adding transparency into who made
a decision. This is due to the difficulty of explaining complicated algorithmic processes in a
non-technical way to regular users, especially when even the developers of an algorithmic system
sometimes cannot explain its operation. In an early work, Gregor and Benbasat studied challenges
and benefits of adding explanations to intelligent systems, arguing that the design of an explanation
to provide users with the right level of information matters a great deal [88]. Following this argument,
during recent years, there has been a growing line of work on designing transparency mechanisms
for algorithms’ operations and evaluating their impacts. Recommender systems, for example, are
some of the earliest systems for which researchers have studied the impacts of increased algorithmic
transparency. Studies have evaluated various aspects of an explanation (such as information types,
soundness, and completeness) on users’ perceptions, showing that well-designed explanations can
increase users’ trust in and acceptance of a recommendation [76, 77, 78, 89]. In social media,
increased transparency about how the Facebook News Feed curation algorithm works increased
users’ understanding of the reasons they see the stories they do in their News Feeds [84]. Kizilcec
evaluated students’ trust in a grading algorithm with different levels of transparency, and showed
that too much or too little transparency both ruined users’ trust in the system [90].
2.3.3 The Complexity of Transparency
While beneficial, algorithmic transparency is not straightforward [91, 92]. Explaining a complex
algorithm’s behavior accurately, comprehensively, and briefly in a non-technical way is challenging
[1]. Even in cases where it is easy to provide users with an interpretable explanation about an
algorithmic curation process, providing explanations is not an unmitigated good. For example,
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providing students with too much or too little information about a grading algorithm both diminished
students’ trust in the grading system [90]: providing students with high transparency (i.e. revealing
the existence of a grading algorithm, along with students’ raw grades) was as harmful as providing
students with low transparency (no information about the existence of a grading algorithm). Both
conditions confused students, violated their expectation of the system’s outputs, and therefore,
eroded their trust in the system. In addition, too much transparency can disclose trade secrets or
provide gaming opportunities for malicious users. For example, Yelp argues that the opacity of its
review filtering algorithm is a design choice aimed to prevent malicious gaming [93]. Thus, while
potentially helpful, adding transparency to opaque algorithmic systems requires finding the right
level of transparency.
More cynically, explanations may not be intended to explain. “Explanations” of ranking and
scoring systems in finance have historically been designed to obscure the actual operation of the
algorithm (e.g., credit scores) [23]. Internet platforms implement some functionality as a signal
to regulators and critics, offering the minimum required to forestall further action [94]. These
transparency features are more useful to forestall regulators than to help the users whose data is
collected: the US data brokerage industry’s transparency applications (e.g., “About the Data”)
may be one example [92]. Online content platforms, as intermediaries between advertisers and
audiences, may not wish to explain their personalization algorithms to users because they need to
avoid explaining them to advertisers [95], potentially because they do not work well [96].
2.3.4 This Work
This dissertation makes new contributions to this line of literature about algorithmic transparency,
primarily in Chapter 7 and 8. In Chapter 7, I evaluate the existing transparency mechanisms in
online advertising, and show that interpretability, creepiness, and linkage to identity are the main
factors impacting users’ evaluation of an ad explanation. This adds to the existing literature about
users’ evaluation of transparency mechanisms that have been provided from a third-party like
researchers and activists, not the advertiser itself. I also provide an opportunity for users to design
their desired level of transparency for an ad explanation, which is beyond what the current literature
does (i.e. asking users to evaluate some already designed ad transparency mechanism). The results
show that for having a satisfactory ad explanation, users do not need full transparency, but just
enough transparency. This adds to the transparency literature, showing that full transparency is not
necessarily desired for users.
While this line of research has investigated different aspects of transparency about how an
algorithmic decision is made, little is still known about the impacts of different levels of detail
in algorithmic transparency on users’ perceptions, when users and the algorithm do not agree. In
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Chapter 8, I take a step towards addressing this gap by evaluating the impacts of four levels of
transparency, from no explanation to a fully transparent explanation about how a review filtering
algorithm made a decision, on users’ perceptions of the decision.
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CHAPTER 3: USER BEHAVIOR AROUND OPAQUE ALGORITHMS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Rating algorithms are one of the algorithmic systems that their outputs — i.e., business ratings
based on online reviews — significantly impact users’ behavior and accordingly the success of a
business. A simple half-star improvement on a Yelp rating, for instance, results in a 30-49% higher
likelihood of selling out the seats for a restaurant [97].
While rating algorithms are influential, little about how they work is made public. These
algorithms’ internal processes, and sometimes their inputs, are usually housed in black boxes, both
to protect intellectual property and to prevent reviewers from gaming business ratings. Computing
a raw average of users’ reviews is a simple way to calculate a business rating; however, many
rating platforms do not use this approach. Amazon, for instance, calculates a product’s overall
rating by taking into account factors including the age of the review, helpfulness votes and whether
the reviews are from verified purchases [98]. Some other platforms, like Yelp [99], calculate a
business rating by computing a raw average of customer reviews, but only of reviews that their
rating algorithms classify as authentic or “not fake.” While we understand the overview of these
algorithms, their details are proprietary.
The power and opaqueness of algorithmic rating systems have raised concerns about the bias they
might introduce into online ratings. As an example, in May 2016, Australian Uber drivers accused
the company of slowly decreasing their ratings to suspend them and then charge higher commissions
to be reinstated. The president of the Ride Share Drivers’ Association of Australia noted that “the
lack of transparency makes it entirely possible for Uber to manipulate the ratings” [32]. Other
algorithmic rating systems such as Yelp [100] and Fandago [48] have faced similar criticisms, as
have other algorithmic systems including search engines [44, 45, 38], online advertising [28, 39]
and e-commerce websites [46]. These issues have given rise to a growing area of research, designing
algorithms audits, that aims to detect algorithmic systems’ potential biases [11].
Detecting the existence of bias in an algorithmic system, however, is not sufficient to understand
its impact on users. An important factor in discovering the effects of an unjust or biased algorithm
is understanding users’ awareness of and behavior around it. However, how users perceive and
manage the bias that an algorithm brings to their online experience is an open question.
In this chapter, I seek to fill these gaps by investigating algorithmic bias and users’ awareness of
and behavior around the bias in hotel rating platforms. An initial study suggested that a potential
bias on a hotel rating platform (Booking.com) skewed low review scores upwards. To analyze
this potential bias, I used a cross-platform audit technique comparing the outputs of Booking.com
20
and two other popular hotel rating platforms. Analyzing the ratings of 803 hotels showed that
Booking.com’s rating system biased ratings of hotels, particularly low-to-medium quality hotels, to
be significantly higher than other platforms (up to 37%).
I employed a mixed-method design to study users’ behavior around this bias. First, I applied a
computational technique to identify the users who noticed the bias; next, I conducted qualitative
analysis over their reviews to understand how users behaved around the bias. I found 162 users who
independently discovered the algorithm’s bias through their regular use. These users, rather than
contributing the usual review content (i.e., informing other users about their hotel stay experience),
adopted an “auditing” practice. When confronted by a higher than intended review score, they used
their review to raise the bias awareness of other users on the site. To do so, they wrote about how
they: a) engaged in activities such as trying to manipulate the algorithm’s inputs to look into its
black-box, b) tried to correct the bias manually, and c) illustrated a breakdown of trust.
While the work I present in this chapter focuses on rating algorithms, I are more broadly
concerned with the role of algorithmic bias and users’ behavior around it in non-transparent
algorithmic systems in general. I conclude with connections to both theory and design. I discuss
how bias awareness can shift users’ attention from their own experience to the system as a whole;
this suggests the possibility of users collaborating to bring an algorithmic bias to the surface via a
“collective audit.” I also explore design approaches that bring actionable transparency to algorithmic
systems, building a more trustworthy and engaging interaction between users and the system.
3.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Booking.com is one rating platform that my initial study suggested is biased in its rating algorithm.
When rating a hotel on Booking.com, users cannot provide an overall score, but instead are asked to
rate different criteria such as location and staff. The rating algorithm then calculates an aggregate
review score for the user [101]. However, while Booking.com’s overall review interface suggests a
lowest possible score of 1, the lowest possible output of the scoring algorithm is a 2.5 (Figure 3.1).
That is, even if a user rates all the criteria of a hotel at the lowest value, the aggregate rating returned
by the algorithm is a 2.5. To understand how much bias this discrepancy introduces to hotels’
overall ratings and how users behave around it, I ask the following research questions:
RQ1: How much bias does Booking.com’s algorithmic rating system introduce to businesses’
ratings?
RQ2: Are users aware of the bias of Booking.com’s algorithmic rating system? If so, how?
RQ3: How do users perceive and manage the bias that Booking.com’s algorithmic rating system




Figure 3.1: (a) Booking.com’s user rating entry interface. With the lowest possible rating for each
criterion, the resulting aggregate rating is 2.5. (b) The distribution of ratings. The lowest bin
suggests the lowest rating is a value of 1.
3.3 BIAS DETECTION AND QUANTIFICATION (RQ1)
To understand whether and how the inflation of the lowest possible review score on Booking.com
introduces bias to overall hotel ratings1, I employed a cross-platform audit technique. Since inflating
the minimum scores might be a result of an inflation of all inputs, using a cross-platform rather than
1Booking.com calls the scores of users’ reviews a “review score” and the score of a hotel a “rating.”
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Table 3.1: Analyzing the difference of ratings between Booking.com and other rating platforms via
one-sample t-test
Rating Ratings Difference% t-value p-value Effect size M SD
<7 Booking vs Expedia 16.26 <0.0001 1.4 27.23 19.46Booking vs Hotels 21.12 <0.0001 1.81 37.07 20.39
≥ 7 Booking vs Expedia 16.26 <0.0001 0.62 4.11 6.53Booking vs Hotels 19.69 <0.0001 0.76 5.67 7.45
within-platform audit is necessary (as there would otherwise be no ground-truth for comparison). A
cross-platform audit requires specific hotel’s reviews and ratings from different platforms. Many
websites aggregate hotel deals from travel websites; such sites, which refer to themselves as hotel
metasearch engines, search several hotel booking websites to help users compare hotels across them.
One metasearch engine, HotelsCombined.com, provides direct links to hotels’ profiles, including
their reviews and ratings from different hotel rating platforms. This site served as the data source
for the study.
I collected hotel information from HotelsCombined.com for every hotel in ten random cities in
the U.S.2, leading to an initial set of 1576 hotels. I excluded any hotels that had not been rated on
Booking.com and two other hotel rating platforms— Expedia.com and Hotels.com — which are
among the top 10 most-used hotel booking websites3. The final corpus contained 803 hotels that
were rated on all three hotel rating platforms. As the scales of rating platforms differ, I mapped all
values to the same range (maintaining the ratio) for comparison.
3.3.1 Augmented Hotel Ratings
An ANOVA analysis showed a statistically significant difference between hotel ratings in the
three hotel rating platforms (F(2,2406) = 39.9, p < 0.0001). To discover which rating platforms
were significantly different, I used a Tukey post hoc test. It revealed that Booking.com’s hotel
ratings were significantly different from ratings of both Expedia.com (p < 0.01) and Hotels.com
(p < 0.01). There was, however, no statistically significant difference between the ratings of
Expedia.com and Hotels.com (p = 0.07).
Figure 3.2 shows the ratings on Booking.com and the other platforms. Hotels with a rating
lower than 7 (low-to-medium quality hotels that Booking.com considers below “good”) show larger
differences across platforms. To better understand this difference, I ran separate analyses on the
lower and higher quality hotels. Higher quality hotels were those with ratings above 7; lower quality
hotels were all remaining hotels. For each pair of significantly different platforms (Boooking.com
2The cities were chosen using the “randomlists” website, https://www.randomlists.com/random-us-cities
3http://www.toptenreviews.com/services/home/best-hotel-booking-services/
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Figure 3.2: A comparison of hotel ratings between Booking.com and other hotel rating platforms.
and Expedia.com, Booking.com and Hotels.com), I measured the percentage difference of each
hotel’s rating. For example, if a hotel was rated 4.5 on Booking and 4 on Expedia.com, the
difference measure would be 12.5%. A one-sample t-test on each group found that the difference
between Booking.com and each of the other platforms is significant, with a mean difference (M)
of up to 37% for lower quality hotels and around 5% for higher quality hotels, with large effect
sizes (Table 3.1). These results indicate that Booking.com’s rating system biased ratings of hotels
higher than the other platforms in general. In doing so, Booking.com benefits hotels, particularly
low-to-medium quality hotels.
I note that a cross-platform audit technique cannot distinguish whether a bias in the outputs of an
algorithmic system arises from its inputs, the algorithm itself, or both. For example, Booking.com,
Expedia.com, and Hotels.com each have their own audience, interface design (e.g., 5- vs 10-
star rating scales) which can impact the inputs to their rating algorithms. Given these inherent
differences between rating systems, I cannot claim the bias in Booking.com rating is only a result of
its algorithm. I term this bias an “algorithmic system bias” rather than an “algorithm bias” because
other elements of the Booking.com algorithmic rating system such as its inputs and users might
play a role in creating this bias.
However, even without identifying the source of this bias, detecting it is important because of its
impact. On aggregator systems such as HotelsCombined.com, users see different rating systems’
outputs on the same page. They may assume that a 5.0 on one site is comparable to a 5.0 on another
because of this presentation. But they do not see the original inputs or algorithms used in the
respective sites. So even though I cannot determine whether it is Booking.com’s rating algorithm
alone or also input differences (e.g., the different users across each platform, different timestamps
for the reviews) causing the bias, knowing that a bias exists may serve as a signal to users and help
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inform their interactions.
3.4 BIAS AWARENESS (RQ2)
Rating platforms are designed for users to rate a third-party business; for example, Google’s
app store allows users to write reviews for applications to provide feedback about an app’s issues.
Researchers have used these types of reviews to detect usability issues in a system [102]. In this
vein, I investigate whether users in a biased system use reviews intended for third-parties to review
the system itself; i.e. whether Booking.com’s users use reviews that are supposed to be about hotels
to instead review Booking.com itself.
To understand whether there were users who were aware of Booking.com’s rating bias and who
mentioned it in their reviews, I studied user reviews from the hotels collected in the previous step.
One possible method for becoming aware of a bias was to note the unintended aggregate 2.5 score
when a 1 was expected. I, therefore, focused on reviews with a score of 2.5. Of 100 random reviews
with a 2.5 score, eight articulated the bias to the community in their review; the reviewers described
their negative hotel stay experience along with an explanation for why they suspected their review
score was not the lowest possible score: “Disgusting, roaches, uncomfortable beds[;] review needs
to be less then[sic] 2.5 stars but [the system] won’t let me” (R66).
This finding inspired an expansion to study more reviews, including those with higher scores.
However, the list of every Booking.com review ever written is quite long. To direct my investigation,
I developed a method inspired by bootstrapping methods that start from one seed and then expand.
I first extracted the three most common keywords (“2.5”, “lowest”, and “score”) found in the
initial set of 2.5 rated reviews. I then searched for these keywords altogether using Google search
(specifying a Booking.com search domain). I devised a coding scheme to describe which reviewers
discovered the bias. With this code, a reviewer was labeled as aware of the bias if they articulated i)
a discrepancy between their intended review score and what the system calculated and/or ii) the
observation that 2.5 is the lowest possible score on Booking.com.
Manually reading the top 200 search results, I identified reviewers with reviews that my code
labeled as aware. I added these reviews to the set of reviews and repeated this process, extracting
the three most common keywords from the new review set, searching for reviews that contained
these keywords on Booking.com and coding the results. After ten iterations and over 2000 reviews,
I found 162 reviewers who discussed the rating bias in their reviews. But how did these reviewers
become aware of the bias?
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3.4.1 Becoming Aware
For all of the 162 reviewers who discussed a bias in their reviews, a review score that did not
match their stay experience was a prompt to discover the bias. For example, their reviews contained
statements such as “[the] overall score DOES NOT accurately reflect my opinion of this hotel”
(R96). Reviewers usually had a roughly pre-determined score in their mind to assign to their hotel
stay.
Reviewers with a score of 2.5 (n=111) wrote that they had aimed for the lowest possible score
for a hotel as they “liked absolutely nothing about this accommodation” (R5). They assigned the
minimum subscore to each evaluation criteria and expected a standard minimum final score (1 or 0)
that never appeared. This mismatch led them to suggest the rating bias: “I rated this motel at 0, but
the review program enters 2.5 as the low limit, so be careful; things can be worse than they appear”
(R98).
Reviewers with higher scores than 2.5 (n=51), up to 8.8, also found the calculated score did not
match their desired score: “Although the above rating indicates a 3.8, I would personally rate it
about a 1.5 ” (R55). My initial hypothesis was that these reviewers had previously written 2.5-score
reviews while expecting a lower score, discovered the bias, and reflected their finding in their
next review(s). However, more than half of these users had only written one review with a score
higher than 2.5 and still discovered the bias. These reviewers realized that “the way [their] score is
calculated doesn’t give a good idea of the overall notation” (R93).
3.5 BEHAVING AROUND THE BIAS (RQ3)
To understand users’ behavior around the bias once they were aware of it, I analyzed users’
reviews using an inductive, iterative process via line-by-line open coding. First, I read all the
reviews several times, before labeling each review with preliminary codes to help organize our
initial insights. These codes included a set of primary themes such as announcing a mismatched
review score, manipulating the algorithm, or asking for a change in the rating system.
Second, I analyzed the codes themselves to find similarities, grouping them into categories based
on common properties. I arrived at three main themes. The first theme revolves around users’
attempts to understand how the algorithm works. The second focuses on users’ efforts to correct the
bias. The third addresses the breakdown of trust between users and the system as a whole due to the
bias.
Last, I conducted axial coding, analyzing the interrelationships among the themes that I had
identified. I found a common theme in all three: raising awareness through situated actions. Users
changed their usual practices around the reviews — instead of only informing other users about their
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hotel stay experience, they sought to raise other users’ awareness of the rating bias. This change
of action resonates with Suchman’s idea of “situated action” in which users adjust their behavior
depending on what is actually happening in an interaction with a system in a specific situation [103].
I describe the three main themes and how the practice of raising awareness is embedded in each
below.
3.5.1 Looking into the Black Box
The algorithm by Booking.com seems to be biased in the high direction. (R55)
Reviewers became confused when confronted by a higher than intended review score. They were
“not sure how booking.com came up with the score” (R114), expressing that the “rating calculated
by this site is confusing based on [their] feedback” (R148). While the uncertainty resulting from
mismatched review scores confused some reviewers, it also prompted some (n=67) to further reflect
on the way Booking.com calculated their review score.
Users tried to make inferences about the review ratings, discovering that “some algorithm they
have on this site is giving them [hotels] a rating better than 0” (R54). They highlighted the
calculated nature of the ratings, stating that their review score “was automatically calculated by
booking.com” (R146) and was not given by themselves directly: “This score is automatically
calculated and even with the most unhappy face gives it a 2.5” (R160).
To understand how the rating algorithm calculated their review scores, users attempted to prod
the algorithm by entering different subscores for each evaluation criteria — the inputs of the rating
algorithm:
I looked at what score your “algorithm” comes up [with] if I give the lowest grade on
all fronts and it still comes out with a 2.5 instead of zero! So I guess your range is from
2.5 to 10, instead of 0 to 10. Nice! (R38)
Through these experiments with the algorithm inputs, some hypothesized that the algorithm not
only inflates the lowest review scores to 2.5, but also skews higher scores upwards: Booking.com’s
lowest score possible is 2.5, not 0. (So while it says 5/10, we’re really aiming at a 2.5/10) (R27).
These explanations match our results in RQ1, where I found that Booking.com biases the businesses
ratings higher in general when compared to other hotel rating platforms.
In “The Relevance of Algorithms,” Gillespie calls such user practices to reverse-engineer an
algorithm “backstage access” [70]. Although algorithms in sociotechnical systems are usually
hidden in black boxes, users sometimes try to make sense of them. They attempt to prod an
algorithm by changing its inputs and affect its outputs for their own benefit. For example, teenagers
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add product names to their Facebook stories in the hope of getting more visibility from the News
Feed curation algorithm [104].
Our study, however, points to a more complex story: users might attempt to prod an algorithm
and understand how it works for reasons that are beyond their own benefit. Confronted by a bias in
their review score, reviewers tried to understand how the rating algorithm works. They, however,
did not do this solely for personal knowledge; they aimed to to make others aware of the bias as
well.
From Uncertainty to Awareness Raising
After probing how the rating algorithm worked, many reviewers used their review as an oppor-
tunity to share their understanding of the algorithm with others. Not only did they seek to share
their knowledge about how the algorithm works, they wanted to warn other users about the existing
rating bias on Booking.com, and help them make more informed decisions when looking for a hotel.
Therefore, reviewers began by asking others to “take note that 2.5 is the absolute minimum you
can score a hotel” (R15). They then used their inferences about the algorithm to suggest that other
users not only “ignore the 2.5 score” (R20) but also “ignore the ratings” (R109) altogether. Telling
readers to “be forewarned” (R58) was a common theme via warnings like “Pay no attention to the
score: the worst is 2.5 thus scores don’t help” (R25) or “Don’t be fooled by the ratings” (R27). As
a result, reviewers urged other users to refer to the text of the reviews rather than their ratings to
learn about the reviewers’ true stay experience:
PLEASE READ THESE COMMENTS - I AM MAKING IT IN THE INTEREST OF
FUTURE GUESTS. The rating as calculated by Booking.com does not do justice to our
experience. (R150)
These results show that users’ confusion and uncertainty about their review scores triggered an
innovative use of the system: prodding the algorithm to understand its functionality and changing
the usual use of a review to reflect it. Reviewers used their review content to raise awareness among
other users about a rating bias in the system rather than only sharing their hotel stay experience.
3.5.2 Righting a Wrong
This survey calculated its own rating; I would rate it 1.0. (R40)
Understanding the bias and making other users aware of it was not the only action reviewers took
when confronted by their biased review score. Over half of the reviewers (n=95) tried to correct the
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bias. Believing that their review score is “very exaggerated” (R60) and “far too kind” (R50) for
their stay experience, many users disclaimed their score: “I don’t know how it calculated a 2.5 but
that’s not my rating!” (R139). They tried to change their review score by announcing their “true
rating” (R71) in their review text; whether their calculated score was 2.5: “Definitely not a 2.5
score. 1 would be my true score” (R119), or higher: “My rating, as added up by Booking.com of 8.8
is more like a 7 in reality” (R140). Some asked others to consider their corrected score rather than
the one the algorithm calculated: “For some reason the lowest score I can give them on booking is
2.5. But don’t get me wrong, this is not even a 1 out of ten” (R28).
Users’ attempts to correct the rating bias via their review text correspond closely with “impro-
visation theory,” where an unmet system requirement triggers users to improvise, making ad hoc
adjustments to their system use to achieve their goal [105]. Here, users’ improvisation was a “repair”
activity. Past work has studied the value of repair in technology reuse and the fixing of broken
machines through users’ creative and improvisational work [106, 107]. Our findings point to a
broader story: as users try to repair broken devices, they might also try to repair a broken algorithm.
And in doing so, they exhibit improvisational and innovative work by changing their review text to
reflect their real review score.
Manipulating the Algorithm
Users’ “repairs” of the biased system did not stop at changing their review texts. A few reviewers
aimed to fix the calculated review score itself. To do so, they manipulated the evaluation criteria
subscores they had previously assigned to force the algorithm to calculate a final review score closer
to their desired score:
After the auto-calculated review score (it runs from 2.5-10, NOT 1-10, so a below
average shows up as a 5 rating), I altered my ratings on the staff to show what the
overall score should be. (R152).
Although this manipulation might misrepresent a reviewer’s opinion about a specific criterion, it
did not stop them from changing their subscores. Their desire to match the overall review score
with their stay was stronger than their desire to match each subscore. Reviewers lowered the criteria
ratings until they were satisfied with the final score:
I had given the hotel the lowest score to customer service and pretty high scores to most
other things as the hotel indeed looks very nice and it’s clean. But [...] this hotel stay
deserved a 3 not an 8 which the algorithm’ had automatically calculated on the back of
my responses and doesn’t allow me to amend. I amended other responses accordingly
to reach the 3 the hotel deserved. (R38)
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Prior work showed users might manipulate an algorithm’s inputs to create workarounds and
maintain control over systems such as ride-sharing services [108] . In this study, however, users do
not create workarounds only for self-concerned reasons, but also to correct a bias to help others.
3.5.3 Trust Breakdown
I will never trust your rating again. (R82)
Algorithms are “stabilizers of trust” [109]: they are supposed to be objective and free of inten-
tional bias. But if they are not, how would that affect users’ behavior? Confronted by a biased
rating, some reviewers (n=26) argued that Booking.com “is misleading [the] public” (R9). This
belief resulted in a mistrust of the platform. Users stated that giving a hotel a score of 2.5 when
they rated every evaluation criteria at its lowest would misguide other readers:
How [are] you calculating the ratings as 2.5 when I rated every option at the lowest.
2.5 is giving them a plug for someone to stay there. STAY AWAY (R73)
Mistrust of the platform led users to call it “a con” (R2) and a “SCAM!!!” (R6), and warn others
that “the rating by booking.com is rigged” (R30). They announced their own mistrust, but also
suggested others “NOT TRUST THE CUSTOMER RATINGS ON THIS SITE” (R152).
Lack of Agency
In reviews questioning the algorithm, users rhetorically asked questions like “Is it possible to
create a score lower than 2.5?” (R59) and “Don’t know what you would have to say to get a 0?”
(R119). Many reviewers tried to achieve lower scores than 2.5, but could not: “I would give a lower
rating if I could, but this review will not allow anything below 2.5” (R128). Their lack of “control
of the overall review score calculator” (R96) made them “VERY UNHAPPY” (R74). They “don’t
like that booking.com [is] taking all [their] lowest score[s] possible and giving an overall rating of
2.5” (R29). The fact that the algorithm “forces” (R141) a score upon them even led one reviewer
not to leave any comment about their hotel stay, instead taking their whole review to question their
lack of control over their rating:
This review is rigged.[...] I am not commenting as the survey would not allow me to
rate the property. The survey already calculated my survey to 7.5 without providing me
the ability to input my rating or data. (R153)
Losing this sense of agency may result in dissatisfaction or even a breach of trust with the system;
particularly if this lack of control has been caused due to a bias, as these results demonstrate.
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Questioning the Algorithm, Asking for Change
Once their trust was broken, some reviewers challenged Booking.com to explain its algorithm:
Your review ratings make no sense. It seems the lower the client rating the higher you
rate yourself. A Complete fraud! You calculate my rating as 7.9 ? My personal opinion
is a maximum of 3 out of 10. Please explain. (R83)
These users questioned whether Booking.com’s ratings were of any use, if they are biased: “What
is the point of offering customers to leave reviews if you just inflate them yourself and clearly
are not interested in the feedback?” (R39). Some users even requested changes to the algorithm,
asking Booking.com to “gather correct information and post the truth rather than manipulated
ratings (R161). They asked Booking.com to “stop tricking people into” (R122) low quality hotels
by skewing their ratings:
“Booking.com needs to change the way they do their ratings!” I Want to know how
you at booking.com come up with your scores. Do you even read anything people say?
Maybe two people said anything a little nice about this place but I think they were
being sarcastic....Maybe people should start rating you guys! (R104)
Stating a Departure from the Platform
A few reviewers experienced a breach of trust with the whole platform, not only its rating system.
Announcing their dissatisfaction with the ratings and asking for explanation and change in the
algorithm was not enough. These users stated that they would not use the platform again: I put
the lowest rating possible for this hotel, and booking.com is still giving them a 2.5 rating. I won’t
use this website again (R134). Another wrote, “I don’t know if I’d use this service again. For
instance, I rated everything super sad face except location. Which I rated sad face and booking.com
‘calculated’ my rating at 2.9” (R162). While I do not know if these reviewers stopped using
Booking.com, these statements, though extreme, are indicative of the serious effects a biased
algorithm can have on the interaction of user and system. When a user finds bias in a part of a
platform, she might judge the whole, perhaps even leaving it entirely.
3.6 LIMITATIONS
While my method of searching for users who mentioned the rating bias in their review was able
to detect many, it did not detect them all. However, this was not my goal. I aimed to understand
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whether there were users who were aware of the bias and if so, how they behaved around the bias.
In addition, I only analyzed behavior of users who reflected the bias in their review, and not those
who became aware of the bias but did not mention it in their review. As a result, I cannot comment
on the number of users who discovered the bias.
I explored users’ behavior at a specific time (when users were writing their reviews); I do not
know whether and how their behavior might change in the future (e.g., in their next use of the
system) as I did not have the means to contact these users. Booking.com user profiles are anonymous.
In this study, a fragment of the algorithm’s biased outcome was visible to the users via the Web
site interface. I investigated users’ behavior around this fragment. I look forward to extending this
analysis to investigate how users perceive and manage other types of biased algorithms whose bias
might not be discernible by users via the interface immediately.
3.7 DISCUSSION
3.7.1 From Bias Awareness to Situated Actions
Users usually have plans when they interact with a system; in a hotel rating platform, for instance,
a user might intend to compliment excellent hotel staff or to warn others away from a hotel they
disliked. Plans change, however, and are difficult to separate from the actions through which they
emerge [103]: seeing a biased score might lead users to revise their plans. In this study, I built on
this theory of situated actions to understand whether and how users orient their actions towards an
algorithm that might bias their intended review score. In doing so, users shifted their attention to
different aspects of their interaction with the system, depending on what they wished to change.
Focus on Own Experience
Some who were unsatisfied with their hotel stay and noticed that their review score did not
accurately reflect their experience focused their efforts on ensuring an accurate representation
of their hotel stay through the comment option, and not on assessing the rating system itself or
informing others about that rating system. To make others aware of how bad their hotel stay was,
for example, they noted that their rating was “way too high” (R43) and “this hotel’ doesn’t deserve
that rating or [their] money” (R124), but did not comment on where the bias might come from, or
how such bias might impact other ratings in the system. They mainly focused on correcting how
platform presented their own stay experience by informing others that their review score did not
reflect their hotel stay correctly.
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A Shift in Focus: From Own Experience to the System
Others, when encountering a system that did not afford them an opportunity to realize their plans,
turned their attention from their hotel stay experience to the system. These users, when confronted
by the rating bias, wanted to know how the algorithm worked and wanted to let others know as well.
In doing so, some generalized the bias they observed in their own review score to the whole system.
They inferred that the algorithm might bias all hotel ratings towards higher scores, suggesting that
others ignore the ratings or not trust the entire platform. Users’ shift in focus towards algorithms
can be used to discover bias or other unexpected outcomes of algorithmic systems, as I discuss
below.
3.7.2 Watchdog from within: Bringing Bias to the Surface
In using their reviews to inform others about rating bias on Booking.com, many reviewers em-
ployed an audit practice: they detected a bias and tried to publicize it. I foresee many opportunities
in designing for this practice as an explicit affordance of platforms wherein bias may unexpectedly
emerge, and perhaps even some advantages over other approaches to discovering such biases.
Existing algorithm audit techniques have usually been used by third-parties (such as researchers and
watchdog organizations) who are neither system designers nor regular users. Audits by third-parties
are limited by their lack of direct access to the algorithm at hand, but also by their perspective
from outside the actual performance and use of a particular interface in day-to-day experience, or
consistent exposure to the algorithm’s potential biases. An audit by users, however, looks for bias
from the viewpoint of regular use, perhaps increasing the likelihood of detecting bias, and certainly
leading to discovery and correction informed by embedded practice. This practice also uses the
platform itself to let other users know about the bias, which increases the likelihood that other users
will become aware as well.
These benefits call for use of “collective audit” practices in algorithmic systems. Previous work
suggested an audit technique in which users come together as volunteers to audit an algorithmic
system, in collaboration with researchers [11]. This technique, however, requires more than a
user’s day-to-day usage to detect bias; it requires users to test a system with different inputs and
collaborate with researchers. Similar approaches exist on external websites where users of travel
websites come together to understand how an algorithm might work4. Yet this practice needs a
second platform for users to join together and audit an algorithm. What if a platform could provide
users with affordances that they could use to detect and report an algorithmic bias via the platform
itself, particularly those biases that the systems designers did not anticipate themselves?
4http://biddingfortravel.yuku.com/
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This study illustrates that users can detect algorithmic bias during their regular usage of a system.
It also shows that they do want to inform others about it, if the platform allows. This suggests the
potential of “bias-aware design” to aggregate the power of many users and bring algorithm bias to
the surface. By bias-aware design, I mean design in which users are able to report algorithmic bias
if they notice it. At the simplest level, this can be an interface that allows users to report a bias (e.g.,
a bias-report button). Achieving a bias-aware design that utilizes the benefits of a collective audit
practice efficiently, however, remains for future work.
3.7.3 What’s Next? Adding “Seams” to the System
At first glance, removing an algorithm’s bias after detecting it may appear to be the simplest
solution. For example, Fandango, a movie rating website, corrected an algorithmic bug that rounded
up to a higher rating rather than to the nearest half star [48]. Flickr resolved its auto-tagging bias
(that labeled Black people with the tag “ape”) by manually removing those tags and using those
mistakes to improve their algorithm [7]. These solutions, however, are not always practical. What if
an algorithm’s bias comes from an inherent bias in input data? What if the bias did not result from a
simple software bug but rather from a complex interaction between thousands of parameters in an
algorithm?
These challenges call for alternative solutions to confront algorithmic opacity and bias. To find
alternative solutions, I looked back at users’ behavior around the opaque and biased rating algorithm
of Booking.com. When users were encountered with such an algorithm, they took different actions
from looking into the algorithm to trying to repair it and announcing their trust break down with the
system. Through all these actions, users used their reviews to add “seams,” visible hints disclosing
aspects of an automation operation, into the system manually in order to increase the visibility of
the algorithm and its potential impacts to other users. So, I asked when users see a need to add
seams to opaque algorithmic systems manually for the sake of a more informed interaction, why
we, as researchers, designers, and developers of algorithmic systems dont do so?
I argue that adding seams to an opaque algorithmic systems can actually benefit both users and
the systems they use. For users, increased visibility in some cases can make them aware of existing
biases in an algorithmic system, showing that algorithms are not always free of bias. This awareness
can help them to adjust their behavior. Making users aware of bias can benefit a system as well,
by building user trust in the system. On Booking.com, a part of users’ distrust comes from the
inconsistency between what the interface claims (1) and what the algorithm calculates (2.5) as
the lowest review score. Even if Booking.com’s business policy prevents modifying its lowest
score to 1, making this policy transparent (e.g. by highlighting the 2.5 limit for low scores in the
interface) may increase user trust in the system. Another option for increasing visibility is to provide
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opportunities for comparison between different algorithms’ outputs. For example, consider a design
in which a user is able to observe and compare a hotel’s rating across different online hotel rating
platforms (for example by providing the data I collected in the cross-platform audit technique). This
comparison might boost users’ understanding of algorithmic systems and their potential biases.
3.8 CONCLUSION
I used a cross-platform audit technique that analyzed online ratings of hundreds of hotels across
different hotel rating platforms and found that one site’s algorithmic rating system biased ratings,
particularly low-to-medium quality hotels, significantly higher than others (up to 37%). Analyzing
the reviews of users who independently discovered this bias showed that these users changed the
typical ways they used a review on a hotel rating platform to instead discuss the rating system itself
and raise other users’ awareness of the rating bias. This raising of awareness included practices like
efforts to reverse-engineer the rating algorithm, efforts to correct the bias, and demonstrations of
broken trust.
The major implication of these findings is that users see a need for increased visibility in opaque
algorithmic systems, and when there is no visibility, they try to increase it themselves by adding
“seams” manually to the system. This implication calls for increased transparency in opaque and
potentially biased algorithmic systems. However, it’s still not clear that where we need to add seams
in these systems to communicate opaque algorithmic process to users. In Chapter 4, I explore this
question by investigating users’ attitudes towards opacity of a potentially biased rating algorithm to
understand what part of the system users see the need for increased transparency.
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CHAPTER 4: WHERE TO ADD SEAMS?
After I presented the findings in Chapter 3, one question emerged: where do we need to add
seams in opaque algorithmic systems to provide users with a more informed interaction with the
system? This is a crucial question as algorithmic systems are usually too complex, and it’s important
to know which parts of these systems we want to make visible to users without overwhelming
their interaction with the system. In this chapter, I aim to answer this question by looking at the
stances users take towards an opaque and potentially biased rating algorithmic system and where
they usually see a need for transparency. I use the findings to build a tool that adds visibility to the
existence of the algorithm and evaluate its impacts on users’ attitudes towards the system[110].
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Another rating algorithm which has caused great controversy and dissatisfaction among users due
to its opacity is the Yelp review filtering algorithm. Nearly 700 Federal Trade Commission reports
have been filed, accusing Yelp of manipulating its review filtering algorithm to force businesses to
pay for advertising in exchange for better ratings [111]. In addition to being opaque in operation, the
Yelp review filtering algorithm is opaque in its very existence. That is, the Yelp platform interface
not only hides how the algorithm decides what to filter, but also the fact that the review filtering
algorithm is at work at all (Figure 4.1). When users discover this opacity, it can lead them to suspect
the algorithm is biased, since it can appear the platform decided to intentionally hide the algorithm’s
existence or operation from them [112].
In this chapter, I present two studies characterizing users’ perceptions surrounding the Yelp
review filtering algorithm, the factors associated with their perceptions, and the impact of adding
transparency on users’ attitudes and intentions. The first study collected and analyzed 458 online
discussion posts by 242 Yelp users about the Yelp review filtering algorithm and its opacity in both
existence and operation, identifying users’ perceptions of this algorithm, and the factors associated
with their perceptions and attitudes towards the algorithm. I found that users took stances with
respect to the algorithm; while many users challenge the algorithm and its opacity, others defend it.
These stances were towards the algorithm’s a) existence, b) opacity in existence, c) operation, and
d) opacity in operation. The stance users took depended on both their personal engagement with the
system as well as their potential of personal gain from its presence. However, no user defended the
opacity of the very existence of the algorithm; that is, users argued that if there is an algorithm at
work, they need to know about its presence.




Figure 4.1: (a) A filtered review is presented as “recommended” to the user who wrote it while
logged in (b) This review, however, presented for other users as a filtered review.
into the Yelp algorithm’s existence impacted users’ attitudes. The study used a tool I developed,
ReVeal, to disclose the algorithm’s existence in 15 interviews with Yelp users. I found that when
transparency is added into the algorithm, some users reported their intention to leave the system, as
they found the system deceptive because of its opacity. Other users, however, report their intention
to write for the algorithm in future reviews.
4.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Users of online review platforms value their reviews greatly. For many users, reviews allow a
creative voice, while providing them the most effective way to share satisfaction or disappointment
with a service rendered, from life-saving medical treatment to a fast food meal. For business owners,
reviews directly determine the business success and livelihood. Even a small, half-star change in a
restaurant rating on Yelp can increase the likelihood of filling the seats by up to 49% [97].
However, while valuable, online reviews can be inauthentic and thereby potentially detrimental
to both users and business owners. If reviews are written by business owners to promote their
own business, they harm consumers; if written by competitors to undermine another business’s
reputation, they harm the business owner as well. To avoid this, Yelp employs a review filtering
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algorithm to decide which user-generated reviews on the platform are inauthentic or fake based on
the “quality, reliability and the reviewer’s activity on Yelp” [93]. Filtered reviews are not factored
into a business’s overall rating and are moved from the main page of a business to another page
called “not recommended reviews”. While Yelp argues that its filtering algorithm is necessary for
a healthy online review platform, the opacity of this algorithm has caused controversies among
users about the algorithm’s bias and deception. Below, I describe two types of opacity in the Yelp
filtering algorithm.
4.2.1 Opacity in Existence
Some algorithms are hidden on the interface, making it harder for users to know that they are the
subject of an algorithmic decision-making process. While such opacity is often an unintentional
consequence of design choices, it can be considered deceptive if the system appears to hide the
algorithm’s existence from users intentionally. In the case of Yelp, Yelp only reveals that a user’s
review is filtered when the user is logged out. When logged in, the user sees her filtered reviews
under the recommended reviews of a business (as if unfiltered). So a user can only detect if reviews
are filtered by looking for their own reviews for a business when logged out or logged in as another
user. Figure 4.1 shows the difference: a review is presented as “recommended” to the user who
wrote it while logged in (Fig 4.1(a)), for other users this review is presented as filtered (Fig 4.1(b)).
This inconsistency in revealing algorithmic filtering of reviews can be deceptive to users.
4.2.2 Opacity in Operation
In addition to its opacity in existence, the Yelp algorithm is opaque in its operation. This opacity
has led businesses to accuse Yelp of developing an algorithm that is biased against those that do
not pay Yelp for advertising. In recent years, growing numbers of business owners have reported
receiving calls from Yelp about its advertising – and that those who turned down the advertising
noticed that long-standing positive reviews were filtered shortly after the call. Some even claimed
that previously filtered negative reviews became unfiltered [112]. These complaints escalated into
almost 700 lawsuits in recent years [113, 111], though all have been dismissed [114]. Yelp while
denying the accusations of extortion [115], has argued that the opacity of its algorithm’s operation
is a design choice to avoid malicious gaming of the system [93]. However, it is unclear how users
perceive and react to this opacity. To understand this, I asked:
RQ1: How do users perceive the a) existence and b) operation of the Yelp filtering algorithm
and its opacity?
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In addition to understanding users’ perceptions of the opacity of the algorithm, I sought to
understand why different users have different perceptions of the algorithm:
RQ2: What factors are associated with users’ perceptions of the Yelp review filtering algorithm?
RQ1 and RQ2 aim to find users’ existing perceptions of the algorithm and the factors associated
with them; these questions, however, do not evaluate how users’ attitudes towards the algorithm
change after making some aspects of the algorithm transparent. This change is particularly important
in opaque and potentially biased algorithmic systems where transparency has been suggested as a
mechanism to establish more informed communication between users and the system. Therefore, I
also sought to understand:
RQ3: How does adding transparency into the algorithm’s existence change user attitudes?
4.3 METHOD
I designed two studies to answer the proposed research questions: 1) a qualitative and quantitative
analysis of 242 users’ online discussions about the Yelp review filtering algorithm, and 2) an
interview study with 15 Yelp users adding transparency about the algorithm via a tool that I
developed.
4.3.1 Study 1: Analyzing Online Discussions on Yelp
I conducted an initial investigation on Yelp, finding that Yelp provides users an “on platform”
opportunity for discussion via forum pages. I searched for “review filtering algorithm” across Yelp
(via Google search specifying a Yelp.com domain) to find posts concerning the algorithm, and
how users discuss it. The search results included thousands of discussion posts, each up to nearly
10,000 words long. I selected the ten highest ranked forum pages discussing the algorithm’s opacity
in existence/operation and its potential bias and deception. In addition, since the Yelp algorithm
changes over time, I expanded this set of discussions by adding the three top-ranked discussion
pages in the search results for each year missing from the original set. The final set included 458
discussion posts by 242 Yelp users (the “discussants”) from 2010-2017.
Data Analysis
To understand users’ perceptions of the opacity in the algorithm’s existence and operation (RQ1),
I conducted qualitative coding on the discussion posts dataset to extract the main themes. A
line-by-line open coding identified categories and subcategories of themes using Nvivo [116], and
further revised these codes through an iterative process to agreement. I also conducted a quantitative
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Figure 4.2: The ReVeal tool shows users both their filtered and unfiltered reviews. Filtered reviews
are highlighted with a gray background.
analysis on the dataset to identify the factors associated with users’ perceptions of the algorithm
(RQ2). For clarity, details of both qualitative and quantitative analysis will be presented in the
Results section.
4.3.2 Study 2: Adding Transparency Into the Algorithm’s Existence
Analysis of the online discussion dataset provided a rich understanding of users’ perceptions of
the algorithm, yet most of the discussants were 1) aware of the algorithm’s existence and 2) active
enough on Yelp to participate in the forum. To analyze a more diverse set of users’ perceptions, I
conducted interviews with Yelp users to complement the results from the first study. That is, Study
1 and Study 2 complemented each other’s results to answer RQ1 & RQ2, one with a population
largely aware of the algorithm and one largely unaware. In addition, to understand how adding
transparency into the algorithm’s existence influenced users’ attitudes (RQ3), I developed a tool,
ReVeal (Review Revealer), using which I disclosed the algorithm to users, showing them which
of their reviews the algorithm filtered. To do so, I first collected a user’s reviews from her public
profile and inspected each review via JavaScript to determine if it had a “filtered” tag. The tool then
highlighted the filtered reviews in the user’s profile page using a gray background (Figure 4.2).
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Recruitment and Participants
To find a set of typical users (not necessarily active or aware of the algorithm’s existence like the
discussants), I employed two methods of recruitment. First, I chose three random cities across the
US and then five random businesses in each. For each business, I investigated both the recommended
and filtered reviews. I contacted every user who had a filtered review for these businesses via the
Yelp messaging feature. For each user who wrote a recommended review, I used ReVeal to check
if they had any filtered reviews for other businesses. If so, I contacted them. Overall, I contacted
134 random Yelp users. Unfortunately Yelp perceived this as promotional/commercial contact and
requested that I cease recruitment.
To reach more participants, I conducted local recruitment via flyers, social media posts, and other
online advertising methods. In this approach, I restricted participants to those Yelp users who had
written at least one review.
Via the above methods, I recruited 15 Yelp users (hereafter the “participants”). Nine had at least
one filtered review (detected via ReVeal prior to the study). The participants had a diverse set of
occupations including clerk, business owner, office administrator, librarian, teacher, student and
retiree. The sample included nine women and ranged from 18 to 84 years old (40% between 35-44).
Four participants were of Hispanic origin, 12 were Caucasian, three Asian and one American Indian.
Participants had reached varying levels of education from less than a high school to a doctorate
degree (about 50% with Bachelor’s degree). Participants also had a varying incomes, from less than
$10,000 to $150,000 per year. All received $15 for a half to one hour study.
The Interview
Participants first answered a demographic questionnaire including their usage of Yelp and other
online reviewing platforms. I then assessed participants’ awareness of the algorithm’s existence by
probing whether they knew a review might not be displayed on a business’s main page. To do so, I
first asked participants to log into their Yelp account. I selected their filtered review (or if they had
multiple, chose a random filtered review) and asked them to show us where that review appeared on
the business’s main page. Since they were logged into their account, the review appeared at the top
of the recommended reviews. Therefore, I particularly questioned them as to whether they thought
other users would see the review in the same place. If they thought yes, I showed them where their
review was actually displayed for other users, under the filtered reviews. Lastly, I asked if they had
ever visited the list of filtered reviews for any business, and if they were aware of Yelp’s practice of
filtering reviews.
For participants with no filtered reviews of their own, I asked them to show us a random one of
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their reviews on the business’ main page. I asked if they thought a user’s review might not show up
at all on that page, further probing for their awareness of the algorithm’s existence.
After exploring users’ existing knowledge of Yelp’s review filtering, I asked them to share
their thoughts about this practice. Next, participants compared the filtered reviews of a business
(including their own reviews if they had a filtered review) with the recommended reviews, discussing
their thoughts about why some reviews were filtered while the others were not. In doing so, I elicited
users’ folk theories about how the algorithm works. Users were also asked to discuss how they
believed Yelp’s interface should present the review filtering algorithm. Finally, I asked participants
whether, in the future when they visit a restaurant, they would write a review on Yelp, and if so,
whether they would change any of their review writing practices. The same qualitative method was
used to analyze the interview results as was applied to the online discussions.
4.4 RESULTS
The two studies found that users’ perceptions and attitudes include taking strong stances with
respect to the algorithm; while many users challenge the algorithm and its opacity, others defend
it (RQ1). Table 1 provides an overview of the number of users who questioned or defended the
algorithm’s existence, operation, and its opacity. The stance the user takes depends on both their
personal engagement level with the algorithm as well as the impact of the algorithm on their life
(RQ2). I report the analysis of RQ1 and RQ2 by combining the discussions of both online users
in Study 1 and interview participants in Study 2. Finally, I found that adding transparency into
the algorithm’s existence changes user attitudes and intentions: some users reported their intent to
leave the system, as they found the system deceptive because of its opacity. Other users, however,
report their intent to write for the algorithm in future reviews (RQ3). I report results of both studies
addressing these research questions, with participants from the online dataset labeled with O#,no
and from the interviews with P#,np.
Qualitative Analysis: To analyze users’ discussions in all the research questions, I conducted
an iterative coding process. First, I read all the discussions several times and labeled them with
preliminary codes. For example, for RQ1, these codes included a set of initial themes such as
demanding for transparency, discouragement, freedom of speech, advertising bias, and demanding
a change in the algorithm. I then analyzed the initial themes to find similarities and grouped them
into final themes based on common properties. For example, in RQ1, I reached the main themes of





Questioning (n) Defending (n)
Opacity in Existence 24 0
Existence 33 32
Opacity in Operation 19 4
Operation 60 23
Table 4.1: The number of users who questioned or defended the algorithm’s existence, operation,
and its opacity in existence and operation.
4.4.1 Perceptions of the Algorithm’s Existence (RQ1a)
Questioning the Opacity in the Algorithm’s Existence
Yelp’s decision to hide the existence of its algorithm led many users (n=24: no=12 & np=12) to
question Yelp’s policy and design choices. First by critically stating Yelp’s practices: “Yelp gives
it’s users the illusion that one’s reviews are all visible as they always remain from the users vantage
point”1 (O1) but also by revealing to others how to uncover its existence: “Yelp only shows me
that my reviews are filtered if I am NOT logged in! If I am logged in, it shows my reviews for the
restaurants as if nothing is filtered!!!” (O92). Others focused on their emotions, sharing how the
design choices increased their anger at finding their reviews filtered: “so frustrating especially since
Yelp doesn’t indicate you’re being filtered” (O13).
Users questioned Yelp motives, suggesting that Yelp deliberately hides the review filtering process
from users because “they don’t want their users to easily know when they’re being suppressed [....]
Kinda like they don’t want their users to catch on that they’ve been poofed” (O1).
Users labeled the Yelp review filtering algorithm “sneaky” (O2), “deceiving” (O125), even
“misleading and possibly censorship” (O120) because “it makes you seem like you are reaching out
people more than you are” (P10). Yelp users believed “there’s a little trickery involved there” (P12)
because “if Yelp is so forthright, then why, oh why, is the ‘filtered review’ link buried at the bottom
of the page behind a faint link that goes to a code to view?” (O94).
Demanding Transparency in Existence: Feeling deceived by Yelp, users (n=14) demanded a “full
disclosure” (O120) of the algorithm’s presence through the interface design by putting the filtered
reviews in “PLAIN SIGHT” (O120): “I really would not have a problem with filtered reviews IF
and only if they were located next to the reviews at the top and in a way that made it easier to know
they are there. Being in gray at the bottom on the left where unless you knew Yelp well, you would
1All review text is presented exactly as it stands in the original, without notation of grammar, punctuation, or other
errors.
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never find nor click on them” (O120). They also argued that Yelp has a responsibility to make the
impact of filtering transparent to affected reviewers: Yelp “should at least show [users] which of
[their ] reviews have been filtered” (O5).
Users even compared Yelp to other platforms that provide more transparency in their filtering
processes: “I feel they should let you know if your review is being filtered. Because I know for other
things like YouTube or things like that, if somethings filtered or restricted or whatever, they would
tell you. So if you want to you could file a claim to remove it” (P7). Highlighting the transparency
provided and the opportunities for user control (e.g., a right to appeal), this user points to preferable
alternative models for algorithmic filtering.
Questioning the Algorithm’s Existence
Many users (n=33: no=25 & np=8) went beyond questioning the opacity in the algorithm’s
existence, to questioning the very existence of the algorithm. They argued that an algorithm should
not control what users read: “Yelp has a robot telling us how to feel about a business based on how
the robot feels about our reviews... Good idea! Let’s put this robot in charge of what I watch on TV
and feed our children” (O39). Instead, they asked Yelp to “let the users be the judge” (O77): “I
prefer my own intelligence instead of censors to help me to sort out ‘absolute junk’ from the reviews
that matter” (O73). In addition to framing the filtering algorithm as a tool for censorship, users
fundamentally contested the need for the filtering at all; while they “might be going to get tricked
sometimes [by the fake reviews], [they] still don’t want to get tricked in order not to get tricked”
(P6). They would “rather just see everything and make [their] own decision than have a computer
do it” (P10).
Disengagement: The presence of the algorithm made many users “very discouraged about
leaving reviews” (O120) since they had spent time and effort to write reviews, but many of them
ended up filtered: “I am extremely saddened and disappointed to see that all my hard work has gone
unnoticed due your software” (O144). This became “so frustrating” (O13) for many users that they
called writing a review on Yelp “a simple waste of time” (O164), expressing a sense of resignation
and fatality: “why did I even write a review then? It’s just going to be filtered out” (P15).
Users argued that this was particularly true for new reviewers, “the filter robot is definitely a huge
discouragement for new people” (O95), and that one “shouldn’t have to write a TON of reviews to
have a valid opinion” (O92). In these cases, users closely tie having an opinion with being able to
express and share it with others, thereby arguing that simply by filtering the algorithm stifles them.
Freedom of Speech: In the same vein, some users argued that Yelp suppresses their speech:
“Yelp holding [itself] out as a public online forum and censoring people that are almost certainly
legitimate reviewers” (O9) “totally defeats the whole premise of Yelp. The filter sucks the life outta
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creditability” O(46): “I don’t want big brother Yelp [...] deciding what I can see. I suppose that’s
very American but [...] it’s freedom of speech, freedom of information. I just don’t like the idea that
they would purport to be a public site that’s crowd-sourcing reviews and would hide anything”(P6).
Users closely tie their ability to communicate with one another on these online platforms with their
fundamental values.
Defending the Algorithm’s Existence
While many users questioned the presence of a review filtering algorithm on Yelp, nearly as
many users (n=32: no=31 & np=1) defended it. These users dismissed fears of censorship and
deception, arguing that “the filter is there to protect against malicious content, for one, and also to
ensure the content showing on Yelp is as useful and trustworthy as possible” (O18). These users
even drew analogies to physical filters, arguing that Yelp with the presence of the filter “is much
safer. Otherwise, you are getting all that unnecessary tar and nicotine” (O97).
Those who supported the filtering process elaborated on the numerous (and creative!) cases
where content would need to be filtered, such as “fake reviews from malicious competitors and
disgruntled former employees” (O89) and “people who may not be ‘real’ (meaning, someone who
came on here just to dump on an exboyfriend or pimp their friend’s new business)” (O90). They
noted that not all reviewers are real people: “there are a lot of ID’s out there, ‘bots’ sometimes [...]
with intent to provide reviews to beef up some businesses or downplay others” (O71). Some pointed
out that that even an otherwise upstanding reviewer might have a questionable review due to bribery:
“restaurants [...] have had Yelp flyers that tell you to leave a review and get a % off ” (O60). These
users argue, therefore, that filtering is necessary. Often implicit in their examples are illustrations of
the scale of this problem: Yelp needs to “keep businesses from promoting themselves with dozens of
fake reviews this way” (O7), thereby requiring an algorithmic filtering intervention.
For such supporters, the algorithm was what distinguishes Yelp from other review websites:
“It’s what sets us apart from other review sites and makes our content the best out there when it
comes to local business reviews. Have you all read up on the filter in our blog posts?” (O81).
Thus, in discussions between those questioning the algorithm’s existence and those defending it,
the supporters argued that “over time, [...] you will actually come to appreciate the filter for not
drowning out YOUR thoughtful, carefully crafted reviews in a sea of irrelevant, profanity-laced and
offensive tirades” (O4).
Your reviews are not gone: Finally, in responding to the concerns of some users questioning the
algorithm’s existence, some users emphasized that no one’s speech is permanently silenced by the
algorithm, and that the algorithm constantly adapts and changes. For example, one participant noted
that “your reviews are not deleted and not permanently filtered, they could more than definitely
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show back up on the business page at any time” (O64). Since the filtered reviews “can still be found
on the your personal profile page” (O89) as well as “among the ‘not recommended’ reviews” (O71),
the filtering algorithm is not really removing users’ content. Furthermore, new reviewers can earn
their place on the main page with time and effort: “filtered reviews are often unfiltered after the
reviewer accumulates more experience on Yelp” (O48).
4.4.2 Perceptions of the Algorithm’s Operation (RQ1b)
Of even more concern than the algorithm’s existence was the algorithm’s operation. Many users
(n=140) engaged in discussions about the algorithm’s operation, suggesting “folk theories” about
how the algorithm works. Based on these folk theories, some users once again questioned the
algorithm’s operation (both in how it functions and the opacity of how it functions) while others
defended it.
Questioning the Opacity in the Algorithm’s Operation
When learning of the algorithm’s existence, some (n=19: no=12 & np=7) questioned the opacity
in the algorithm’s operation, perceiving Yelp as being secretive about how its algorithm works:
“The unfortunate thing about Yelp is that if they decide to filter or delete a review or pic they are not
specific as to why they did it” (O15). This left users feeling powerless: “thanks Yelp, you sure are
mysterious and so are your Al Gore Rhythms. I certainly feel properly hazed & initiated. You can
put away the Goat masks, flowing robes & fraternity paddle” (O1).
Users especially challenged what they perceived as Yelp hiding behind the word “algorithm”
when questioned about filtered reviews: “Did we ever get an answer as to why his reviews are
filtered? is ‘Algorithm’ the answer? the FAQ says ‘Algorithm’” (O21). The opacity in operation
was particularly frustrating for users who contacted Yelp to ask about their filtered reviews and
received unsatisfying answers: “Emailing yelp goes nowhere - just a form letter saying the same
thing about how they don’t want to give away how their formula works, but it ‘considers many
variables’” (O180). This lack of specificity left users without an understandable reason for being
filtered, leading some to consider it “a little underhanded that some of [the reviews] are hidden for
unknown reasons” (P11). Some even called Yelp “a useless, fraudulent system” (O57) as a result.
Demanding Transparency in Operation: As a result of the opacity in operation, users asked Yelp
to “unbox the algorithm” (P3). They argued that if Yelp has “some standard of what [is being
filtered], they have to communicate that standard to people [...] so users know how they can avoid
being filtered out because people want their review to count” (P6). Even users who did not oppose
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the algorithm argued that “it would be nice if Yelp was more up front about this [because] there
would be far less disgruntled users questioning their algorithm” (O32).
Some suggested that more transparency about the algorithm’s operation might not require
publishing standards or revealing how particular decisions are made. Instead, they would be
satisfied with overall statistics about filtered and unfiltered reviews: “I would love to see a global
query in all posts within Yelp showing a graph of positive vs negative reviews, and would love to
see a graph on the millions of post simple filtered” (O164) though they then revealed their critical
stance: “then I would love to see how many post[s] were bogus with no cause or reason” (O164).
Defending the Opacity in the Algorithm’s Operation
The opacity in the algorithm’s operation was not always seen as a drawback by the discussants.
A few users (no=4) appreciated the opacity, expressing similar concerns to Yelp itself. Arguing,
for example, that if the algorithm’s operation was open to public, “it would allow unscrupulous
players to game the system” (O18). To defend the algorithm’s opacity in its operation, users also
shared their own understandings of the “Catch-22” argument Yelp discusses on its blog [93]: “If
Yelp publicized the factors, then people would easily be able to ‘fool’ the filter, and the site would
be more prone to spam, fake reviews, etc. It would be like putting a security system on your house
and then posting the PIN on the front door” (O44).
Investigating the Algorithm’s Operation: Folk Theories
While discussing the opacity in operation, many users engaged in sense-making practices to
investigate the algorithm’s operation (n=87). These investigations resulted in a series of “folk
theories”: informal theories that users develop to perceive and explain how a system works. These
theories, while non-authoritative, informal and sometimes incorrect, play an important role in
how users interact with a system since they guide users’ reactions and behavior towards a system
[117, 118]. Indeed, I find that users suggest very direct actions to adapt to the theories and ensure
that their reviews are seen. In this section, I analyze users’ theories about how the Yelp filtering
algorithm works and how these theories can impact their attitude towards the system.
The Reviewer Engagement Theory: The most common theory of how the filtering algorithm
works was based on the level of a reviewers’ engagement with Yelp. Many users (n=66) believed
that “the activity is the main thing that keeps you in circulation” (O98). Therefore, “the more you
participate in the site, the more Yelp will take into consideration that you an actual human” (O32),
and “the more likely your reviews will show up!” (O26). Users suggested many different factors
that affect a user’s engagement level with the site:
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• Reviewing Experience: The main engagement factor users suggested was the amount of
experience the reviewer had, as measured by the age of their account (n=9) and the number
of reviews the user had posted on Yelp (n=41): “The reviewer’s Yelp experience is definitely
a factor. If the reviewer is new to Yelp, has [...] few or no prior reviews, that reviewer’s
credibility scores much lower than someone already having a history of reviews over a period
of time” (O48). Therefore, a suggestion to users with filtered reviews was “to write some
more reviews & keep on Yelpin’ if you’d like them to come out of the filter” (O187).
• Friendship Network: Users (n=26) also theorized that the number of friends a user has will
influence the filtering algorithm: “you’re sending up flags by [...] not having friends” (O51).
To address this, users suggested that “a few friends and a few more reviews will take you out
of the ‘filter algorithm’ and allow your reviews to be posted” (O63).
• Profile Completeness: Many users (n=24) stated that “Yelp requires that you completely fill
out your profile” (O32), and suggested adding a profile picture, because accounts with “no
profile picture [...] the algorithm will filter them out because they look like fake profiles”
(O145). Some even offered more specific suggestions to adapt to the algorithm: “I definitely
agree about a clear pic of yourself, the algorithm looks for things like that” (O206).
• Providing or Receiving Feedback: Another common factor users (n=14) proposed was
providing or receiving feedback for reviews: “if your review earns FUC’s (Funny, Useful,
Cool), it increases the likelihood of it being recommended” (O162) because “while the
algorithm is certainly secret, its a pretty safe bet that the rest of the community indicating
they found value in the review could help it make it back to the front page” (O79). Thus, the
reviewers’ folk theories of the algorithms operation could drive community engagement, as
in one user who wrote, “You should also be sure to FUC his review if you feel that way about
it” (O79).
The Review Format Theory: The other main theory about how the algorithm filters a review
revolved around the review itself. Users (n=37) described different features of a review that can
impact the algorithm’s decision to filter it:
• Extreme Language/Rating: Some (n=24) believed that “fake reviewers tend to have the BEST
or the WORST experiences” (O45). Therefore, “if the review seems exceptionally over the
top giddy about how great your business is, or exceptionally negative, [the algorithm] may
also pick those reviews out for filtering as well, thinking the great ones may have been
submitted by someone affiliated with the business, or the poor ones may have been submitted
by a competitor” (O151). So, users suggested those who had filtered reviews “avoid liking
everything or hating everything” (P4).
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• Details: A lack of details in a review was another reason some users (n=15) suggested a
review might get filtered: “Writing 2 sentences and giving a sterling or abysmal rating is
a sure way to get that review flagged and voted as suspicious” (O100). Therefore, they
suggested users with filtered reviews to “be more descriptive” (O67). Indeed, some suggested
that reviewers go beyond the review text and also “add pictures” (P9) to their reviews.
• Length: Distinct from adding details, some (n=11) simply suggested writing “lengthy” (P12)
reviews to avoid filtering.
The above theories, while not necessary validated, still impacted how users interact with the system.
Users tried to use their theories to remove their reviews from the filter. Some actions they could
take themselves – adding more details, pictures or more reviews – but for others they called on the
Yelp community for help – asking for votes on their reviews. Later in the chapter, I discuss how
users also used the theories they developed to write for the algorithm when ReVeal exposed the
presence of the algorithm.
Questioning the Algorithm’s Operation
While developing their theories about how the algorithm works, many users (n=60: no=50 &
np=10) questioned the algorithm’s operation when they found it “inconsistent” (P11) or “arbi-
trary” (O210). Users struggled because every theory was faced with exceptions. As some wrote,
they “can’t imagine what the rationale that the algorithm is using could possibly be” (O180)
because “everything [they] try to figure out was in common with many [filtered reviews], there were
a bunch that didn’t fit that pattern” (P14). And similarly, when many users turned to common
theories about how the algorithm works to get their own reviews unfiltered, those theories did not
work: “I even included photos from my meal [in the review]! What else can I provide to prove I was
there? DNA?” (O34).
This perceived lack of consistency in the algorithm’s operation, along with the lack of response
from Yelp, caused confusion and even resignation among users. Some even felt that they did not
have a right to inquire why their reviews were filtered: “But maybe this is all like Biology; you
cannot really ask why, it just is” (O54). This was particularly problematic for small business owners
whose business’s positive reviews were mostly filtered by the algorithm, since they could not even
choose to remove their business page from Yelp: “The filter needs to be modified but it won’t. [...]
Can’t opt out, can’t delete...so what do I do if I can’t get out?” (O102).
(Advertising) Bias: Users’ perceived lack of algorithmic agency, together with the inconsistency
of the algorithm’s operation, caused fears that Yelp biases results to promote its own advertising
business: “you pay Yelp you get more positive [reviews] and they hide your negative [reviews]”
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(O144). Many business owners claimed they received calls from the Yelp Sales team about
advertising with Yelp, and as soon as they rejected the offer, positive reviews began being filtered:
“a bit coincidental when examining the timeline vs conversations with the Yelp Sales Team” (O102).
These business owners considered this “a common tactic used by Yelp to ‘strong arm’ small
businesses to advertise with Yelp” (O135) which “SMELLS LIKE EXTORTION!” (O144). This
alleged practice has been the subject of multiple lawsuits [113, 111].
This claim, regardless of its validity, drove many users to argue that “Yelp has finally crossed over
from an honest user generated content review site, to a capitalist advertisement platform” (O121).
This opinion was held not only by business owners, but also by reviewers. When they could not
find a pattern in how reviews were filtered, some participants stated that “maybe the automated
software is a lie [and] they can take out the reviews they don’t want” (P2). This show how a lack of
transparency, combined with a perceived inconsistency in an algorithm’s operation, can lead users
to suspect bias.
Demanding a Change in Operation: Users (n=16) argued that Yelp shouldn’t use “the algorithm”
as an excuse for deceptive practices: “Oh, my toilet, watch, car and email is ‘automated’ too...but
doesn’t mean I can change or improve the ‘automation’. Stop hiding behind that please” (O102).
These users even proposed improvements they wanted to see:
• Adding Human in the Loop: Some users (n=7) suggested Yelp “add a human touch to the
algorithm, or they’re gonna continue to get allegations that Yelp reviews are paid for” (O163).
They also suggested an appeal process to include human oversight: “My only wish is that it
had a button on the filtered reviews for people to click on, so if an Elite member or regular
user of this site felt that one or more of the filtered reviews was actually genuine, they could
click on that and send it to a human for their review” (O151).
• Adding or Modifying a Variable: Some users (n=8) suggested adding or changing variables.
For example, users suggested that “every review that is posted on a business should affect
their overall star rating”(P8) even if it is filtered. Others suggested adding variables like a
user’s account age or IP (though some believed that these variables are already included in
the algorithm).
• Equality vs Equity: A few users (n=2) argued that the algorithm may have disparate, unequal
impacts on different communities, and asked for a change in the algorithm’s operation to
provide equity, rather than equality. That is, while it may seem fair that the algorithm treats
all businesses the same way, some communities may be more harmed by the algorithm’s
impacts. For example, if a business can only do three jobs per month (e.g., a sculptor), but
their reviews are filtered and their score is calculated in the same way as busy restaurants,
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they may suffer lower overall ratings: “[the] problem is that the quantity and type of my
customers doesn’t fit within Yelp’s one-size-fits-all approach. I’ve struggled to get 3 reviews,
and guess what? All of them [are] “not recommended” but are all legitimate clients and
reviews. I sincerely hope that Yelp changes their algorithm to be more industry specific [...
and help] grow small business with few but precious clients.” (O193)
Defending the Algorithm’s Operation
I found some users (no=23) who actually defended the algorithm’s operation, arguing that “while
‘the algorithm’ isn’t perfect and isn’t always 100% accurate, in most cases it does its task and does
a decent job of keeping the reviews honest” (O151). They also argued that the algorithm has the
right to be imperfect in operation because it is faced with so many fake reviews: “the Yelp review
filter is like the liver. It flushes out toxins. Sometimes it doesn’t work because of excessive drinking”
(O117). These users suggested that those complaining about the algorithm’s operation “give it time
[and] keep reviewing” (O154) until they “gain the ‘bot respect’” (O82).
The Algorithm isn’t Biased towards Advertising: In addition to defending the algorithm’s imper-
fection, some users (n=10) argued that “advertising has nothing (zero, zilch, nada) to do with [...]
the way the review filter works” (O104). These users often made reference to the fact that “not one
lawsuit [about Yelp’s advertising bias] has succeeded and the biggest class-action one was thrown
out of court” (O105). Some also argued that “there are plenty of successful businesses on Yelp
that don’t advertise” (O138), adding the fact that “there are examples all over Yelp of advertisers
that have positive reviews filtered and non-advertisers with negative reviews filtered” (O18). Using
these arguments, users tried to defend the algorithm and convince others that while the algorithm’s
operation is imperfect, it is not biased towards advertising.
4.4.3 Factors Associated with Different Perceptions (RQ2)
I found that while some users challenged the algorithm and its opacity, many others defended it.
But why do some users challenge the algorithm while others passionately defend it? Past work has
not yet captured what factors are associated with different perceptions of and stances towards an
algorithm. I hypothesize that these users’ interactions with the system may influence their stance.
To study this, I first devised a coding scheme to capture the stance of a discussant/participant
towards the algorithm. This coding scheme labels a user as i) an algorithm “challenger” if she only
challenged the algorithm, ii) an algorithm “defender” if she only defended the algorithm, or iii) a
“hybrid” if she challenged the algorithm in one aspect but defended it in another. For example, a
participant would be labeled a hybrid if she argued against the opacity of the algorithm’s existence
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but defended the algorithm’s operation overall. Using this scheme, I coded 150 Yelp users’ stance
towards the algorithm : nchallenger=69,nde f ender=61,nhybrid=20 (there was not enough information
for the rest of the users to code their stance).
During the coding process, I observed that users who were more engaged with the Yelp platform
(e.g. wrote many reviews, provided or received feedback on reviews, or had a large number of
friends) usually defended the algorithm and/or its opacity. I also found that elite users usually
strongly defended the algorithm, while business owners questioned it. To gain a more precise
understanding, I ran a statistical analysis to find the influence of the engagement level of a user
with the platform as well as the users’ personal gain from the system on their stance with respect
to the algorithm. This analysis shows what correlates with users’ stance on the algorithm, but not
necessarily what causes this stance.
Engagement level
To capture the engagement level of a user, I selected features from the Yelp user profile. Features
were selected on the basis of the “reviewer engagement theory” captured in RQ1. I collected 13
engagement features (such as number of reviews, friends, and compliments) for each user. I then
ran a pairwise correlation analysis on these features and the stance of a user toward the algorithm.
As Table 1 shows, the more engaged a user is with Yelp, the more she/he defends the algorithm in
its existence, operation, and/or opacity. This may be because as a user engages with an algorithmic
platform, they begin to understand the platform’s dynamics better. Greater engagement provides
users an opportunity to “play” with the algorithm and investigate its inputs and outputs.
Personal Gain
I also studied the algorithm’s impact on a user’s life, that is, their personal gain from the system.
In particular, I measured these in the form of user types: elite users and business owners. I collected
these either from their profile (if they were elite, and if so, for how many years) or from their
discussion (if they asserted that they own a business page on Yelp). The same statistical analysis as
above revealed that being an elite user positively correlates with defending the algorithm, while
being a business owner negatively correlates with defending the algorithm.
To understand the underlining reasons, I investigated the discussions of elite users and business
owners from the online dataset. Many users argued that for elite users, the algorithm has a positive
reputational and social impact on their online status. First, the algorithm has a role in deciding who
is an elite member and once an elite members, users’ reviews are rarely filtered. Furthermore, Yelp




Review count 0.460 0.00**
Friend count 0.369 0.00**
First review count 0.356 0.00**
Update count 0.346 0.00**
Compliment count 0.339 0.00**
Feedback count (Funny,Useful,Cool) 0.329 0.00**
Account age 0.318 0.00**
Lists count 0.308 0.00**
Tips count 0.270 0.00**
Follower count 0.265 0.00*
Has photo? 0.243 0.00*
Bookmark count 0.221 0.00*
Photo count 0.138 0.09
Personal gain
Elite member? 0.586 0.00**
Business owner? -0.227 0.00*
** p < 0.001 * p < 0.01
Table 4.2: The correlation between the engagement level as well as personal gain and user’s stance
towards the algorithm.
beverage, and the authority to act as a Yelp Ambassador (e.g., answering other users’ questions).
Such privileges led some elite users to call themselves a part of Yelp, using phrases like “we” or
“us” when addressing other users’ complaints about the algorithm.
Business owners, on the other hand, argued that the algorithm has a negative impact on their
financial status. They stated that the review filtering process caused “a loss of income to [their]
business on some fronts” (O102) since it moved some of their positive reviews to the filter.
4.4.4 Adding Transparency into the Algorithm’s Existence (RQ3)
I found that only three of the 15 interviewees were aware of the Yelp review filtering practice.
The others stated that they “had no idea that that was a thing” (P11) which made them “aggravated
and annoyed” (P3). Some who saw their filtered review at the top of a business’s page thought that
“maybe because it’s such a good review that maybe they put it at the top” (P12) but found moments
later that it was filtered.
I also found this lack of awareness among discussants (no = 13): “Little did I know my indepen-
dent reviews posted in earnest with no ties to any business whatsoever were considered suspect by
the mysterious Yelp algorithms” (O1). The fraction of unaware users was much lower among the
discussants, however, most likely because participating in an online discussion about the algorithm
would either require or prompt knowledge of the algorithm’s existence.
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Change of Attitude
After being exposed to the algorithm and their filtered reviews via ReVeal, participants who were
unaware of the filtering process expressed their intent to change their behavior.
Writing for the Algorithm: Six participants stated that they will change the way they were writing
their reviews: “I would write for the algorithm as my audience [...] to get my reviews unfiltered
(P3). They said that “they would put a little more thought into” (P12) writing a review, and in
doing so, they used the theories they developed during exploring filtered and unfiltered reviews
on Yelp in the Interview. For example, some said that they “will probably add pictures (to their
reviews) because [they] noticed that the filtered ones didn’t have pictures” (P9). “Making [their
reviews] lengthy” (P12) and “doing a review that has more detail” (P4). These results add practical
evidence to Gallagher’s discussion about “algorithmic audience” [119] and corroborate previous
findings about transferring the knowledge users gain through an algorithm visualization tool to their
behavior [120].
Using the System Less or Leaving It: About half of the participants (np = 7), however, stated
that they “won’t probably use Yelp that much” (P1) or they “would probably stop using Yelp” (P3)
“because if [your review] is just going to be grayed out in the bottom and no one’s ever going to
see it, why are you going to put the total of the time and effort for it?” (P15). Therefore, some
added that they “want to use a different [reviewing platform]– like TripAdvisor or Google” (P2).
I found a similar pattern among some discussants (no = 10) as well. The statement of leaving
an algorithmic platform due to the presences of an opaque and biased algorithm corroborates the
findings of Chapter 3 in which Booking.com users stated that they would leave the platform due to
its algorithm’s bias and opacity.
4.5 LIMITATIONS AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
In developing ReVeal, I attempted to use the Yelp API to comply with its terms of service.
However, because the Yelp API does not allow access to filtered reviews, I collected this information
via scraping. Nevertheless, I avoided accessing any users’ private data; all data ReVeal used for
analysis was public data available to any online user. However, I note that while the data in the
online dataset was public, researchers have noted potential issues with public data, for example,
privacy issues and dealing with future deletions [121]. Therefore, I have excluded from analysis any
discussion touching on topics that might be considered private. Finally, when adding transparency
into the algorithm’s existence, I studied self-reported intentions, but have no data on future usage of




Here, I discuss a set of design implications about adding different levels of transparency to
opaque algorithmic processes. I also propose changes in the design of algorithmic platforms to
empower users as auditors.
4.6.1 Transparency: A Solution or A Challenge?
While this work shows that adding transparency into an opaque algorithm’s existence can provide
users a more informed interaction with the system, it is not clear how much transparency is enough.
Here, I discuss the three aspects of an algorithmic system that users demanded adding transparency
into: algorithmic existence, operation, and also impact.
Transparency in Existence
The results showed that while users defended the algorithm’s existence, operation, and even its
opacity in operation, no user defended the opacity of the very existence of the algorithm (Table 1).
That is, while users may see the algorithm as supporting the functioning of the platform, they want
to know that it exists. Opacity in the algorithm’s existence can be considered a deception, resulting
in a breakdown of trust between users and the system. In Chapters 5 & 6, I study the impacts of
adding transparency into an opaque algorithm’s existence and its impacts on users’ folk theories
and behavior in long-term.
Transparency in Operation
The literature on folk theories suggest that users who build theories about an algorithm’s op-
eration act on those theories [53]. Therefore, the level of transparency a system provides about
an algorithm’s operation affects users’ usage behavior. However, given the complicated internal
process of an algorithm, it is usually impossible to make an algorithm’s operation fully transparent
via design. Such design would also likely complicate users’ interactions with the system. Another
issue in making an algorithm’s operation transparent is the potential for malicious users gaming the
system. In Chapters 7 & 8, I explore these issues by evaluating the impacts of different levels of
transparency about an algorithm’s operation on users’ perceptions of the algorithmic decision.
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Beyond Existence and Operation: Transparency in Impact
While this work focused on the existence and operation of the Yelp review filtering algorithm,
the results also suggest a third important factor: the algorithm’s impact. This study investigated
the impacts of users’ perceptions of the existence and operation of Yelp’s opaque review filtering
algorithm. However, I found that even when people have a sense of the existence and operation of
the algorithm, they often do not have a sense of how the algorithm impacts them.
As the results showed, when business owners do not understand how the algorithm affects their
business’ score, they can fear that it is lowering scores, or even that Yelp intentionally lowers
scores to force them to buy advertising. However, past work has shown that there is no significant
difference in the ratings of reviews that are filtered between businesses that pay for advertising
versus those that do not [122].
I believe adding transparency into algorithmic impacts could help address these user concerns.
Given that Yelp’s review filtering algorithm does not appear to be biased, the interface design
should showcase their efforts to keep the system fair. For example, the interface might surface this
one aspect of the algorithm’s impacts, showing business owners their final rating both with and
without the filtered reviews. Adding the impacts of an algorithm can be adopted in other opaque
algorithmic platforms, particularly when the reality of the impact of an algorithm differs from users’
perceptions.
4.6.2 Users as Auditors
Similar to Booking.com users in Chapter 3, I found that Yelp users also followed a collective
audit –a practice driven purely by users in a collective attempt to understand how an algorithm
works. Here, Yelp users came together on the Yelp forum to discuss, question, and/or defend the
review filtering algorithm. Below, I discuss the design implications of this practice.
Providing an Auditing Platform from Within
Whether intentional or not, Yelp has helped support this collective audit by its users through
its interface design. In Chapter 3, I showed a case of watchdog from within when Booking.com
users improvised using their reviews to report the algorithm’s bias rather than just reviewing their
hotel stay. Here, the Yelp interface provides a space to take this user audit further. By providing
an online discussion forum – a single, focused location where users can discuss with others – the
Yelp platform supports the kinds of awareness raising identified in Chapter 3, but also a deeper
engagement with the algorithmic operation, including defense of the algorithmic design that I
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uncovered in this work.
The discussion forums provide a stronger version of the watchdog from within in three ways: 1)
the forums are integrated within the platform itself, and since users may perceive their discussions
as being permitted by the platform, they may feel greater agency and support, 2) the discussion
is within the platform, rather than external so more users are likely to discover it, and 3) it is a
discussion forum, so users engage with each other – people get feedback on their ideas, learn from
each other, develop and even change their thinking. Unlike comments integrated into reviews, this
style of forum has the potential to help users adapt and grow in their understanding and perception of
the algorithm. Developers can leverage similar on-platform community forums on other algorithmic
systems to solicit input on algorithms from a variety of users and create communities that foster
algorithmic agency.
Algorithm Bug Bounty
While on-platform communities can provide users with an opportunity to discuss possible
algorithmic biases, I believe designing algorithmic platforms so that users can report bias directly can
provide users with even more algorithmic agency. This reporting process can also be incentivized,
analogous to security’s “bug bounty” programs [123] in which companies incentivize users to
conduct security research and report flaws for monetary and reputational gain while providing legal
protection from the applicable anti-hacking laws. Embedding such design practices in opaque
algorithmic systems not only can empower users, but also can increase users’ trust in the system.
As the results showed, users may identify unexpected aspects of a system as biased (e.g., disparate
impacts on smaller businesses) and thus these “bias bugs” may also help system designers better
understand their users’ needs.
4.7 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I found that users questioned or defended the Yelp review filtering algorithm and
its opacity depending on their engagement with and personal gain from the algorithm. However,
I observed a unanimous agreement among users in questioning the opacity of the algorithm’s
existence: regardless of their engagement with and personal gain from the algorithm, all users
argued that when an algorithm is at work, they have the right to know about the presence of the
algorithm. This finding inspired me to build ReVeal, a tool that signals the presence of the Yelp
review filtering algorithm to users. I found that adding transparency into the algorithm’s existence
changed users’ attitudes towards the algorithm: users reported their intention to either write for the
algorithm in future reviews or leave the platform.
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Designing a system to signal an algorithm’s existence, however, is not straightforward. ReVeal’s
design suggests the presence of a filtering algorithm by changing the color of the filtered reviews.
But whether this design is explicit enough needs more investigation. Another challenge in revealing
the presence of a filtering algorithm is user discouragement. Seeing that their reviews have been
filtered can make some Yelp users frustrated, even stating they plan to leave the platform. Therefore,
in addition to signaling an algorithm’s existence, designs may need to signal the necessity of the
algorithm as well. Finally, whether adding transparency into an algorithm’s existence affect users’
folk theories, and accordingly their behavior in long-term is an open question. I explore these ideas
in the next two chapters.
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CHAPTER 5: SEAMFUL DESIGN FOR ALGORITHM SENSEMAKING
After I found out that users see a need to add seams to the existence of opaque algorithms, I
decided to build such design in practice to investigate users’ behavior around it. In this chapter, I
present a tool called FeedVis that increases visibility to the Facebook News Feed curation algorithm
via a seamful design. I evaluate FeedVis via a user study and describe how it helped users to have a
more informed, yet engaging and satisfying, interaction with their feed.
5.1 INTRODUCTION
News feeds, which provide users with frequently updated news, are one application where
algorithms play an influential role. An example of a prominent news feed today is Facebook News
Feed, which at the time of writing this dissertation (the second quarter of 2019), was viewed by
on average 2.41 billion monthly active users [124]. This list of updating stories that appears front
and center on Facebook home pages displays an algorithmically curated or filtered list of stories
selected from a pool of all stories created by one’s network of friends.
The Facebook News Feed curation algorithm has attracted significant attention in recent years,
particularly after a recent, controversial study of emotional contagion [125]. Facebook currently
uses close to 100,000 factors to algorithmically choose the best stories from the large pool of
potential stories for News Feed [126]. Although Facebook has stated it would change how it
communicates updates to News Feed due to the large number of user requests [127], there is still
little understanding among users or anyone outside of Facebook of how the News Feed curation
algorithm works.
The prevalence of such algorithmically generated feeds in social media has triggered discussions
about the appropriateness and opacity of the curation algorithms employed. Some commentators
are primarily concerned about friends that “vanish” from the platform [128], and others see an
opportunity for profit linked to the position of posts [129]. While other work has attempted to
reverse-engineer these algorithmic processes or develop new summaries of algorithmic results
[75, 73, 74], to my knowledge no researchers have developed systems to reveal to users the contrast
between algorithmically manipulated and unfiltered results. Whether it is useful to give users such
insight into these algorithms’ existence or functionality and how it might affect their experience are
open questions.
In this chapter, I describe a study that takes a first step to address these questions. In this study, I
first explored users’ awareness and perception of the Facebook News Feed curation algorithm. I
interviewed 40 Facebook users and discovered that more than half (62.5%) were not aware that
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News Feed hid stories. They believed every single story from their friends and followed pages
appeared in their News Feed. To understand why so few participants knew of the algorithm’s
existence, I analyzed users’ usage behavior quantitatively and qualitatively, and found associations
between users’ awareness of the algorithm’s existence and Facebook usage.
To assist me in these interviews, I developed FeedVis, a seamful design that revealed the presence
of the algorithm to the participants. FeedVis extracted participants’ News Feed stories as well
as their friends’ stories to disclose what I call “the algorithm outputs”: the difference between
users’ News Feeds when they have been curated by the algorithm and when they have not. Using
FeedVis, I showed participants alternate views of their familiar News Feed and provided them with
an opportunity to modify the algorithm outputs to curate their desired News Feed. Initial reactions
for previously unaware participants were surprise and anger. Participants were most upset when
close friends and family were not shown in their feeds. I also found participants often attributed
missing stories to their friends’ decisions to exclude them rather than to Facebook News Feed
algorithm. However, I discovered that strong initial negative reactions to the mere presence of an
algorithmic filter often subsided once users understood who and what was being hidden. I followed
up with participants two to six months later and found that their usage patterns had often changed
due to the insight they gained about the algorithm via this study.
5.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This chapter addresses three research questions:
RQ1. How aware are users of the News Feed curation algorithm and what factors are associated
with this awareness?
RQ2. How do users evaluate the curation of their News Feed when shown the algorithm
outputs? Given the opportunity to alter the outputs, how do users’ preferred outputs compare to the
algorithm’s?
RQ3. How does the knowledge users gain through an algorithm visualization tool transfer to
their behavior?
5.3 METHOD
To address the proposed research questions, I conducted a mixed-methods study consisting
of three phases. First, participants visited our lab and completed a questionnaire and interview
to measure algorithm awareness. At this time, I also collected participants’ network size, News
Feed stories and friends’ stories to populate an interface for the next phase. In the second phase,
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participants used an application (FeedVis) to visualize the algorithm outputs, and I used a long form
open-ended interview to discuss them. Third, I e-mailed participants two-to-six months later to ask
closed- and open-ended questions to evaluate the consequences of any insight gained by observing
the algorithm outputs. All in-person interviews were audio recorded and transcribed for analysis.
5.3.1 Pre-Assessment: Testing Algorithm Awareness
At the beginning of the study, participants answered a demographic questionnaire including
measures of their social media use. With one exception, all participants used Facebook at least
once a day. To assess their familiarity with the algorithm, I asked a combination of open- and
closed-ended behavioral, knowledge, and attitude questions whose answers likely depend upon
awareness of the algorithm. First, I asked if and how they used Facebook settings to adjust the
content on their News Feed (including sorting the stories of News Feed by recency or top stories,
hiding a story, following or unfollowing friends and making Facebook lists). Next, I asked them
to imagine they had a “friend,” Sarah, and she shared a public story visible on her wall to all her
friends. I asked them whether this story would appear in their own News Feed. In addition, I
asked whether they missed any stories that they would have preferred to see in their News Feed. If
they answered affirmatively, I probed further to understand their reasoning for why they may have
missed a story; for instance, whether they thought missing a story would be a result of their own
actions such as scrolling past it or a result of a filtering process. During this pre-assessment, I asked
participants to use their Facebook accounts to log into FeedVis. FeedVis extracted and collected the
participant’s network size, News Feed and their friends’ stories. This collected information was
used to generate a series of alternate views for the feed.
5.3.2 Main Interview: Algorithm Outputs Disclosure
After understanding the participants’ existing News Feed knowledge, I presented them with a
series of FeedVis feed views. Paging through these views revealed some algorithm outputs to the
participants. If they were not already aware of the algorithm’s existence, these views provided
the first revelation of News Feed’s algorithmic curation. These views were used as prompts in the
interview so that participants could react to and discuss stories that actually appeared on their News
Feed. As extracting all stories from an entire friend network is process-intensive, I limited the time
period of the stories collected to one week or less depending on the number of the user’s friends. I
briefly describe the four FeedVis views.
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The FeedVis Content View: Revealing Content Filtering
The Facebook algorithm shows a user a selection of stories chosen from the universe of all stories
contributed by the people and pages that the user follows. In the first view, I aimed to show the user
this universe of potential content, highlighting content that the algorithm excluded from display.
This view helped the user compare what they saw and what they might have seen in the absence
of a filter, or with a different one. The Content View consisted of two columns (Figure 5.1). The
right column, “Shown Stories,” included only the stories displayed on the user’s News Feed. These
stories were shown with a blue background. The left column, called “All Stories,” showed every
story posted from all the user’s friends. In this column, stories which did appear in the user’s News
Feed were again shown on a blue background, while stories which did not appear in their News
Feed were shown on a white background. The content for the “Shown Stories” view was generated
by querying user id/home/user via the Facebook Graph API. It is important to note that “Shown
Stories,” while displayed on the user’s News Feed, might not have been seen if the user did not
scroll far enough. The content for the “All Stories” view is the union of friend id/feed/ queries for
each friend; I extracted all stories that the user would see if she went to a friend’s page while logged
in. I then used post ids to determine whether those posts had appeared in the user’s News Feed. To
verify our operationalization of “Shown Stories,” I asked participants if they remembered seeing
randomly selected stories in this column. With a few exceptions, they did remember them.
The FeedVis Friend View: Revealing Social Patterns
By filtering content, the Facebook algorithm also creates user perceptions about how other people
use Facebook. I built a visualization, the Friend View, to help the user understand which users
usually appear and which are hidden. This view divided the user’s friends into three categories
based on the proportion of each friend’s stories that had appeared in the user’s News Feed during
the previous week: “rarely shown,” “sometimes shown,” and “mostly shown” friends (Figure 5.2).
The FeedVis Friend & Content Rearrangement Views: Envisioning a Different Algorithm
After exploring the algorithm outputs, I wanted to gauge participants’ desire to change them.
I created two new views that invited participants to “tweak” their algorithm. The first view
allowed adjustment based on story authorship, the second based on story content. First, the Friend
Rearrangement View (Figure 5.3) presented a list of friends according to the same three categories
described above, and invited re-assignment of friends to different categories. Second, the Content
Rearrangement View (Figure 5.4) randomly selected ten shown stories and ten hidden stories, then
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Figure 5.1: The Content View. Shown stories (in blue) occur across both columns, while the hidden
stories (white) appear only in the left column as ‘holes’ in News Feed. Stories appear in reverse
chronological order.
invited users to indicate whether they would have preferred a “shown” story to be “hidden” or vice
versa. The lab portion of this study, including the pre-assessment, lasted one to three hours per
participant.
5.3.3 Post-Assessment: Evaluating Algorithm Outputs Revelation
To understand the long-term consequences of revealing hidden aspects of a curation algorithm, I
contacted participants via e-mail two to six months after conducting the study. I asked two questions
and invited any additional comments participants wished to share. The questions were: (1) Has
participation in our study resulted in more, less or no change in your satisfaction with Facebook
News Feed? (2) Have you changed anything about how you use Facebook in light of what you
learned in our study? (e.g., “I ‘like’ more posts now” or “I view posts using the ‘Most Recent’
setting instead of the ‘Top Stories’ setting.”).
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Figure 5.2: The Friend View. “Rarely shown” includes friends whose stories were mostly hidden
(0%-10%) from the user. “Sometimes shown” includes friends who had roughly half of their posts
(45%-55%) shown to the user. “Mostly shown” includes those friends whose stories were almost
never filtered out (90%-100%) for the user. The number of the shown stories is displayed above the
x-axis and the number of hidden stories is below the x-axis. The expand button augments the three
category lists below the chart.
5.3.4 Participants
I used modified quota sampling to obtain a non-probability sample that is roughly representative
of the US population on four dimensions. The national proportions for gender, age, race/ethnicity
and socioeconomic status were used as quota targets for recruitment and selection in the Champaign,
Illinois and surrounding area. Quotas required an elaborate recruitment strategy including posters
in varied public places, e-mails to local online communities and civic organizations, and posts
on Facebook. I recruited 40 participants consisting of five students, two faculty members and 14
staff from the University of Illinois and 19 people with other occupations such as homemakers,
delivery persons, servers, artisans, performers and writers. Participants received $10/hour for the
pre-assessment and main interview; participation in the post-assessment entered them in a lottery
for a $50 gift card. The original sample was 60% women and ranged between 18 and 64 years
old. 68% of the participants were Caucasian, 15% were Asian and the African-American, Hispanic
and Native American participants were nearly equally distributed. Approximately half of the
participants’ annual income was less than $50,000 and the rest were between $50,000 and $150,000.
Our participants are typical of Facebook users in terms of age, gender, race and income [130, 131].
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Figure 5.3: The Friend Rearrangement View. User can move friends between the categories by
changing the color of a friend to the destination category’s color.
5.3.5 Data Analysis
To organize and conceptualize the main themes discussed by the participants, two researchers
used line-by-line open coding to label the pre-assessment, main interview, and post-assessment
data under primary categories and subcategories. I used Nvivo [116] to map the interviewees’
statements to these categories. Through a collaborative, iterative process, I revised these categories
to agreement, then used axial coding to extract the relationships between themes. To further explore
our data, I used statistical analysis to support our qualitative findings. For clarity, details of this
analysis will be presented later in the paper.
5.4 RESULTS
5.4.1 Awareness of the Algorithm (RQ1)
Surprisingly, the majority of the participants (62.5%) were not aware of the algorithm’s existence.
When asked whether the public story of their “friend,” Sarah, would definitely be shown in their
News Feed, they answered affirmatively: “I bet it would be on my News Feed. I probably would
catch [it] at some point during the day” (P30). In their opinion, missing a public story was due to
their own actions, rather than to those of Facebook. Importantly, these participants felt that they
missed friends’ stories because they were scrolling too quickly or visiting Facebook too infrequently.
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Figure 5.4: The Content Rearrangement View. User can move a story from its original category to
the other by clicking the button beside each story.
They believed if they “wanna go back to [a missed story], it’s accessible” (P39) in their News Feed.
I refer to this majority as the “Unaware” participants.
The rest of the participants (37.5%) knew that their News Feed was filtered. When answering the
question about Sarah’s story, they stated that a friend’s story might not appear in their News Feed
due to a filtering process: “I don’t think everything is supposed to be there. I mean I don’t think the
News Feed shows everything that everyone puts on Facebook. It’s just certain things” (P22). As
a result of their knowledge, these participants stated that they might miss a story because of the
Facebook algorithm in addition to their own actions. I refer to them as the “Aware” participants. In
a later study in 2018, Rader et. al. showed this lack of awareness among Facebook users in a larger
scale, supporting these results [84].
Paths to Awareness
I investigated Aware participants’ responses further to understand how they became aware when
so many others did not. Three learned of the algorithm’s existence from external sources such as
other people and news articles. However, most Aware participants stated they gained knowledge
about the algorithm via one or two of the following common paths: inductively comparing feeds or
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deductively considering network size.
Inductively Comparing Feeds: Most Aware participants (n=12) compared the quantity of stories
from different friends in their News Feed and felt they were seeing some friends’ stories much more
than others. This observed difference suggested to them the possibility of the existence of a News
Feed filtering process: “I have like 900 and some friends and I feel like I only see 30 of them in my
News Feed. So I know that there’s something going on, I just don’t know what it is exactly” (P26).
Most had observed that interacting with a friend (e.g., visiting their page, liking and commenting
on their stories) often resulted in more stories from that friend in their News Feed. A few compared
their News Feed to their friends’ pages and found that stories were missing.
Deductively Considering Network Size: Seven Aware participants believed a filtering process
must logically be part of the News Feed curation, since “there’s too much material in general
on Facebook” (P22). They argued that as the number of friends that people have on Facebook
increases, there should be “some way that filters out those [stories] that you may not be as interested
in” (P31). These participants thought the algorithm was a basic, even obvious, element necessary
to curate News Feeds and to avoid overwhelming readers.
Although there were many avenues towards algorithm awareness, more than half of the partici-
pants were unaware of the algorithm’s existence. This raises questions about their unawareness:
While all the participants were exposed to the algorithm outputs, why were the majority not aware
of the algorithm’s existence? Were there any differences in Facebook usage associated with being
aware or unaware of the News Feed manipulation? The following section answers these questions.
Connecting Exposure and Engagement to Awareness
To address the above questions, I investigated the participants’ Facebook usage. Some participants
engaged with the algorithm outputs passively by, for instance, scrolling News Feed and reading
the stories as they appeared. Some engaged with the algorithm outputs actively, for example,
adjusting their News Feed content using the settings Facebook provided. To understand whether
this difference in engagement with the algorithm outputs was associated with algorithm awareness
and to identify features related to these engagement patterns, I combined our interview material
with data I extracted from each participant’s Facebook account. I identified three passive and four
active engagement features. Each feature was either mentioned by participants or found in their
Facebook data.
Passive Engagement: I identified several features that are likely to be related to awareness of the
algorithm, but that may not imply any intentional activity by the user or could involve circumstances
that are out of their control. These include: Membership duration, the number of years a user has
been a member of Facebook. Shown content percentage, the ratio of the number of stories in a
67
user’s News Feed to the number of all the potential stories that could have appeared in an unfiltered
News Feed. A smaller shown content percentage means overall the user would expect to read fewer
stories from any friend. Friendship network size, the number of Facebook friends. Network size
can be grown in a relatively passive way — for example, by responding to friend requests initiated
by others — and it may reflect social behavior outside of Facebook (such as actual friendships)
rather than decisions related to the platform. Network size is related to algorithm awareness because
the prioritization in News Feed results in a greater proportion of filtered potential stories by the
algorithm when the network is large1.
Active Engagement: I then identified several features that are related to awareness of the algorithm
and are more likely to also indicate platform- or algorithm-related intentional behavior. They are:
Usage frequency, the number of times per day a participant uses Facebook. Frequent users may
be more prone to active engagement with the algorithm outputs. They possibly explore more
spaces on Facebook (such as options and settings screens) and may compare different aspects of
the site. Activity level, a categorization of users as “listeners” (mostly reading the feed without
posting a story), “light posters” (posting stories occasionally), or “heavy posters” (posting stories
frequently), based on the participants’ descriptions of their Facebook usage during the study. A
light or heavy poster is more actively engaged with algorithm outcomes than a listener because
they receive feedback and attention (likes and comments) to their stories which affect algorithm
behavior. This makes a potential filtering process more salient. News Feed content adjustment,
whether a participant uses settings to control what they see in their News Feed. Sorting stories
based on importance, following a friend, hiding a story and making lists are some examples of these
settings. Using any of these makes a user more actively engaged with the algorithm outputs because
they are intentionally trying to change them. Facebook page/group management, whether a user is
involved in managing a Facebook page or group. This suggests familiarity with Facebook analytics
(information that shows a page manager how many people see a page’s story, revealing the possible
existence of a filtering process).
I used open coding to find and compare engagement patterns between Aware and Unaware
participants using these features, and used statistical methods to support our qualitative analysis.
For numerical features, I conducted Welch’s test to avoid unequal sample size and variance effects
between the Aware and Unaware groups. For categorical features, I used Chi-square tests. I
performed Fisher’s exact test to confirm Chi-square results due to our small sample size.
I found a significant difference between the Aware and Unaware groups for all of the active
engagement features by both thematic and statistical analysis (Table 5.1). In terms of usage
frequency, I found that all participants who used Facebook more than 20 times per day were aware
1I found friendship network size and shown content percentage have a significant negative correlation; r = -0.44, p =
0.005
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of the curation algorithm. There was a significant difference in usage frequency between the
Aware (M=27.18, SD=33.8) and Unaware participants (M=6.92, SD=5.79). Frequent users were on
Facebook “all day” (P21), they were “constantly logged in” (P33) and looked at Facebook “too
many [times] to count” (P22). I hypothesize that spending more time on Facebook allowed these
participants to explore more stories, features and views (such as others’ profile pages) than infrequent
users. This exploration led to inductive feed comparisons and consequently new knowledge about
News Feed and the algorithm.
Table 5.1: Active Engagement Features
Active Engagement t-value
§
Chi-square† p-value Effect size
Usage Frequency -2.2§ 0.03 0.83
Activity Level 8.57† 0.03 0.46
News Feed Content Adjustment 14.14† 0.00 0.59
Facebook Page/Group Management 4.23† 0.04 0.32
Participants unaware of the algorithm’s existence included both posters and non-posters (“listen-
ers”), but in contrast all 15 Aware participants were light or heavy posters. In Aware participants’
discussions of their Facebook usage, I found the number of likes and comments on their own stories
suggested the possibility of the existence of a filtering process. They found that their popular stories
were shown in their friends’ News Feeds more often: “I feel some of the stuff got to reach to [a]
certain threshold of comments or number of likes before Facebook thinks that I might be interested
in [it] enough; and I experienced in my own post[s] [....] I think it probably has to do with the way
Facebook presents [stories]” (P23).
All six participants who did not apply any settings to adjust their News Feed content were
unaware of the algorithmic curation of their News Feed. Conversely, all the Aware participants
tried to adjust their News Feed content by using at least one of the options provided by Facebook.
Among the participants who did not apply any changes to their News Feed, some believed they
“cannot control the News Feed [since] it’s kind of receiving what Facebook gives [us], it’s kind of
limited” (P1). The rest believed they could apply settings to adjust their News Feed if they were
“willing to invest the kind of time to find out how” (P3), but did not invest this time.
There were seven participants involved in Facebook page/group management and all were aware
of News Feed curation. These participants mentioned that Facebook provided some analytics for
page/group managers such as ‘post reach’ (the number of people in whose News Feed a page/group
story appeared) and ‘people engaged’ (the number of people who have clicked, liked, commented
on or shared a story). They stated that observing this analytic information suggested a filtering
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process that causes some of their page/group stories to reach more people than the others: “[My
friends] all don’t get to see everything, and I’ve always been suspicious of [Facebook], on how
they choose who gets to see it, who doesn’t” (P28). Consistent with theories about the construction
of mental models [132, 53], I believe these participants extended their knowledge from a known
domain (Facebook page/group) into an unknown domain (personal profile) and used the analogy
between these two domains to infer the algorithm’s existence in their personal profiles.
In contrast to the active engagement features, I did not find any noticeable difference between the
Aware and Unaware groups in terms of the passive engagement features. This suggests that being a
periodic Facebook user over many years, having a larger friendship network, or having a smaller
fraction of stories from your friends actually shown in your News Feed is not associated with an
awareness of the algorithm. These results suggest that simple exposure to the algorithm output
is not enough to gain information about the algorithm’s existence. To learn about an algorithm
without any outside information, active engagement is required.
5.4.2 Reactions to & Expectations of Algorithm Outputs (RQ2)
Once I knew participants’ prior awareness of the algorithm’s existence, I walked them through the
FeedVis tool. I started with the Content and Friend Views, to discover their reactions to an unfiltered
alternative. Then I directed them to the Friend and Content Rearrangement Views, allowing them to
create their desired Friend and Content Views.
Initial Reactions
Many of the Unaware participants (n=15) were initially very surprised by how long the “All
Stories” column was in comparison to the “Shown Stories” column in the Content View (Figure
5.1): “So do they actually hide these things from me? Heeeeeeey! I never knew that Facebook really
hid something!” (P1). One participant described it as a completely new idea that she had never
considered before, despite using Facebook daily: “It’s kind of intense, it’s kind of waking up in ‘the
Matrix’ in a way. I mean you have what you think as your reality of like what they choose to show
you. [...] So you think about how much, kind of, control they have...” (P19).
Observing the algorithm outputs in FeedVis surprised some Unaware participants (n=11) by
revealing misperceptions about their friends whose stories were not shown in the participants’ News
Feed at all. For example, seven of them assumed that those friends simply did not post on Facebook.
It was through FeedVis that they discovered these friends did indeed post. A few participants
falsely believed that those friends had left Facebook: “I know she had some family issues so I just
thought she deactivated her account” (P35). Importantly, some participants disclosed that they
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had previously made inferences about their personal relationships based on the algorithm output
in Facebook’s default News Feed view. For instance, participants mistakenly believed that their
friends intentionally chose not to show them stories because they were not interpersonally close
enough. They were surprised to learn via FeedVis that that those hidden stories were likely removed
by Facebook: “I have never seen her post anything! And I always assumed that I wasn’t really that
close to that person, so that’s fine. What the hell?!” (P3).
A few participants (n=5) were curious and began asking questions about the algorithm. For
example, P37 asked:“Do they choose what they think is the best for me to see? Based on what?”
This curiosity led them to wonder whether “there is some algorithm or something or some rules to
choose these [hidden] things that would not appear [in News Feed]” (P1). In contrast to Unaware
participants, most of the Aware participants did not express surprise or curiosity, because of their
previous awareness of the algorithm’s existence. They did, however, express dissatisfaction, as I
describe below.
Expectations
Along with surprise and curiosity, many participants, Aware or Unaware, (n=19) expressed
dissatisfaction and even anger when missing stories were revealed to them on FeedVis because
Facebook violated their expectations: “Well, I’m super frustrated [pointing to a friend’s story],
because I would actually like to see their posts” (P3). Participants explained that seeing an otherwise
hidden story would affect their behavior toward the friend who posted it: “I think she needs support
for that; if I saw it, then I would say something [to support her]” (P8). In the Friend View, as with
the Content View, many participants (n=19) expected their network to be categorized differently than
was reflected on Facebook. This expectation was particularly likely for posts by family members;
many participants stated that family members should appear in the “mostly shown” category in the
Friend View: “I cannot really understand how they categorize these people. Actually this is my
brother [in ‘sometimes shown’] and actually, he needs to be here [in ‘mostly shown’]” (P1).
Some participants (n=9) believed it was not Facebook’s place to decide what to show in their
News Feed: “It was sort of like someone was deciding what I wanted to see and it kind of made
me mad” (P32). These participants preferred to see every story and use “manual filtering” (P23)
themselves. However, a few argued that Facebook, as a free service, had the authority to manipulate
the feed without concern for the users’ desires: “I feel like I’m a mouse, a little experiment on us.
To me, that’s the price I pay to be part of this free thing. It’s like we’re a part of their experiment
and I’m okay with it” (P21).
To better understand how participants’ expected outputs compared to the actual algorithm outputs,
I asked participants to move friends to their desired categories via the Friend Rearrangement View
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(Figure 5.3). On average, participants moved 43% of their friends to another category. This high rate
of change demonstrates that the algorithm is not effectively capturing the strong feelings participants
had about which friends should appear in their News Feed. In the Content Rearrangement View
(Figure 5.4), participants moved on average 17% of their News Feed content between the “shown”
and “hidden” categories (SD = 9%), a noticeably lower percentage.
Despite the frustration in some initial reactions, more than half of the participants (n=21) came to
appreciate the algorithm over the course of the study. Even as they first scrolled down the Content
View, many mentioned that they began to understand why Facebook hid some storiesFor example,
many hidden stories were about friends’ interactions with each other (e.g., likes, comments, happy
birthday messages) that were not relevant to them: “A lot of what is filtered out are things that don’t
really pertain to me. I’m so grateful because, otherwise, it would just clutter up what I really want
to see” (P13). Although many participants were initially shocked, concerned or dissatisfied with
the existence of a filtering algorithm, they concluded there were few stories they actually wanted to
move: “Honestly I have nothing to change which I’m surprised! Because I came in like ‘Ah, they’re
screwing it all!’” (P23). This suggests that while filtering is both needed and appreciated, a lack of
awareness of the existence of the process leads to dissatisfaction.
5.4.3 From Algorithm Awareness to Future Behavior (RQ3)
During our initial discussions with Aware participants, I found their perceptions of the algorithm
already affected their Facebook usage. They stated that awareness of the algorithm led them to
actively manipulate their News Feed, using theories they developed about how the algorithm might
work. For example, those who believed interacting with their friends would affect the number of
stories seen from those friends adjusted their interactions: “I know that if you don’t interact with
people you won’t see their posts; sometimes I purposely don’t interact with people just so that
hahaha, [I’m] manipulating the system” (P20). Others thought the number of stories displayed was
limited by the algorithm. They believed if they unfollowed someone, “there’s always a new person
that [would] start showing up more” (P26). In addition to manipulating their own, a few Aware
participants (n=4) tried to manipulate News Feeds of others. Participants who believed that stories
with more comments and likes would reach more people might comment on their own stories to
get into more people’s News Feeds. For example, one participant suggested “if you post a picture,
without a comment, it’s less likely to show up on your friends’ News Feed” (P21).
72
Following Up with Participants
To understand whether exposure to the algorithm outputs during the study would prompt similar
behaviors in the previously Unaware participants (or reinforce these behaviors among the Aware
participants), I contacted our participants two to six months after the study. I asked them whether
their Facebook usage or satisfaction with the News Feed had changed as a result of participating in
our study. Of the 40 original participants, 30 responded2.
Usage
Most of the follow-up participants (83%) reported changes in their behavior due to participation
in our study. I noted that despite coming into the study with varying levels of awareness, Aware
and Unaware participants reported similar changes. The Aware participants specifically noted that
FeedVis provided new information to them not available in the existing Facebook interface.
Manipulating the Manipulation: 21 of the 30 who completed the follow-up (both Unaware and
Aware) asserted that they started to manipulate what they saw on Facebook, mainly by using News
Feed settings or changing their interaction with friends. Of those who started to use News Feed
settings for the first time after the study (n=13), most began using “Most Recent” and “Top Stories”
options provided by Facebook to sort stories. Most said that they “make more of an effort to make
sure [their] viewing of posts is more on the ‘Most Recent’, as opposed to the ‘Top Stories’ option”
(P35) because they preferred a time-sorted, unfiltered feed to Facebook’s “Top Stories.” A few
stated that they “tend to switch up between the ‘Most Recent’ setting and the ‘Top Stories’ setting”
(P14) to see both the trending and the chronological feed.
Ten participants changed their interaction with their friends in order to affect the stories appearing
from those friends in their own News Feed. Some started to be “more selective about clicking ‘like’
because it will have consequences on what [they] see/don’t see in the future” (P4). On the other
hand, a few participants “liked” more stories than they used to. This was particularly true if they
“may not want to comment on their status but want to make sure that their posts continue to show up
in News Feed” (P31). A few participants changed their interaction with some friends by visiting
their personal pages “so they pop up on News Feed again” (P11). In addition, a few who realized
that they might not see some stories due to the filtering process, said they were “more likely to visit
home pages for certain friends to see if they’ve posted anything” (P38). Finally, unfriending people
in order to receive updates only from those they were most interested in was a more drastic change
some mentioned.
A few participants tried to make their own stories appear on more of their friends’ News Feeds.
For example, starting to like their own posts “to give them more visibility” (P28). Others modified
2I attribute this attrition rate in part to the different incentives for participation in each part of the study. Initial lab
visits were paid by the hour, while completing the e-mail follow-up entered participants into a lottery.
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their settings to limit who saw their stories.
Exploration: Four participants began to “play around with Facebook a little more” (P25). They
stated that after the study, they “went back and started experimenting a little with the News Feed
and discussing with some friends on ways to streamline” (P10) what they were receiving in News
Feed. Some also shared “what [was] learned from the study with others” (P18) as they felt more
knowledgeable about how Facebook worked. One participant even made their friends aware that
the algorithm hid their stories from her News Feed: “I told some friends that I was not seeing their
posts” (P36).
Decreasing Usage Frequency: Three participants used Facebook less than they had in the past.
One reason was the frequent changes to the News Feed settings, including the location of the “Most
Recent” story sorting setting, leaving them frustrated with the need to search for and understand
settings. In an extreme case, one participant stopped using Facebook as she believed it was not
straightforward with its users about News Feed curation: “After the study, I stopped using Facebook
because I felt the way the Feed items were curated had, in some ways, broken the expectations
between myself and Facebook [...] By neither showing me everything nor making their actions
explicit, I felt like I was being lied to” (P3).
Overall, participation led to more informed Facebook use, even for those who were previously
aware of the algorithm’s existence: “It definitely made me more aware of how I was using it” (P20).
Even from the nine participants who reported no change in their usage, six noted they “do feel more
knowledgeable of the way [Facebook] ‘studies’ viewing preferences and accordingly adapts News
Feed” (P22) after the study.
Satisfaction
In the follow up, I also asked the participants whether participation in our study affected their
satisfaction with News Feed. The majority of the participants (n=24) who answered reported the
same or higher satisfaction level with News Feed after the study. However, a few participants
(n=6) declared that their satisfaction decreased when they understood that “some updates were
deliberately not shown” (P9). They explained that worrying they might miss stories they wanted to
see made them trust News Feed less: “I’m disappointed because I keep thinking that I might be
missing some of the updates from my friends. [..] I don’t really trust the News Feed about giving me
updates on everything I want to know” (P17). They also felt “less empowered to have an optimal
experience [since] the rules can change at any time [...] which makes no promises in terms of
permanence” (P21).
Participants who had the same or higher satisfaction level with News Feed generally discussed
how they felt more knowledgeable about the algorithm as a result of participating. For instance,
one Unaware participant stated that becoming aware of the algorithm’s existence resulted in less
dissatisfaction when stories did not receive enough attention from others: “Because I know now that
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not everything I post everyone else will see, I feel less snubbed when I make posts that get minimal
or no response. It feels less personal” (P38). Another noted how understanding that Facebook hid
some stories they might not be interested in made them “more interested in checking Facebook
because it does not seem as cluttered with random information” (P10). Overall, gaining insight
into the algorithm via FeedVis resulted in people feeling more knowledgeable about Facebook’s
algorithm and their satisfaction level with Facebook generally remained high.
5.5 LIMITATIONS
While this study’s results are suggestive, I hope future research will employ a quantitative
experimental design featuring a control group to better establish causal relationships between
algorithmic awareness, its antecedents and consequences. This study employed a non-probability
sample and did not vary geographic diversity to match the US population, a dimension that may
be important. And although the study was longitudinal, all behavioral assessment was based on
self-reports.
As this study focused only on one instance of a curation algorithm, I do not know how far to
generalize the conclusions. I suspect different dynamics exist in other contexts and even for other
curation algorithms within Facebook (such as the algorithm that selects advertising).
Some FeedVis design decisions were influenced by the query limits in the Facebook API. At the
time of this study, the Facebook API permitted 600 queries per minute. Therefore, it took longer
to collect data for participants with larger friend networks. The size of a participant’s network
determined the time duration of the presented data for their FeedVis views.
While validating “Shown Stories” and “All Stories” feeds, I noticed that in a few cases, an
expected story was not returned by the Facebook API. This finding has been reported by various
developers and Facebook [133]. So this would not affect user perceptions, I used post ids to ensure
that “Shown Stories” were a subset of “All Stories” in the FeedVis views.
5.6 DISCUSSION
Users clearly benefit from awareness of an algorithmic curation process and likely from knowl-
edge about how it works. Although algorithm awareness on Facebook was prompted by what I
termed “active engagement,” most users were not so engaged, and thus were not aware. I suspect
that users are not aware of most curation, even when the presence of a filter appears obvious to
those with a background in computing.
On Facebook, ignorance of the algorithm had serious consequences. The study’s participants
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used News Feed to make inferences about their relationships, wrongly attributing the composition
of their feeds to the habits or intent of their friends and family. Users incorrectly concluded that
friends had dropped them due to political disagreements or their unappealing behavior. In the
extreme case, it may be that whenever a software developer in Menlo Park adjusts a parameter,
someone somewhere wrongly starts to believe themselves to be unloved.
5.6.1 Designing for Algorithm Awareness
This conclusion draws my attention to more than just the danger of misunderstanding a filter.
Users felt betrayed when discovering an algorithm that they were unaware of. Yet over time,
knowledge about the algorithm increased satisfaction with the product. What are the best ways of
alerting users to the presence of these processes? Below, I propose two approaches.
On the first approach, as this study suggests that prolonged or passive use of Facebook did not
correlate to knowledge of the algorithm at work, some form of direct intervention is required. An
alert to the presence of an algorithmic process could take place external to the platform, as did
this study, providing a sort of temporary x-ray or ombudsman’s perspective into the composition
of a normally seamless experience. This approach is consistent with that of interaction designers
looking to create trust in critical systems such as voting machines; there, initial training and
later auditing ensures trustworthy use [134]. Such an approach would also lend itself to continued
“seamless” interaction with algorithmic media, avoiding the regular introductions of “seams” through
explanations of algorithms that make interactions less fluid. However, while reverse engineering
and explaining algorithms is promising, algorithms often use so many features that educating users
about them is unlikely to be meaningful. And training through system help pages or blogs often
falls short, both because users are unaware those resources exist and the resources provide too little
information to be truly educational.
A different approach to alerting users to the presence and function of these algorithms could
be integrated into routine use. Persistent, predictable feedback that enables users to understand a
process has long been a staple of interaction design, and perhaps the introduction of new, more
predictable capabilities for “tweaking” one’s feed, or one’s appearance in other feeds, achieves
awareness of algorithms without sacrificing fluidity and dependability. Providing a visual narrative
for algorithmic processes has the potential to educate users without revealing technical specifications
or intellectual property. I argue that providing this kind of feedback requires trusting the user, but I
believe all are capable of better understanding how their digital environments work.
What other insights might we draw from the findings of this study to inform the design of
technology? Designers often struggle to determine what parts of a system’s operation should be
made visible to users. This study shows that users respond differently to revelations about different
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features of the algorithm (e.g., friend-based vs. story-based filtering). Tools like FeedVis could be
extended to other domains or to demonstrate the performance of more than two algorithms. They
could also be extended to allow users to create their own curation; related “personally developed”
algorithms have been explored in the past [135], and I argue that they will play an increasingly
important role in the increasingly personalized online world.
This study also shows that the decision to promote a “secret sauce” or to highlight an otherwise
hidden process is far more than marketing. Some designers prefer systems that operate as if by
magic, delivering results without muddying the user experience with details of a complicated
process. In contrast, I suggest that enabling active engagement with the process shows users that an
algorithm exists and gives them an important sense that they are not controlled by an algorithm but
are a part of one, and can have some influence on its results. Indeed, the algorithm can offer users
agency, control, and a deeper relationship with the platform itself.
In conclusion, given the recent rise of concerns among many parties over the ethical and social
consequences of opaque algorithms in search, news and other applications, it is high time for
interaction designers to bring their own approaches to the conversation. Arguments for algorithm
transparency by ethicists or journalists may strike more pragmatic developers as unrealistic, and
product satisfaction or popularity as a primary standard for evaluating success will strike others
as inadequate for ensuring sound civic roles for these powerful platforms. Like many complex
infrastructures, our algorithmic platforms reflect the influence of economic interests, empirical
and design research, and competing foundational assumptions about collective living. If the best
systems have achieved success through careful integration of such disparate approaches into the
design process, certainly our algorithms deserve the same.
5.7 CONCLUSION
This study illustrates that many Facebook users are not aware of the existence of News Feed
algorithmic curation despite using it on a regular basis. I have observed that users’ awareness of
Facebook filtering algorithm is awakened by their active engagement with the algorithm outputs
such as adjusting their News Feed content. I believe these findings suggest new research avenues,
investigating the relationship between the exposure to hidden algorithms outputs, interaction with
those outputs and the awareness level of those algorithms.
After being exposed to FeedVis and seeing the impacts of the curation algorithm surprised,
concerned or dissatisfied many Unaware participants initially. However, over the course of the study,
many became gradually more satisfied with the filtering process. When observing the algorithm
outcomes, participants recognized that the algorithm hid many stories that were not mainly related
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to them (e.g. likes, happy birthdays). Following up with the participants, I found that while gaining
insight about the algorithm via our tool affected users’ usage behaviours substantially, it almost did
not change their satisfaction level with News Feed.
This chapter shows that a seamful design like FeedVis could help users to gain awareness about
the opaque algorithms they deal with everyday. However, it is still an open question whether adding
seams into an opaque algorithm actually affects how users develop theories about the algorithm’s
operation and use those theories in action. The next chapter addresses this gap.
Another question which still needs investigation is that how much information about such opaque
algorithms is adequate to satisfy the needs of effective interaction design, principled and ethical
use, civic good, and, pragmatically, the protection of proprietary interest. In Chapter 7 & 8, I take a
first step in answering this question by evaluating the current transparency mechanisms in opaque
algorithmic systems, and then investigating the impacts of different levels of transparency on users’
perception of algorithmic decisions.
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CHAPTER 6: THEORY DEVELOPMENT VIA SEAMFUL DESIGN
In the previous chapter, I showed that becoming aware of the existence of a feed curation
algorithm via a seamful design helps users to have a more informed, yet engaging and satisfying
interaction, with the system. However, it remains unclear how a seamful design affect users’
reasoning about the operation of an algorithm (beyond its existence), and the theories users develop
about it. In this chapter, I describe the other part of the study I did in the previous chapter to explore
the interplay between folk theories and seamful design in the domain of social media feed curation
algorithms.
6.1 INTRODUCTION
In the study I did in Chapter 5, I also sought to discover the folk theories of News Feed curation
held by Facebook users before and during the probe that FeedVis provided for users. While Chapter
5 reported on the degree to which users were aware of the algorithm, what factors resulted in
awareness, and its effects on user behavior, this chapter reports findings about how users reason and
talk about their ideas about the operation of the algorithm – their folk theories. To make following
these findings easier, here I describe the study design again, but this time focusing on the parts that
were related to extracting users’ folk theories about the algorithm’s operation. Therefore, some
parts might have overlap with the methodology section in Chapter 5.
I found that revealing the outputs of the algorithm in a new way and incorporating intentional
seams into the feed in a structured manner helped participants who were unaware of the algorithm’s
existence develop theories similar to participants who were aware of the algorithm’s presence prior
to the study. Several of these theories were unexpected. In considering theories’ functionality, I
learned that users called on theories they had control over to guide their behavior. I conclude that
foregrounding these automated processes may increase interface design complexity, but it may also
add usability benefits.
6.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Facebook has provided an abstracted model of the News Feed curation process in its public
blog, describing the three most important features involved in the algorithm: engagement (“see
more stories that interest you from friends you interact with the most), popularity (“the number of
comments and likes a post receives”) and story format (“what kind of story it is; e.g. photo, video,
status update”) [136]. This, however, is only a quite vague description of an algorithm that uses
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close to 100k factors to choose the best stories from the large pool of potential stories for a user’s
News Feed [126]. Therefore, users still build their own theories about how this algorithm might
work and much remains unknown about which folk theories exist to make sense of such algorithms,
the connection between design and the development of folk theory, and the utility of these theories.
To address these lacunae, in this chapter I investigate:
RQ1: After typical use of News Feed, what folk theories do users hold that explain the curation
algorithm?
RQ2: Does providing seams into the Facebook News Feed algorithm help users develop new
theories or change their existing theories about the algorithm? If so, how?
RQ3: Do users perceive their theories to be useful?
6.3 METHOD
To address these research questions, I devised a three-phase qualitative laboratory study using a
within-subjects design as a part of a larger study that some of its parts were described in Chapter
5. In the first phase, I evaluated the participants’ awareness of the algorithm’s existence. I then
interviewed those participants who were aware of the algorithm’s presence in their News Feed to
understand their preexisting folk theories about the algorithm’s operation. In the second phase,
termed the probe, I revealed algorithm outputs to the participants through a custom Facebook
application (FeedVis) [137]. Through this probe I sought to understand how differing visualizations
of their News Feed affected participants’ folk theories of the curation algorithm. In the third
phase, I asked how participants would use the theories they developed during the probe to alter
the News Feed’s behavior. Each participant spent from 1 to 3 hours in the laboratory during the
study. Participants received $10/hour for the interview. The participant pool was the same pool that
I described earlier in Chapter 5.
I took elaborate precautions to minimize experimenter and demand effects throughout all phases.
After confirming an algorithm existed in News Feed, participants, especially the Unaware par-
ticipants asked many questions. To avoid leading participants towards particular theories, the
interviewer followed a protocol wherein she did not respond to questions about the algorithm’s
functionality. In response to participants’ questions about News Feed’s algorithmic process, she
consistently replied, “I don’t have any more information than you do about how Facebook works.”
In addition, she was consistent in following a script for both close-ended and open-ended questions
and did not validate or deny any theories. I provide further methodological details in the appendices.
I emphasize that while the Aware participants’ theories discovered in the first phase developed
naturally from their regular Facebook usage, the theories proposed during the probe phase are
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Figure 6.1: FeedVis Content View. It is composed of two columns: all stories written by the users
friends (left) and those shown in News Feed (right).
affected by the FeedVis design and the seams I chose to reveal. I elaborate on this seam selection in
the discussion.
6.3.1 Phase 1: Pre-Probe
After inviting participants to the lab, I began by asking them questions to understand their
awareness level of the filtering process in their News Feed. As previously reported and analyzed
in Chapter 5, I presented participants with a scenario: I asked them to imagine that their friend,
“Sarah,” posted a story visible to all her friends in Facebook. I then asked them whether and why
this specific story would or would not appear in their News Feed. I refer to those participants who
believed that Sarah’s story might not appear on their feed due to News Feed algorithmic curation as
“Aware” participants and the rest as “Unaware” participants. I next asked the Aware participants to
scroll down their News Feed and explain how they thought Facebook chose what to display in their
News Feed. During this open-ended discussion, participants described their theories about how the
algorithm functions in great detail.
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Figure 6.2: FeedVis Friend View. Shows three categories of friends: rarely, sometimes and mostly
shown, based on the percentage of shown stories.
6.3.2 Phase 2: Algorithm Probe
My goal in the second phase was to provide an alternative view of News Feed to see how (or if)
this new information changed participants’ understanding of the algorithm. I walked participants
through an algorithmic probe to show them two alternative views of the algorithm’s outputs that
highlight differences in content (with or without curation) and across people (whose stories are
shown or hidden).
The first view, the Content View (Figure 6.1), displayed stories that appeared in the user’s feed
(“Shown Stories”) adjacent to stories posted by a user’s network of friends (“All Stories”). I obtained
“Shown Stories”, in the right column, by querying user id/home/user via Facebook’s API 1.0. While
this column consisted of stories the algorithm chose for user’s News Feed, the user might miss some
stories if they did not log into Facebook or if they scrolled through the feed too quickly. The left
column, “All Stories”, contained the union of friend id/feed/ queries for every friend. This content
view highlights the difference in length between the two columns and emphasizes the stories that
were hidden from the user by color (shown stories in blue & hidden stories in white).
I first walked the participants through this view and asked them to scroll through the interface
and compare the “Shown Stories” and “All Stories” columns, sharing their thoughts aloud about
the columns’ differences, noting anything they found interesting or surprising. I then started a
discussion with participants by asking them to explain the possible reasons that some certain stories
had been filtered out and others had not. In continuing this discussion, I chose some hidden stories
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and asked participants “What criteria do you think Facebook might have used to decide to exclude
the item from the feed?” Through this open-ended discussion, I sought to understand the possible
theories participants developed about how the filtering algorithm might work.
I then used another FeedVis view, the Friend View (Figure 6.2), to show the participants their
Facebook friend network sorted into three groups based on the proportion of each individual’s
stories that were selected by the algorithmic sort for inclusion in News Feed. One group, “rarely
shown,” displayed friends for whom 10% or less of their stories appeared in the participant’s Feed;
“sometimes shown,” for whom approximately half of their stories were shown; and “mostly shown,”
whose stories almost always appeared. Absolute numbers of shown and hidden stories from a
friend appeared in each group (i.e., to distinguish proportions such as two shown stories out of
four stories versus 60 shown stories out of 120 stories). I asked participants to compare the three
groups and discuss their thoughts on why some friends’ stories appear less than others in the feed. I
chose some friends from each group and asked participants “What criteria do you think Facebook
might have used in deciding how much material to release into your feed?” for each friend. I
started by grouping nine friends into these categories, and gradually enlarged the list, checking with
participants at each point to see if and how their theories evolved.
6.3.3 Phase 3: Post-Probe
After understanding participants’ folk theories of how the algorithm might work before and
during the probe, I wanted to know whether participants believed their theories were useful. To
explore this, I directed participants to two new FeedVis views where they could tweak algorithm
outputs. In the Friend Rearrangement View, users explicitly articulated which friends should belong
in each of the three categories (“rarely shown,” “sometimes shown,” or “mostly shown”). In the
Content Rearrangement View, participants selected which content News Feed should show and
which it should hide. After participants modified the content they wished to see and the friend
groupings, I chose a few modified friends/stories and asked the participants, “Do you think there
might be anything you could do to try and accomplish that change, simply through how you use
Facebook?” For example, if John was in the “rarely shown” category and they moved him to the
“mostly shown” category in FeedVis, what would they do in Facebook to see most of John’s stories?
This interview question allowed us to code which folk theories of Facebook’s operation had the
potential to affect planned behaviors by the user.
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6.3.4 Data Analysis
I recorded and transcribed the interviews to conduct qualitative data analysis on the transcripts1
using Nvivo [116]. I first employed line-by-line open coding to identify the participants’ theories in
each phase. I then revised and categorized the theories of each phase through a collaborative and
inductive process. Finally, I used axial coding to extract the relationships between the theories from
the different phases.
6.4 RESULTS
6.4.1 Pre-Probe Folk Theories (RQ1)
Fewer than half of the participants (n=15) were aware of the algorithm’s existence in their News
Feed [120]. I found that these participants employed abductive reasoning to develop theories;
reasoning from an observation to a simple and likely hypothesis although other hypotheses might
be possible [138, 139]. That is, they used the observation of their own feed to make sense of the
behavior of the algorithm. A few participants (n=3) reported learning about the algorithm from
external sources such as news articles and friends. I expect this to be part of developing folk
theories, as I take the prefix “folk” to be similar to its use in “folklore” in that a folk practice does
not necessarily denote an individual view, but rather ideas that are developed, shared, and circulated
by everyday people who are not expert.
Participants held multiple theories even when they could logically be considered mutually
exclusive. I also note that despite developing these theories, participants were often uncertain and
described the filtering process as “a very strange game [...] because [we] don’t really know what
the rules are” (P28). Nevertheless, many participants converged on similar theories. Here, I present
the four primary theories proposed by the Aware participants of how the algorithm might work
(Table 1, column 1) ordered by their relative prevalence (how many participants mentioned them).
The Personal Engagement Theory: The most common theory of feed curation among the
Aware participants was based on the amount of interactions they had with a friend on Facebook.
Most of the Aware participants believed that “the more interactions that you have with somebody,
the more their stuff will show up on your News Feed” (P15). From their point of view, engagement
mainly included commenting on or liking a friend’s stories: “If there are things on the News Feed
that I comment on or like, sometimes things [from that person] will start showing up more” (P13).
Believing that “[Facebook] can figure out who’s going on whose wall” (P26), some participants
argued that “when you go to [your friends’] sites more, if you go check out their stories, like you
1The resulting transcripts contained more than 160,000 words.
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read some of their stuff [...], you get them more [in] your News Feed” (P21). Messaging, poking,
tagging a friend, sharing their stories, visiting a friend’s wall or posting on a friend’s wall were
all forms of engagement that many believed could influence the algorithm. They also argued the
opposite: “if you are not interacting with a person too much then Facebook hides it [from News
Feed]” (P20).
I found that some participants used The Personal Engagement Theory in practice: “Sometimes
when I see someone on my News Feed who I don’t often see, I might go and click in [their timeline]
and so I can see their stuff more often” (P21). Interestingly, there were participants who used
this theory in reverse, trying to counteract their own previous interaction to avoid the effects they
theorized: “When I ‘like’ something, I usually hide it from my News Feed because I like it but I
don’t necessarily want to know all about it all the time” (P20). While they wanted to send a signal
to their friend via the “like” feature, they did not want their News Feed to change. In their view,
they added some weight to that friend and then removed some weight to maintain a balance.
While most Aware users thought their engagement level was one of the main factors affecting the
filtering process, some expressed uncertainty after describing their theories: “Sometimes I’m not
seeing anything on my News Feed from a particular person, and then I’ll go to their friend page
and I’ll check them out a little bit and then almost the next day more things from them start showing
up. So, I don’t know if Facebook is tracking who I’m interacting with and putting that on my News
Feed or if it just happens to be a coincidence or what ...” (P13).
The Global Popularity Theory: Some participants believed the likelihood that content would
appear was primarily measured by the number of “likes” and comments made by others: “The more
people that click that they like [a story], the more people that comment, the more people get to
see it” (P28). Sometimes popularity was envisioned as a threshold: “there’s got to be a certain
amount of popularity weight” (P33) for a story to appear in others’ News Feeds. A few participants
said that they used The Global Popularity Theory to affect their News Feed. For example, because
News Feed can not contain everything and it prioritizes popular content, they sometimes unfollowed
friends who produced popular content to be sure there was enough “open space” for stories from
others.
In addition to influencing their own News Feed, a few used The Global Popularity Theory to
affect others’ News Feeds: they purposefully “liked” or commented on their own stories, which
they hoped would make their stories more likely to appear in others’ feeds. In particular, business
page owners, who saw page followers as potential customers, consciously tried to increase their
follower count. While one way to increase this number is by purchasing “likes,” one participant
argued that this practice might decrease their profit: “[Suppose that] I’m going to buy more ‘likes’
and all of a sudden I had 2000 more [...] But what happens is they have a whole bunch of fake














Personal Engagement Theory 12 (80%) 15 (100%) 22 (88%) 6 (40%) 12 (48%)
Format Theory 2 (13%) 14 (93%) 23 (92%) – –
Control Panel Theory – 9 (60%) 12 (48%) 7 (46%) 10 (40%)
Theory of Loud and Quiet Friends – 7 (46%) 12 (48%) – –
Eye of Providence Theory – 6 (40%) 11 (44%) – –
Narcissus Theory 2 (13%) 6 (40%) 9 (36%) – –
OC Theory – 2 (13%) 10 (40%) – –
Global Popularity Theory 5 (33%) 2 (13%) 3 (12%) – –
Fresh Blood Theory – 3 (20%) 2 (8%) – –
Randomness Theory – 2 (13%) 3 (12%) – –
Table 6.1: Theories of feed curation proposed by participants in the pre-probe and probe phases and
their described utility in the post-probe phase; a participant might propose/utilize anywhere from
zero to many theories in each phase.
250 of them are getting it. But if 90% of those are fake, then fewer real people are seeing it. So it
doesn’t help you at all” (P28).
The Format Theory: A few participants thought some types of stories would be more likely to
appear in News Feed than the others. For example, P28 argued that stories composed of text had a
higher priority than videos or photos: “This is what I found: If you just do a written post, just words,
it reaches more people. As soon as you put a video or photo attached, they cut down how many
people are going to see it”.
The Narcissus Theory: In classical mythology, Narcissus loved his twin and his own reflection.
A few participants stated that their similarity to a friend would affect the number of stories they
would see from those friends: “I feel like people that I have sort of the least in common with are
the ones I tend not to see very much” (P34). Examples of features that characterized this theory
included “liking” the same stories, listing similar interests in the profile and belonging to the same
Facebook group. P13 stated, “Maybe if we’re from the same group, like the rugby people, I see
more from [them].”
6.4.2 Probe Folk Theories (RQ2)
After discussing the Aware participants’ theories in the pre-probe interviews, I walked both
Aware and Unaware participants through FeedVis. Participants again employed abductive reasoning
to develop their theories, this time by observing the FeedVis views of the News Feed’s outputs. I
present these theories below (Table 1, column 2).
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The Personal Engagement Theory, Revisited: This theory was previously mentioned in the
pre-probe by the Aware participants, but during the probe it was proposed by most participants.
They suggested that Facebook “has some kind of history of how [they] interact with things on
News Feed” (P39) and considered their interaction with others as an “interest gatherer” (P21) for
Facebook. In addition to the types of interaction already mentioned, some thought that clicking on
a friend’s story in their own News Feed would affect the algorithm: “I’m sure it adds something
to the algorithm that shows that you have an interest in a person” (P7). Some extended this view,
suggesting that Facebook tracked users’ reading behaviors by “monitoring scrolling [patterns]”
(P21) to understand whose stories they spent more time reading.
Based on this theory, participants suggested that “Facebook is doing some fancy [process] [...]
by virtue of who is tied with whom” (P3) to choose what to show to users. Given this theory, some
were surprised that friends they frequently interacted with did not appear in the “mostly shown”
category: “I’m kind of surprised about them because she just had a baby, and I’m constantly liking
pictures of her son. So, I would think she would be in the green [mostly shown group] because
I’m always on there and she’s always liking my things too so this is weird; She should be in the
green!” (P32). As highlighted by this example, the probe interface supported the development of
new theories but also challenged participants’ existing theories.
Participants worried about the possibility of negative feedback loops. For example, if they were
to interact with a friend too infrequently, they believed the algorithm might start hiding that friend’s
stories – making it harder to interact with her content in the future. One participant noted a friend
was rarely shown in her News Feed “because I don’t interact that much, but I don’t interact because
I don’t see his posts!” (P20). If they saw their friend’s stories, they might want to interact more: “I
feel like it’s somebody who never interacts with me on Facebook and I never interact with her but
it’s interesting that I might interact with her if I would see some stuff like this [that wasn’t made
visible to her]” (P19).
The Format Theory, Revisited: During the probe, users described an expansion of The Format
Theory: They often believed Facebook contained two kinds of stories: primary and secondary. From
the participants’ perspective, primary stories were in a format that conveyed important information:
e.g. the textual status update. In contrast, secondary stories were automated notifications, such
as those that declared that “people [were] interacting with each other” (P30), had “liked” or
commented on a story, became friends with someone, or sent birthday greetings. However, there
was no general agreement among participants about the value of some formats. While some believed
photos were clearly primary, others disagreed. Overall, participants stated that filtering secondary
stories made sense because their lower value: “This kind of stuff I don’t care to see, so I’m fine with
that being left off ” (P15).
The Control Panel Theory: After the probe, many participants posited that using some control
87
settings might affect their News Feed. Some stated that a friend’s stories were hidden from their
News Feed because of their input to the system: they had unfollowed or blocked that friend.
However, in other cases where the friend was not unfollowed or blocked, participants speculated
that a prior use of Facebook’s “I don’t want to see this” option on a status update might result in
more widespread filtering because their intent could have been interpreted more broadly by the
platform. Facebook might think they were no longer interested in that person. Some participants
thought this could apply similarly to story formats. That is, hiding a specific story format once
might cause widespread filtering of that format: “I’ve hidden things like this before, like the daily
horoscope and things like that, so maybe that’s why these types of things don’t show up on my feed”
(P35).
Adding people to Facebook lists was another action that some participants believed might trigger
the algorithm to show more or fewer stories from those people in News Feed: “And also whenever I
post a status, I post [it] to a custom group, and that group excludes people like family members.
So, that might weigh into the tie strength. So, my guess is that again algorithmically, they are
like ‘ok well obviously you don’t care about those [people]’” (P3). Adding friends to the “close
friends” list was another explanation for why more stories appeared from those specific friends. A
few participants stated that they used a Facebook control option that allowed them to specify what
format of stories (e.g. photos, “likes,” comments, status updates) they wanted to see from a friend.
The Theory of Loud and Quiet Friends: Some participants discussed how the amount of
content produced by a friend contributed to the presence of their stories in News Feed. While some
believed “if someone posts a lot on Facebook, then [you] will be more likely to see their posts”
(P22), others thought the opposite; they argued that the stories of users who posted more frequently
were more likely to be filtered out in the interest of fairness. Some suggested that Facebook was
“trying to filter the amount of information one person’s trying to put out” (P30) to avoid filling
people’s News Feeds with one person’s stories. If a user posts too much in a short period, they
thought Facebook filters them more aggressively: “Time definitely has something to do with it. If
they’re going to post every single post onto someone’s News Feed, someone could use that to their
advantage and literally post the same letter over and over and over again to bury someone else’s
message. Or they could possibly spam a message of [...] like ‘free the penguins’ and just copy
and paste, enter, copy and paste, enter, copy and paste, enter, and that’s going to absolutely fill up
whoever is on that list” (P30).
The Eye of Providence Theory: The Eye of Providence is the notion common to many religions
that God’s all-seeing eye is watching over you. In the U.S., its iconography is often accompanied
by the Latin “Annuit cptis”, literally meaning “it approves.” The participants who articulated this
theory thought that Facebook was powerful, perceptive, and ultimately unknowable. Adherents to
this theory said that Facebook saw into every story in some detail. They thought that Facebook was
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removing low quality content such as low resolution photos or very long stories. Some said that
Facebook matched newly contributed content against all other contributed content on the platform.
If a similar or identical photo, link, or status update was posted multiple times, “maybe somehow
Facebook recognized that it was the same thing and only announced it once” (P4).
Others took the idea that Facebook processes content even further. Several thought Facebook
uses face detection to prioritize photos of people over photos of objects or landscapes. Others
proposed that “there could be keywords that Facebook is taught to look for, identify, and if it sees it,
maybe puts it lower on the priority list” (P21). They believed that words about religion and politics
would be most likely to cause a story to be suppressed. For instance, some explained how political
stories were shown less in their News Feed compared to stories with other topics: “Now to the
average eye, you could probably think that the one that two girls sitting on a couch enjoying their
day was not filtered because it’s a lovely little picture and the other one [...] got filtered because
it’s highly saturated in government and politics” (P30). Overall, these participants believed that
Facebook avoided distributing political and religious content because it does “not want to even have
the opportunity to become polarized” (P24).
Some participants said that Facebook tried to adjust News Feed based on interests they specified
in their Facebook profile. “I don’t know if this is possible or not, but this guy [a friend’s name] and
the other guy [another friend’s name] always post these very liberal posts and you know, I tend
to be liberal in politics and I’m wondering [if that’s the reason]” (P27). However, perceptions of
Facebook’s all-seeing eye were negative: “It’s kind of weird. It’s like ‘don’t make those decisions for
me’ or ‘don’t pigeonhole me’; just because I said I’m liberal doesn’t mean I wanna see everybody’s
liberal stuff ” (P27).
Some adherents to the theory thought that interest-based filtering extended beyond Facebook,
suggesting that Facebook “tracks the outward links we’re following” (P21). A few suggested that
Facebook has wide access to any user behavior, on the platform or beyond it. “Because I do news
searches on world news, but that’s been through like CNN and Fox, not Facebook. But if Facebook
is linked to Google, then Facebook is getting that search saying, ‘Hey, [P10] is looking for political
news’ ” (P10).
The Narcissus Theory, Revisited: In addition to the instances of The Narcissus Theory men-
tioned in the pre-probe interviews, during the probe participants also considered family relationships,
“how many friends you share” (P3), and shared geography as potential sources of similarity. Partici-
pants speculated that Facebook could determine that users were family either via stated relationships
or by matching “the same last name” (P15). This theory was sometimes extended from the number
of mutual friends to the user’s relationship with those friends. For example, “It might be because
my wife is tied in with his wife and him pretty closely. So if my wife is looking at [a friend’s name’s]
page all the time, I’m tied in with my wife’s page so Facebook automatically ties me in all the time.
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So it’s like the association” (P10).
The OC Theory: On many Internet platforms, original content is referred to as “OC.” Some
participants thought that original “self-composed content” (P39) was shown more than shared
content. Therefore, they assumed that “when you upload your own photo versus just sharing
another photo from another Facebook page” (P19), it would more likely be displayed in News Feed.
Overall, “people who tend to create their own content” (P39) would have more stories appear on
others’ News Feeds.
The Global Popularity Theory, Revisited: This theory appeared in the pre-probe discussion,
but participants during the probe extended this idea of a popularity weight to friendships. For
example, a participant suggested that having many friends itself implied a higher level of personal
popularity which might trigger the algorithm to show more of that person’s stories: “I think it’s
possible that the people here [in ‘mostly shown’], they have more friends. So maybe they think they
are more social [...] for example, the number of [their] friends might be very large” (P1).
The Fresh Blood Theory: A few participants thought they saw most of a friend’s stories because
they had recently become friends on Facebook: “He recently friended me so maybe that’s why
[he’s in the ‘mostly shown’ column]” (P32). Some thought that Facebook might not have enough
information about new friends to filter well, so they suggested it might default to sharing all stories
from new friends.
The Randomness Theory: Finally, a few participants felt that the algorithm acted randomly: “It
looks to me that it’s very random on what it weeds out because I do sometimes see posts where
[a friend] is now friends with [a friend] but it looks like it’s not posting all of those” (P16). “I’m
guessing it only sends out 20% of [a friend’s] posts, and maybe it just randomly selects which ones”
(P28).
Theory Development with Seamful Design
Comparing the theories of Aware participants before and after the FeedVis probe, I found that they
extended their pre-probe theories and proposed new theories. This suggests the potential of such
visibility tools, even in cases where it is difficult or impossible to reveal the authoritative description
of a hidden algorithm. Although users were shown only outputs with and without algorithmic
curation, they were able to develop their mental model of how News Feed worked, extending or
exploring new ideas in response. Aware participants, while having preexisting theories, found that
the probe allowed for more exploration opportunities than the current News Feed interface: “This is
fantastic by the way. It’s lovely how you’ve made the trends and you can have hypotheses based
on what you’re seeing there” (P21). This exploration helped them confirm their existing theories:
“The study confirmed a lot of things I assumed, or knew, about Facebook already and how I was
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using Facebook actually did make a difference to the things I saw on my News Feed” (P20).
Since Unaware participants began with no initial theory of the algorithm’s functionality, I
compared their probe theories with the Aware participants’ probe theories. In doing so, I examined
whether providing visibility into the hidden algorithm’s outputs could help participants with no
prior understanding of the algorithm’s functionality reach a similar level of understanding as the
previously aware participants. Because I could not provide any “ground-truth” understanding of the
algorithm’s functionality, I considered Aware participants’ understanding or theories as a baseline
of the level of understanding that could be developed through Facebook usage and its interface.
Through this comparison, I found out that each theory was similarly prevalent in both the Aware
and Unaware groups (Table 1, column 2). That is, by the end of the probe, both groups had a
considerable stock of common understandings about how the algorithm might work. This rapid
similarity suggests that providing extra visibility could help the users rapidly develop new and
predictable conceptual understandings of a system.
6.4.3 Applying Theories to Achieve Desired Outputs (RQ3)
With the post-probe phase, I hoped to better understand whether the theories developed during
the probe would help users achieve their goals and more generally, how much control and influence
participants felt they had over their News Feed with and without particular theories. I found that
although the participants proposed many theories to explain how the algorithm might work, they
primarily resorted to two of them when trying to think of ways to accomplish their own tasks or
goals within the system.
Reasoning with The Personal Engagement Theory: This was the most common theory users
employed. They believed that changing the number of their interactions with a friend might
accomplish their rearrangement goals. The primary forms of interaction they mentioned were
“liking” or commenting: “I would assume the next time I see him post something, if I click ‘like’, or I
comment on it, I am more likely to see the next [story]” (P28). Other interpretations of engagement
were also proposed: “I feel that if I [...] look at her page more, that would maybe trigger something”
(P14). Or, “I would think that if looked for him, if I typed his name into the search, then I would
think that I started seeing his posts but I don’t know, that’s just my hunch” (P27). A few brought
up tagging, noting that “maybe tagging that person yourself; maybe Facebook starts recognizing
patterns that maybe you are interested in what that person is doing.” (P4). These participants
thought of changes in their engagement as a message or “an instigator” (P21) “that would cause
Facebook to recognize that [they] wanted to see [a friend’s] posts too much or not [at all]” (P36).
Facebook users thought their own behaviors in these circumstances were manipulative as they
did not represent a genuine or authentic interaction. In other words, they were forced to deceive the
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algorithm by changing their behavior. For example, one suggested that “you could just prod the
algorithm along” (P38) to move someone from the “rarely shown” to the “mostly shown” category
in FeedVis.
Reasoning with The Control Panel Theory: The second most common theory participants
relied upon was The Control Panel Theory. The settings they were interested in were primarily
those discussed earlier: following or unfollowing friends, hiding stories and using lists. “I could
probably just hide his posts to see less from him” (P20). “If [my] theories are correct, I can make
sure he’s on one of my kind of self-created groups of people” (P39). A few suggested “to go to
the friends button [...] and click on ‘show on News Feed’ [option]” (P9). There were also a few
participants who believed that “there has to be a filter on Facebook” (P10) that can be controlled to
achieve their rearrangements, though they were not aware of where it might be or how it would
work.
Despite proposing a variety of actions, participants following both The Control Panel Theory
and The Personal Engagement Theory were uncertain of their efficacy: “I don’t know if my writing
on a person’s wall has anything to do with it or not” (P39). Of all the participants, eight could
not suggest any method to reach their rearrangement goals. For example, in an attempt to find a
way to change a story written by her cousin from the hidden to the shown category, one participant
eventually stated that she did not “know if there’s a way you can decide what you see from a person”
(P15). Although these participants developed theories for how the algorithmic filtering operates,
they asserted that “there’s a lot [they] don’t know and understand about Facebook” (P31) that
prevented them from proposing any theory on how to accomplish a modification task such as this
one: “If I understood how Facebook chose to do what they did, then I would know what I needed
to do but since I don’t know what that is, I don’t know. If they told me what to do, I would do it!”
(P35).
Beyond these two theories, why did the other folk theories go unused? In the Personal Engage-
ment Theory and The Control Panel Theory, the participants considered themselves an active party
with the power to change the inputs to the algorithm; for the remainder of their theories, they did
not. In other theories, the main sources of agency were either other Facebook users, Facebook
itself, or both. For example, if a user believed The Format Theory, there was no way to act on this
theory for content to produced by others: they had no ability to make a friend upload more photos
and less text. Some of the remaining folk theories do have potential behavioral implications in
other contexts. The Eye of Providence Theory might lead a user who was concerned about privacy
to carefully monitor the identifying information that appears in their own Web searches, as they
believe everything they do is being collected and sent to Facebook. Alternately, the theory might
lead them to abandon attempts to protect their privacy – the all-seeing eye is so powerful, it might
make such attempts seem futile.
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6.5 LIMITATIONS
I found these results provocative, but the small, non-representative sample leaves us unable
to assess folk theories across all Facebook users, much less all people. This study did not use a
randomized experimental design, therefore it cannot state that particular probes cause particular
kinds of reasoning. It is also important to note that the elicitation procedure used in this study is
intentionally a demand response. That is, I almost certainly produced some folk theories in the
minds of the participants when they may have held no theory at all before participating in this study.
The within-subjects design is intended to expose users to several views of Facebook as puzzles
in order to maximize the chance to observe and collect reasoning and variance in folk theories.
Although I achieved a diverse sample, the prevalence of these theories “in the wild” cannot be
measured by this research design, and is left for future work.
6.6 DISCUSSION
6.6.1 The Power of Seams
In this study, FeedVis introduced seams to flag that Facebook News Feed curation algorithms were
doing behind-the-scenes work, provoking the users to speculate about how that algorithmic work
might function. System-builders wish to hide this mediation for both pragmatic and self-serving
reasons. On Facebook, a discontinued service previously known as “sponsored stories” allowed
advertisers to pay to use status update text and images of users as advertisements. According to
journalists, most users were unaware their contributed materials could be used in this way, making
sponsored stories “one of Facebook’s most unpopular” and controversial features for those users
who were aware of it [140]. Yet most users probably never knew their writing could be sponsored,
as the feed interface blended advertising and so-called “organic” posts in a way difficult to visually
disentangle. It is unlikely that commercial platforms will highlight mediations such as invasive
personal data collection or resale.
Seamful interfaces may then be legitimately seen as a tool for the user to be empowered against
a system when their interests might differ. Seams could be deployed to build trust and dispel
suspicion. This study of seamful design, however, demonstrates additional roles for the practice.
Using FeedVis combined the experience of learning about a platform that was important in the
participant’s lives with the experience of introspection about their own relationships. I speculate
that seams themselves can be pleasurable, as they satisfy curiosity as readily as they might produce
oversight.
I found that participants’ ability to derive theories was a function of the information revealed via
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the seams in our interfaces. This information is present on the Facebook web interface; it is simply
displayed differently, in some cases with different seams. The participants in this study noticed
features such as story format and engagement with friends, probably stemming from the Content
View and Friend View, respectively. This certainly suggests that choosing which seams to reveal
affects the theories that people create. While no design can or even should reveal all the possible
seams into an algorithmic system, this finding shows that selecting specific seams would affect
users’ understanding of algorithmic systems. The exploration of seams in algorithmic processes is
in its infancy. This work presents a first step.
This study’s intervention revealed seams through a third-party interface. I stated earlier that seams
make elements visible when the user actively chooses to understand or modify that system. This
approach enables selective exploration, but it is not the only approach. Accidental or unintentional
reveals in the main interface as well as variance due to A/B testing catalyze community discussion
and exploration. I ponder how institutionalizing an intermittent “glitch” day or hour, whereby a
system would temporarily reveal potential debugging or additional information (e.g., audience size)
would affect the community and their algorithm awareness.
Finally, I should note that during the past few years, we received many requests from CS
departments, I-Schools, and Design programs to make FeedVis public. We are still receiving
requests for it. However, the Facebook API at its core no longer exists, and while I could have
replicated the FeedVis functionality via scraping, I made the decision to abide by Facebook’s terms
of service. However, I hope that more systems provide opportunities that allow researchers or even
regular users to tweak the system design by adding seams into the system.
6.6.2 Uncertainty: Challenges & Opportunities
Though using the probe helped many participants propose new theories or extend their existing
theories, participants were still uncertain about some of their proposed theories. For example,
some participants proposed a theory and then noticed in the probe that the theory did not work
everywhere: “I have absolutely no clue, because I don’t even talk to that person on a regular basis –
which I thought is what they show me: ‘people whom I talk to’ ” (P15). Such inconsistencies made
it difficult for some to “see any type of pattern ” (P4) to develop a theory. A few participants even
argued that the algorithm might function randomly in some cases.
While the uncertainty resulting from inconsistent outputs confused some participants, it prompted
others to further reflect on the algorithmic process. In these cases, participants found the incon-
sistency more intriguing than confusing: “It’s interesting that it shows me that somebody liked a
webpage but it won’t show me when a friend changes a picture” (P5). It prompted them to examine
many News Feed features simultaneously and come to the realization that some received more
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weight than others. I posit that uncertainty stemming from seamful design can lead users to deeper
thinking and even more creative and innovative use of the system.
6.6.3 Agency
I found that participants relied on two of their theories, and they could not imagine applying their
other theories. In fact, in most of their proposed theories, they did not see themselves as possessing
any agency; either the content creators or the algorithm determined what they saw. And yet, in the
post-probe phase, users clearly did have goals and tasks they wished to accomplish – changing
which people they saw most frequently or what types of stories they saw. However, many users
see even these simple tasks as being outside of their abilities. This suggests an important area for
potential growth in interface design: changing the design to give users a greater feeling of agency
over their News Feed and promoting learning about it using seamful design.
6.6.4 Folk Theories and Platforms
Reflecting on the folk theories I discovered, I conclude that they may be formed in a process
of interactions between a user’s prior assumption about a platform’s status or motive and their
experience of seams. For instance, the Control Panel Theory and the Eye of Providence Theory
both envision a position of powerlessness, but the former posits filtering is unmanageable due
to the user’s personal limitations, while the latter suggests it is due to a vast power differential
with the platform. Other filtering theories may be epiphenomenal of assumptions about fairness —
for instance, some imply a commitment to representing all voices (the theory of Loud and Quiet
Friends, Randomness). This suggests a critical role for future research that disambiguates the role
of seams, trust in the platform, perceived personal efficacy, and other factors.
6.7 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I investigated folk theories of a diverse, non-probability sample of 40 Facebook
users before, during, and after being presented alternative displays of Facebook’s News Feed
curation algorithm’s output. Interviews revealed 10 “folk theories” of automated curation, some
quite unexpected. Users who were given a probe into the algorithm via an interface that incorporated
seams (FeedVis) could quickly develop theories. Users made plans that depended on their theories.
I conclude that foregrounding these automated processes may increase interface design complexity,
but it can add usability benefits.
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CHAPTER 7: DESIGNING AROUND ALGORITHM TRANSPARENCY
Chapter 6 showed that while users might have no visibility into an opaque algorithm’s operation,
they still develop folk theories about how the algorithm might work and adjust their behavior based
on those theories (at least those that they feel having agency over). This shows users do see a
need for increased transparency about how an opaque algorithm works. However, it is not clear
that how disclosing aspects of an opaque algorithm’s operation affects users’ perception of and
interaction with the system. In this chapter, I take a first step in answering this question by a)
evaluating existing transparency mechanisms about how behavioral advertising algorithms work,
and b) understanding what aspects of an adverting algorithm’s operation users would want to be
disclosed in their ad experience, if they had access to full transparency into the system.
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The opacity of advertising algorithms, along with their potential for violating user privacy, has
resulted in a call for algorithmic transparency—a call to communicate how an ad is tailored to
users. Advertising is the primary means of financing Internet services, although for some it is one
of the least favorite aspects of the online experience. To increase the effectiveness of advertising,
marketers have started to use behavioral targeting, which algorithmically infers who likes what by
collecting users’ behavior [141]. However, the opacity of algorithmic ad tailoring has raised privacy
concerns and decreased user trust in advertisers. Researchers, activists, and regulators argue that
if advertisers want positive relationships with their potential customers, advertisers must clearly
communicate their algorithmic ad curation process [142, 143].
Many advertising platforms now give users the opportunity to learn about ad tailoring processes
by showing more information when users click on a question like “Why am I seeing this ad?”
[144, 145]. However, algorithmic transparency is not straightforward. Explaining a complex
algorithm’s behavior accurately, comprehensively, and briefly in a non-technical way is challenging
[1]. Even in cases where it is easy to provide users with an interpretable explanation about an
algorithmic curation process, providing explanations is not an unmitigated good. For example,
providing students with too much or too little information about a grading algorithm both diminished
students’ trust in the grading system [90]. Explanations are more challenging in behavioral
advertising because revealing curation processes may create new privacy concerns [146, 147]. How
revealing aspects of the algorithmic ad curation process will affect user perception of behavioral
advertising remains an open question.
I take a first step toward addressing this question by conducting a qualitative user study in which
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I exposed 32 users to three distinct lenses in online behavioral advertising: 1) why a specific ad
is shown to them, 2) what attributes an advertising algorithm infers about them, and 3) how an
advertiser uses this information to target users. Through this process, I investigated participants’
perceptions of different communication mechanisms in online behavioral advertising. I then
evaluated how users desired the inner workings of the advertising algorithmic process to be reflected
in their ad experience.
I discovered that vague and oversimplified language made many existing ad explanations unin-
terpretable and sometimes untrustworthy. Participants were most satisfied with explanations that
included specific information that an advertiser used to target an ad. However, participants did not
wish to see information that they considered “creepy”. They also preferred explanations that related
to an important and recognizable part of their identity. Participants were especially appreciative
when these valued traits were inferred by an algorithm.
I learned that disclosing algorithmically-inferred interests, particularly those that are wrongly
inferred, can lead users who assumed algorithmic authority—that advertising algorithms are percep-
tive, powerful, and sometimes scary—to algorithm disillusionment—that algorithms are not scary
and powerful, or even effective. I conclude the chapter with design implications which can provide
users with a more informed, honest, and satisfying interaction with their personalized ads.
7.1.1 Process Communication in Online Behavioral Advertising
In this chapter, I turn my attention to the complex problem of transparency in online behavioral
advertising and how advertising algorithms tailor ads to users. Prior work has shown that a user’s
lack of information about personalized ad tailoring can result in mixed feelings towards ads in
general [147, 143]. Users hold inaccurate or incomplete “folk models” about how online behavioral
advertising works [148, 149]. Sometimes, users believe that advertising algorithms collect more
data than they actually do, causing privacy concerns [143]. Recent work has shown that when
advertisers do provide some information about how ads are tailoring, it is incomplete, vague, and
misleading [150].
This failure to communicate algorithmic processes to users [151] has resulted in efforts by
researchers and activists to reverse-engineer ad targeting mechanisms [152, 153] to give users
control over their ads and to inform them of who tracks them [154]. Researchers also have built
tools like Floodwatch [73] and visualizations like “Behind the Banner” [155] that create a multi-
faceted view of ads to inform users of data advertisers might collect [156] and what can be inferred
from that data [157]. As another strategy, ProPublica’s browser plugin “What Facebook Thinks
You Like” collects information from the Ad Preferences settings page [158].
These approaches have usually resulted in more negative attitudes towards behavioral advertising.
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Using browser plugins that make users aware of existing tracking practices in online advertising
[146] or informing users about the types of personal data advertisers use to tailor ads [159, 147] has
increased users’ privacy concerns and decreased their trust and preference in behavioral advertising.
However, these disclosures were all from third-parties, not advertisers themselves. Therefore, it
remains unknown how users would perceive personalized ads if effective disclosures came from the
advertisers themselves as a sign of effort to provide transparency and trust. In this dissertation, I
take a step towards filling this gap by evaluating the current transparency mechanisms provided by
advertisers, as well as users’ desired level of transparency about how their ads are tailored to them.
7.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In this study, I began to investigate the communication of algorithmic processes in online
behavioral advertising. I first explored how advertisers currently choose to communicate the
algorithmic process to users. Usually this communication is in the form of an option such as
“AdChoices”, “Why am I seeing this ad?”, “Why this ad?”, etc. I call this an ad explanation (see
Figures 7.4, 7.5, and 7.6 for examples). To understand the effectiveness of these techniques, I asked:
RQ1: a) How do users perceive and evaluate existing ad explanations? b) Given the opportunity
to craft their own ad explanations, how do users’ preferred ad explanations compare to the existing
ad explanations?
The existing ad explanations, however, only disclose the tip of the behavioral advertising iceberg.
To tailor ads to users, advertising algorithms analyze user behavior to build a profile for users
that includes their attributes and interests. While usually hidden, a few advertisers have started to
disclose these inferred profiles, or at least a part of them (Figure 7.1). Advertisers interact with these
algorithmically-derived attributes to identify their desired audience via an ad targeting interface
(Figure 7.2). These advertiser interfaces often provide more information about what is happening
inside the black box of online advertising than information intended for users; however, they are
usually not easily visible to users. Therefore, I asked:
RQ2: When exposed to typically hidden inner attributes of an algorithmic advertising platform
(such as users’ algorithmically-derived attributes and how advertisers use them), how do users think
about and evaluate these attributes?
7.3 METHOD
I conducted a lab study in which I exposed 32 Internet users to different disclosures about
how their online ads are tailored to them and interviewed them about the experience. First, users
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viewed their actual personalized ads and the explanations given by advertisers about why they were
seeing those ads. I call this the Ad Explanation View. Next, users saw a view that showed what
an advertising algorithm has inferred about them—the Algorithm View. Finally, users used an ad
creation interface to experience creating an advertisement in the Advertiser View. In this phase,
users were asked to imagine an audience that they belonged to for a specific product and target it.
Following both the Ad Explanation View and the Advertiser View, users wrote their own desired
explanation for a product of interest. I called this a Speculative Design Task. All interviews (of one
and a half to three hour duration) were audio recorded and transcribed for analysis.
7.3.1 The Ad Explanation View
I started the study with a pre-interview to understand participants’ understanding of and opinions
about behavioral advertising. I first asked participants whether they found advertising useful and
how they usually interact with their ads. Next, I explained the practice of behavioral advertising to
participants who were not previously aware. I then evaluated participants’ awareness of existing
ad explanations (see Figures 7.4, 7.5, and 7.6 for examples). If a participant was aware of these
explanations, I asked if they could point to any explanations on their own ads. If they were not, I
showed the participant ad explanations on popular public sites.
In the next step, I sought participants’ opinions on some existing ad explanations. For ecological
validity, I asked participants to view ads and the ads’ explanations (if present) on a browser of their
own personal device (laptop, tablet, or smartphone). In this way, participants could see ads that
were actually tailored to them and that reflected the interests and attributes inferred by real systems.
Participants were free to view any site where they usually see ads. If they could not think of
one, I suggested news and social media sites that usually contain ads. For each ad a participant
chose to discuss, I asked if they thought it was generic or personalized. If they believed the ad was
personalized, I asked why they thought it was shown to them. Participants then offered their opinion
on the ad explanation (if present) and discussed how well the ad explanation described why that ad
was presented to them. I continued this process until each participant had observed explanations
from at least five different advertisers. Participants compared the explanations and stated which
they preferred more, and why.
7.3.2 The Advertising Algorithm View
In the second view, I provided all participants with more information by showing them the
interests and demographic features that the Facebook advertising algorithm inferred about them
(Figure 7.1). I checked for users’ prior awareness of this Algorithm View, and demonstrated this
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view to those who were unaware of it via the interviewer’s Facebook account using Facebook’s
”Manage Your Ad Preferences” option. Next, participants explored their own actual Facebook
Algorithm View, and talked about the algorithmically-inferred attributes they felt comfortable
sharing. During this phase, I asked participants to discuss these attributes and how these attributes
aligned with their identity. Although I term this the Algorithm View for this report, I did not use the
word “algorithm” during any part of the study.
Figure 7.1: Algorithm View: This view shows the interests that the Facebook advertising algorithm
infers about a user.
7.3.3 The Advertiser View
After discussing the Algorithm View, I demonstrated the Advertiser View, which discloses
still more information to users. In this view, an advertiser can build a target audience based on
demographics, interests, and behaviors via a variety of inferred attributes (see Figure 7.2).
I first asked participants to choose a product or service they were interested in and might purchase
in the near future. Next, I asked them to use the Facebook Advertiser View to create a target audience
consisting of users similar to themselves. At this point, many participants noticed that attributes
from their Algorithm View appeared as target attributes in this Advertiser View. Participants were
allowed to refer to anything in the previously shown Algorithm View.
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Figure 7.2: Advertiser View. This view shows the options given to an advertiser when creating an
ad for Facebook.
7.3.4 A Speculative Design Task
To understand how participants would like advertisers to communicate the algorithmic process to
users, I asked them to design an ad explanation for a product or service of interest to them. This
design task was conducted two times: First after the participants viewed the Ad Explanation View
and again after created a target audience using the Advertiser View. These tasks complemented
each other. In the first speculative design task, participants were not yet aware of the “exact” factors
used to target ads to them, while in the second, they were. I compared the explanations of these
two tasks to see how awareness of exact targeted attributes was reflected in participants’ desired ad
explanations.
Writing an Explanation after the Ad Explanation View
After they viewed some of their own ads and explanations, participants chose another ad that they
found interesting or relevant without looking at its explanation (if it had any) and guessed why the
advertiser tailored this ad to them. Next, they wrote an explanation for this ad that they desired the
advertiser to show. To minimize design fixation and maximize diversity, I provided participants with
examples based on press reports [160, 161, 162] that were very different from previously viewed ad
explanations (see Figure 7.3). I avoided explanations that listed obvious demographic categories
(e.g., age) or behavior (e.g., you visited a page about X) because participants had already seen such
explanations in the Ad Explanation View1.
1In our pilot studies, this speculative design task was given prior to viewing existing ad explanations to minimize
fixation. However, I found that many participants had never seen an ad explanation before, and therefore had trouble
writing one. Therefore, I moved this task after the Ad Explanation View.
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Figure 7.3: Examples: I gave participants diverse examples from trade press: a vague explanation
(left), an explanation that stated something that the user was never asked to explicitly disclose
(middle), and one that described a characteristic of the user’s network (right).
Writing an Explanation after the Advertiser View
After targeting “people like themselves” in the Advertiser View phase, participants wrote an
explanation from the perspective of an advertiser to provide the audience (people like them) with
an explanation for why they were targeted. Participants were free to look at the Advertiser View
and use any information in their ad explanation, including the features they just chose to target
the ad. Participants were then told that the ad would appear on their own Facebook News Feed
because they were a part of that audience. They then evaluated their ad explanation design from the
perspective of a user, and described what they liked or did not like. To reiterate, note that I asked
participants to target an audience as an advertiser, to write an ad explanation as an advertiser, but
then I asked them to evaluate and revise it as a Facebook user. In pilot studies, I found that this
ordering was necessary so that users were not confused about which role (advertiser or audience)
they were playing during a specific task.
7.3.5 Participants
This is a small-sample laboratory study, yet it was still imperative to avoid a convenience sample
of computing students or professionals with insider perspectives about social media platforms
and algorithmic processes. I therefore used craigslist to recruit participants from San Francisco,
California and the surrounding area. I requested participants with Facebook accounts who could
bring their own personal device. From the 207 replies I received, I performed non-probability
modified quota sampling to balance five characteristics with the proportions of the US population:
gender, age, education, race/ethnicity and socioeconomic status. I recruited 32 participants with
various occupations such as hair stylist, driver, mechanic, etc. The participants in our sample were
50% women and were 18 to 64 years old: 18-24 (12.5%), 25-34 (37.5%), 35-44 (19%), 45-54
(28%), and 55-65 (3%). The sample consisted of Caucasian (47%), Asian (16%), African-American
(12%), Hispanic (6%) participants. The rest (19%) were multiracial. 44% of the participants had an
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income of less than $50,000, 43% between $50,000 - $150,000, and 13% greater than $150,000.
Participants had reached varying levels of education: high school graduates (3%), some college
experience (34%), Associate’s degree (9%), Bachelor’s degree (38%), and Master’s degree or above
(16%). Participants received $60 for their participation.
7.3.6 Data Analysis
To discover and organize the main themes discussed by participants, one researcher first conducted
line-by-line open coding and labeled preliminary codes for each interview. Next, the researcher
used axial coding to extract the relationships and similarities between themes to group them
into categories. I used Nvivo [116]—a qualitative data analysis tool— to map all interviewees’
statements to our categories and subcategories. Three researchers then conducted face-to-face
meetings to discuss and revise the extracted themes for agreement.
7.4 WHY AM I SEEING THIS AD? (RQ1)
I found that only five of the participants were aware of the existence of ad explanations: “Some-
times there’s a little text. It’s like ‘why am I seeing this?,’ and it tells you, ‘based on your certain
interests, I thought this would be applicable to you.’ [...] It was just interesting information. It was
like, ‘oh, cool.’ ” (P13). The rest had never seen an ad explanation and they “don’t think the ad’s
going to tell me how it was being tailored to me” (P18) or vaguely remembered an ad disclosure
icon but “never clicked on it” (P10). However, they were still “curious of why and how that happens”
(P25). Some (n=8) became surprised when they saw an ad explanation during the study as they did
not expect that an advertiser would reveal such information: “That seems fairly transparent and
nice, and it’s weird because I didn’t even know it was there [chuckle]” (P6).
When participants compared the actual ad explanations that they saw, participants’ reactions var-
ied based on the 1) interpretability, 2) “creepiness”, and 3) linkage to identity of the ad explanations.
These factors were also reflected in the ad explanations participants designed later in the study.
7.4.1 Interpretability
Many advertisers used vague and simplistic language in their ad explanations, making it difficult
for users to understand why they were seeing an ad. For example, Figure 7.4(a) states that an
ad has been targeted to a user based on interests inferred from the user’s browsing activity. This
explanation, however, does not describe what those interests were or any specific browsing activities.




Figure 7.4: Two uninterpretable explanations. Both lack specificity about what activity or interest
has resulted in a user being targeted for this ad. Although (b) is more detailed than (a), the lack of
specificity made it still uninterpretable.
stated that these explanations “seem like a black box.” A lack of explicit connection between the ad
explanation and the ad made the explanation unsatisfactory and uninterpretable: “This just tells you
how they do it for every ad, it doesn’t tell you why it’s that specific ad” (P13).
Some advertisers tried to elaborate the types of browsing activity they used to target ads to users
(see Figure 7.4(b)). However, participants rejected those statements that did not match a particular
activity to a particular ad by arguing that these did not count as explanations: “That’s pretty
broad, just saying ‘search history, other devices or cookies,’ without saying what specific searches
I did make” (P14). Furthermore, unspecific statements prompted users to express uncertainty:
“This doesn’t say anything specific; so I don’t know what information they’re looking at” (P3).
They argued that these explanations “had a lot of text but really just said nothing specific” (P14).
Using this standard, participants identified the majority of advertiser statements as not really being
explanations. Even advertiser statements that included information new to the participants were
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viewed negatively if this information was about how ad targeting worked in general and not about a
specific ad.
Interpretable Explanations
A minority of advertiser statements were interpretable–they provided specific information about
the data or the inferences an advertising algorithm used to target a particular ad to a user. Figure
7.5(a) shows an example which explains that an ad has been targeted due to a user’s visit to a
specific website, age range, and location. Most participants (n=22) preferred such explanations
because these explanations were more interpretable: “I guess I’m more comfortable with it because
I understand it better. The other ones, I don’t understand what they’re doing” (P5).
Trustworthiness
Some participants (n=6) felt that advertisers were intentionally vague in their ad explanations, re-
sulting in a lack of trust: “The[se] ones seem vague, almost on purpose, and I don’t necessarily trust
the way they gather their data” (P5). They wanted a “more transparent and specific [explanation],
because, excuse my language but these [explanations] are like bullshit” (P31). Participants stated
that they would trust advertisers who provided interpretable and specific ad explanations more: ‘I
would trust [advertiser’s name] more, it[s explanation] is simple, it’s easy to read, and it tells you
the reason” (P7). This finding recalls previous work that showed an oversimplified explanation of
how intelligent agents work can cause users to lose trust in the system [89].
Completeness
Some interpretable explanations did not describe why an ad was tailored to a user in exact detail,
but still satisfied users. For example, Figure 7.5(b) shows an explanation that participants found
positive and interpretable. It stated that the user’s inferred interest in personal finance, age range,
and location resulted in this targeted ad. This explanation, however, did not specify the exact pages
the user liked or the ads she clicked. To understand if users wanted this kind of completeness, I
asked them if they desired more specific details about what was left unspecified in this type of ad
explanation. Participants, however, stated that “that’s more than enough” (P19) for them. They said
that such an explanation identifying factors but not their values still “covers everything, it’s short
and sweet, and simple” (P20) and it “didn’t leave room for me to ask a lot of, like too many more
questions” (P17). Discovering precisely what makes an ad explanation satisfying, interpretable, and




Figure 7.5: Two interpretable ad explanations. Both provide information about the data and
inferences used to target this ad. However, (b) is not as complete as (a) because it does not show the
exact pages the user liked or the ads the user clicked on.
106
Designing an Ad Explanation
Participants also enacted their definitions of interpretability when they wrote their own ad
explanations. They tried to write more detailed explanations and described these as “easier to
understand ” (P7). Participants invoked advertiser motives by referencing honesty: “the honest
reason why they are showing this ad is what I wanna see.” (P8). One example of a participant-
generated ad explanation stated that: “You are seeing this ad because your frequent browsing history
shows an interest in animals, specifically dogs. Data also shows that you frequently purchase
these items and I have provided suggestions for future purchases” (P4). Participants contrasted the
explanation that they wrote with the ones provided by advertisers by saying that their designed
explanations contained “more [specific] information versus generalized” (P25) information.
7.4.2 “Creepiness”
Sometimes, participants identified ad explanations as “creepy.” Both vague, uninterpretable
statements and specific, interpretable explanations could be labeled as creepy. Participants (n=7)
stated that vague and uninterpretable explanations (such as Figure 7.4(a) and Figure 7.4(b)) were
creepy because they reminded them of “big brother of advertising” (P31) that “sounds really
invasive’’ (P28). Some participants’ belief that advertisers go through their private emails or even
phone conversations to target ads were reinforced by unspecific explanations: “I feel like definitely
[they looked at] my email still and they’re not saying that [...] they’re afraid of people complaining
that you’ve been in my email” (P28).
Figure 7.6: A creepy ad explanation. While this explanation is interpretable for users, pointing to
the exact products/services the user visited made it creepy for some users.
I found some interpretable ad explanations, which specifically explained why an ad was targeted,
could also be creepy. Figure 7.6 shows an example of an interpretable but creepy explanation.
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Ad explanations that pointed to exact products/services the user visited were creepy for some
participants (n=4):“ohhh, that’s kind of creepy [...] that it keeps track of the exact products I was
looking at” (P6). In another example, P19 freaked out when she received an ad because she had
close friends with a birthday between seven to 30 days from now: “How would they know my
friends’ birthday? This is exactly why my sister does not have Facebook, Snapchat, Instagram, and
etc. and says ‘Get off that[sic] crappy sites. They’re getting all your information.’ ” Some specific
explanations also signaled the exchange of data between advertisers, which turned out to be creepy
as well: “This makes me feel like Amazon sold my information to Facebook” (P4).
Designing an Ad Explanation
In the speculative design tasks, some participants (n=6) preferred to omit some specifics about
the ad targeting process in order to avoid being creepy.
For example, in the first speculative design task, P16 stated that he received a Samsung Galaxy
S8 phone ad because “I’m loyal to this brand. I’ve had an S2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.” However, his ad
explanation—“Because you’ve made previous purchases for this brand numerous times in the past,
and you’re loyal to this brand” (P16)—did not mention the exact purchases because he thought
“that might become scary”: “ ‘On November 5th, 2016, you bought this phone. Don’t you think you
need a new one?’ I don’t think I like that. I know they probably know that and everything else, but
no, I’m good with that. [Otherwise,] that’ll start scaring me.” But participants at this stage of the
study, could only speculate about why they were seeing an ad. Did they omit detail from a fear of
being inaccurate?
After participants were shown more information about the factors used to target ads they returned
to perform a second speculative design task. This time, participants were aware of the exact reasons
an ad might be targeted to them because they selected the targeting factors themselves. I found that
although participants were now aware of the reasons for targeting an ad, they still left out details
that they felt were creepy.
For example, in the second speculative design task, P5 wrote an explanation for an ad (targeted
to himself) by identifying an audience that was young, interested in music, had a specific range
of income, and were home renters. However, he only included the first two features in his desired
explanation because, even though the advertiser might know his income or his homeownership
status, “I don’t [want the advertiser to] tell it back to me [laughing]” because “I don’t want to know
that they know that information” (P27). To underscore the context here: Participants were aware of
all the variables used in ad tailoring, but some wished that they weren’t aware. There were features
of the advertising system that they would rather not have learned or be reminded about.
Overall, users tried to write a “more transparent” (P31) explanation but avoided sensitive topics
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and were sometimes keenly aware of the tone of their writing. They wanted transparency “without
being creepy and being like I kept track of the last five dresses that you’ve purchased” (P6).
7.4.3 “Linkage” to Identity
I found that linking an ad explanation to the user’s identity correlated with users’ satisfaction.
Participants (n=24) expressed a negative view of explanations for personalized ads that they felt
were not personalized enough. They argued that a “weak linkage” (P22) between an ad and the
user’s identity in an ad explanation illustrated that advertisers “take an impersonal approach to
explaining something like a personal ad, which is kind of contradictory” (P17). This was regardless
of the explanation’s interpretability or specificity. For example, P15 described that he did not like
a specific ad explanation because “they didn’t really feel like they were directed to [him]” (P15).
Therefore, participants did not like an ad explanation if it did not feel “personal” (P17) enough:
“Because my friend is looking for fashion, Chanel bag, they think that I might be interested? That,
to me, is mumbo jumbo” (P19).
On the other hand, when an ad explanation showed a link to their identity, participants thought
the advertiser was “kind of going an extra mile” (P29) to make the ad “geared more towards” (P20)
them. As P11 described, these explanations “gave me insights into ‘why me’ more specifically. It
said my demographic, and then it said the reason.” This made participants more satisfied with
their ad explanation “because I like to see how I’m categorized” (P29). On the other hand, when
participants did not see the link to their identity, although the ad sounded targeted to them, a few
stated that they did not “think this is the real reason for this particular ad” (P12) and “there’s got to
be more to it [...] they’re lying” (P31).
Designing an Ad Explanation
The preference for a link to identity was also demonstrated when participants designed their
desired ad explanations. Participants (n=17) argued that their explanations should be “detailing it
towards of you as an individual” (P32): “I would like to hear I’m seeing the ad because I’m their
target, the product is [...] designed for me, it’s not because I just saw it” (P7). They, therefore,
wrote explanations that referred to the interests that defined an important part of their identity:
“because music is my passion, all I had to see is ‘you’ve visited music sites’ [...] it’d be funny if it
said something like ‘do you have any other interests besides music, [P8’s name]?’ ” (P8).
Participants also preferred to include the attributes they were proud of. P2, for example, selected
both “people between ages 20-30” and “millennial” as her target audience, but when she wrote an
ad explanation, she chose to include the “millennial” option “because there’s some pride in being a
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‘millennial,’ opposed to ‘between ages 20-30’ ” (P2). Participants wanted their ad explanations to
tell them that they were a select audience, like in P14’s designed ad explanation for a Santa Cruz
mountain bike: “Because you like the same cool things I do (bikes, beer, coffee, Santa Cruz)”. P14
even asked to “have something written out that it would seem like it was written by a person instead
of just like a copied form with all the tags.” This shows the importance of the user being recognized
for their identity and “not just because I’m a warm body” (P15).
7.4.4 To Whom Does an Ad Explanation Matter?
While a well-designed ad explanation can increase user satisfaction with their ad experience,
it is not equally important to all users. From our interviews, I found that the importance of ad
explanations depends on how much a user is 1) interested in online ads and 2) concerned about
privacy.
Prior Interest in (Personalized) Ads
During the pre-interview, I evaluated participants’ existing interest in and interactions with online
advertising. I surfaced three categories of interests in online ads: Participants found an ad “rarely”
(n=8), “sometimes” (n=19) or “often” (n=5) useful. Participants who found advertising useful
said that they preferred tailored advertising to generic advertising because the usefulness of an ad
“depends on how relevant it is” (P12). They argued that personalized ads sometimes helped them
get what they were looking for or saved them money: “I was planning to join [a] Zumba training
program [...] I looked it up before but I didn’t book it, and then I saw the ads. They had 20% off, so
I booked it” (P7).
I found that those who “often” or “rarely” found online ads useful did not care about ad explana-
tions much because the former liked all ads while the latter would not look at ads anyway. Those
who “often” liked advertising stated that they “just didn’t care” (P10) to click on an ad explanation
because “to tell you the truth, I would never even need to look for the reason. I mean it’s interesting
to know why but I don’t even really care because if this is a product that I’m interested in, I’m
gonna stop and look at it, if it’s not, all I’m gonna do [is to pass]” (P8). Those who “rarely” found
an ad useful stated that they “couldn’t think of a reason that [an ad explanation] would make [them]
feel better about [an ad]” (P5) because they already did not like the ad.
On the other hand, those participants who found online ads “sometimes” useful stated that an
explanation was very informative: “It’s a very impressive thing, you really taught me a lot about
[ads]. I had no idea that that’s how things work” (P15). If an ad had a clear explanation, participants
stated that they “appreciate that type of ad because [...] the [advertisers] are transparent about
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where they got your information from” (P28). It is possible that interpretable ad explanations
can result in a more informed and trustworthy ad experience for those users who do not have
extreme feelings (positive or negative) about online advertising. In our study, more than half of the
participants fell in this group (n=19).
Prior Concerns About Privacy
While perceived as more useful than generic ads, tailored ads brought privacy concerns. In the
pre-interview I asked participants about privacy and distinguished 1) people who were not worried
(n=23) and 2) people who were worried (n=9) about advertisers using their data for the purpose of
ad tailoring. Those who were not worried about their privacy stated that they “understand that with
using the Internet, data is being collected by every site—cookies and all that shit” (P13). Some
even said that “there’s no privacy anywhere” (P16) and “the genie’s out of the bottle” (P10), and
they had “kind of come to terms with that” (P29). However, those who were worried about their
privacy called tailored advertising “an intrusion of your own privacy” (P25)
Ad explanations mattered the most to participants who did not like advertising, mainly due to
privacy concerns. They asserted that “it’s better that [an explanation] is here than it’s not” (P30).
Participants said they might be more willing to interact with an ad when an advertiser provides
them with an honest reason: “So after this experience, I will even say probably I will start clicking
on those things more just out of curiosity, just to see what they say, and potentially, if I see some
advertisers that are more transparent, [...] I appreciate that about their company, [and] I probably
will be more likely to buy from them” (P31). Communicating the ad curation process to users who
are worried about their privacy may increase their trust in an advertiser.
7.5 IN THE EYE OF THE ALGORITHM (RQ2)
None of our participants had ever seen the Algorithm View. They believed that they “can’t
get that much information about data collected about” (P30) them. Participants, however, were
quite interested in seeing such a view and were even willing to pay for it: “If I could buy my
internet profile somewhere and learn about, see what the internet thinks I am, I would totally do
that [chuckle]. I think it’s really interesting [to see how] I’ve been categorized, what they think of
me, and ads [for me]” (P29).
7.5.1 The Algorithmic Self
“It’s the best version of your own movie.” (P12)
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Observing their algorithmically-inferred attributes, the algorithmic self [163], made participants
argue that advertisers utilize “much more of what you do, and using that to target and to generate
ads [...] versus just what you say” (P12). Participants stated that their algorithmic self reflects that
“how many algorithms and things actually go into social networking websites, and there’s more
math and science involved [...] , ‘Okay, I can see the data collection and how they actually make
it come to life’ ” (P17). They, however, argued that “your life that you portray on Facebook isn’t
probably the most accurate reality, it’s the best version of your own movie” (P12).
Algorithmic Self, Real Self, and Ideal Self
Comparing their algorithmic self with their self-described attributes, which participants felt
was their real self, some people (n=10) expressed great satisfaction when the algorithm detected
attributes that they were proud of: “ ‘very liberal’, nice, glad it knows that [chuckle]” (P5) or “Oh, it
calls me a frequent traveler [chuckle]” (P11). This satisfaction turned to great dissatisfaction if the
algorithm detected attributes that were opposite of those participants were proud of. For example,
P16 was angry when the algorithm called him a “late technology adopter” while he was proud to
identify himself as an “early technology adopter”: “I don’t know what the hell this is all about. [...]
I have all the newest crap [...] Every time the new phone comes out, I get them. [...] I have all the
video game systems, Smart TV, Roku, Wii.”
Participants were happy to be assigned attributes by advertising systems that were wrong but
flattering. When an algorithmically-inferred interest described an attribute a participant did not
have but would be proud to possess (the ideal self ) the participant was still satisfied. For example,
a 30-year old participant who was mistakenly described as a “baby boomer” by the algorithm
said that her behavior (that she was proud of) might cause this mistake: “Maybe they think I’m a
business-oriented woman, maybe that means I tend to be an older woman, or more mature woman
rather than looking ads for Botox, or Kim Kardashian or Taylor Swift” (P28). Similar to the trend
I observed in RQ1, these statements reflect the importance of recognizing users’ identity when
communicating the algorithmic process in behavioral advertising.
7.5.2 Assuming Algorithmic Authority
“People are firm believers in free will. But they choose their politics, their dress, their
manners, their very identity, from a menu they had no hand in writing. They are
constrained by forces they do not understand and are not even conscious of.”
Friedman,1999, p240 [164]
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Before walking through the Algorithm View, several participants (n=12) illustrated a strong
belief in algorithmic authority, arguing that advertising algorithms “seem to really understand what
your interests are, their robots know me, the programs that they wrote, they know about me” (P9).
Participants said that they “always assume that [advertisers] have that technology to target” (P29)
the right audience. This perception corresponds with the “eye of providence” folk theory from
previous research wherein users perceived algorithmic systems to be all-powerful and all-knowing
[165, 147].
Justifying Algorithmic Decisions
While many algorithmically-inferred interests matched participants’ real-selves, there were many
interests that did not. When participants started viewing these incorrect interests, rather than stating
that the algorithm was wrong, many (n=23) tried to find reasons to justify those mistakes. This
effort partly arose from the fact that we, as humans, tend to find patterns (even in randomness)
and fit explanations to unknown phenomena (here incorrect algorithmic outputs). This tendency of
explanation, however, becomes stronger for those users who believe that an algorithm could not
be incorrect. For example, Springer et. al. [166] showed that even when an algorithm functions
at random, users still try to justify a wrong algorithmic decision due to their belief in algorithmic
authority.
In our study, I observed a similar trend where users who assumed algorithmic authority tried to
justify incorrect algorithmic decisions. For example, P8 did not know why the algorithm inferred
an interest in “Minneapolis” for him. He, however, tried to come up with an explanation by making
a connection between what he really liked and what the algorithm inferred: “Minneapolis, I’m not
sure why that’s there. Maybe because I have an interest in Prince and he was in the Minneapolis
area. The musician Prince.” Another participant who had an interest in “Whole Foods” but didn’t
know why guessed: “ I think Amazon just bought Whole Foods, so maybe that’s why [...] because I
do buy stuff from Amazon” (P16). Even if participants could not think of a concrete reason to justify
an incorrect interest, many (n=14) still argued that they must have done an action that “connected
something with [that interest]” (P20): “I don’t know what I am politically, but I bet you my user
browsing is liberal for sure” (P11). A few participants started reviewing their Facebook account
(their likes, groups, etc.) to justify their incorrectly inferred interests, rather than believing that the
algorithm could be wrong.
Taking the Blame: When partitioning the responsibility of a mistake between the algorithm
and themselves, some participants (n=7) even put the responsibility on themselves rather than the
algorithm. These participants believed that they did not provide the algorithm with the right input
data. For example, P11 said that he “‘unliked’ every single page [on Facebook] until [he] didn’t
113
‘like’ anything” and that’s why his algorithmic self only included a few interests. In addition, P8
stated that one of his important interests was not detected because “a lot of what I do is based on
another apps [...] maybe [Facebook is] not getting the information [...]. I should follow them in
Facebook [...] I gotta help [Facebook] out”.
Our results support previous findings in the realm of personality judgments [167] when users
were hesitant to argue against what an algorithm inferred about their personality, even though
they disagreed with it. This could be because users felt unqualified to oppose an algorithmic
decision, even if it was about their own personality. These results show the necessity for redesigning
algorithmic systems to increase user algorithmic literacy and reduce the assumption of algorithmic
authority.
7.5.3 A Path to Algorithm Disillusionment
From “Their robots know me” to “Maybe you are not as smart as I thought you were”
(P9)
While many participants justified incorrect algorithmic decisions at the beginning of the study
because of their strong belief in algorithmic authority, observing more and more incorrectly inferred
interests through the course of the study gradually led many (n=26) to algorithm disillusionment:
the realization that advertising algorithms were not as perceptive and powerful as users thought.
Questioning the Algorithmic Self
As participants (n=21) noticed more and more discrepancies between their algorithmic self and
their real self, they started to confront their algorithmic self. P25, for example, argued that “they
must think I’m a boozy person on the internet. [...] I do drink wine, but [...] I’m not an alcoholic.
This is not a good representation of me.” Some said that their algorithmic self was “not very telling”
(P29) because they were “way more cultured than this, actually, all this stuff is kind of silly, not
really deep stuff [chuckle]” (P11). Other participants received incomprehensible interests such as
“tears”, “Wednesdays”, or “toxicity”. This led many participants to question algorithmic authority
because the algorithms are “surprisingly not very good [even though] they access so much data”
(P6).
Some participants (n=12) were also disillusioned when their algorithmic self did not include
interests that were obvious or important: “I’m surprised it didn’t get my undergrad institution” (P2).
Participants usually believed they had already provided the algorithm with enough input data to
infer those interests: “I was going to say, photography is a huge interest for me. Why that’s not
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showing up? Because I post a lot of photos on Facebook. I take photography classes on Lynda.com.
I read photography websites, blogs, magazines (P9).
Diagnosing Algorithmic Weaknesses
While participants tried to find out why their algorithmic and real selves were misaligned, many
(n=16) discovered some common (and sometimes funny) mistakes that advertising algorithms made:
‘Kayaking,’ I can’t figure out where this is. Okay, oh wait. This is weird. I was wondering why. I
have the app ‘Kayak’. Kayak is this travel comparison site, not a sport of kayaking in the water
thing [laughing]” (P12). Because of these mistakes, participants thought that advertising algorithms
might make assumptions such as “‘well if you like this, then you like that,’ and it seems a little bit of
a stretch” (P12). Participants did “not like that [advertisers] simplify people that much into these
weird little categories [chuckle]” (P6). They argued that advertising algorithms are “making a lot of
assumptions that are overly specific in these things [...] It’s putting someone into categories, but
maybe someone isn’t defined by a category” (P15).
While many participants began the study with beliefs like “their robots know me,” being exposed
to the sometimes large misalignment between algorithmic and real selves and discovering algorith-
mic errors made participants realize that “Ah, maybe you are not as smart as I thought you were
[laughing]” (P9). I argue that this disillusionment could be effective in building a more realistic and
intelligent interaction between users and algorithmic systems. I elaborate on the design implications
of disillusionment in the discussion section.
7.6 LIMITATIONS
This was a qualitative project involving a non-probability sample. Many choices in the research
design favored gathering diverse and even speculative data to reveal the breadth of possible user
reactions and provide a basis for further work. Further research is needed to generalize these results.
This study was not longitudinal. Except for the design tasks, many of our methods focused on
opinions and attitudes rather than behavior. For example, I described some results (such as algorithm
disillusionment) as attitude change occurring over the course of the study. Yet if this phenomenon
is replicated it will be important to determine how persistent it is over time and whether it translates
into changes in user behavior.
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7.7 DISCUSSION
7.7.1 The Requirement for a Critical Stance
I studied user reactions to ad explanations and found that participants preferred interpretable,
non-creepy ad explanations that have a recognizable link to their identity. User satisfaction, however,
is only one goal of algorithmic transparency. A satisfying explanation might be misleading or even
completely false. Deceptive business practices are prohibited by law, while targeting certain kinds
of advertisements using certain protected categories is illegal (for example, in the US see [168, 169]
). Ideally, algorithmic transparency would provide the user with the information required to protect
her own privacy while also providing interested third parties (like consumer advocacy groups and
government regulators) the ability to identify undesirable behavior by an algorithmic system.
User studies like this one have no way to understand if an ad explanation actually reveals all
of the data and inferences an advertising algorithm used to target an ad, or if the descriptions of
the algorithmic processes at work are defensible. This study and future work on users should be
complemented by algorithm audit techniques [170]. For example, [150] used controlled experiments
to compare what private data or inferences advertising algorithms use to target ads to users and how
much of that information an ad explanation reveals.
7.7.2 Designing to Convey Algorithm Limitations
Many online users believe in algorithmic omniscience. They believe that AI and algorithms could
control or destroy the world, and this scares them sometimes [171]. This belief has resulted in
misperceptions about algorithmic systems. For example, people believe that advertising algorithms
collect more data about users than they actually do [143]. Users also fear algorithmic systems
because they do not know how their information is processed by these systems. As described in
[172], when Facebook recommended a previously-unknown great-aunt, this scared the user because
the process that resulted in such an intimate connection was so unclear.
Our findings show that this fear often subsided when people observed that algorithms were not
infallible. Participants became disillusioned, but also became more secure in the realization that
algorithms were limited in their power. Conveying or communicating these limitations as users
interact with opaque systems may put users at ease. But how do I do this?
The first step in conveying algorithm limitations into online behavioral advertising is to increase
the visibility of users’ algorithmic self. While a few advertisers such as Facebook and Google
provide the Algorithm View to users, usually such views are buried within the system interface (and
typically reveal only a small proportion of the users’ stored information). Recall that none of the
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participants in our study were aware of or had seen this view. One option to increase this view’s
visibility is to add more clues in the main interface of the system. For example, P11 suggested that
Facebook could provide users with their algorithmic self occasionally in their feed, similar to what
Facebook does for Facebook memories: “Facebook does do that thing at the end of the year, like
‘your eight year anniversary on Facebook. In those years, you’ve liked ...’ But I’ve never seen one
super specific [view] on my likes and dislikes [...] that’s kind of what that reminds me of [...] It
would be really cool” (P11).
Some participants wanted to increase the visibility of this view by showing it to their friends.
For example, when P17 explored the Algorithm view, he said: “I gotta have to show people.” In
another example, P11 suggested a “share” option for the Algorithm View: “this is cool, I like this.
It’d be cool if I could share this with my friends, and they’d probably think it was cool, too.” These
suggestions would allow for engagement and experimentation with opaque algorithmic systems.
Finding algorithm disillusionment via such interfaces offers knowledge and comfort.
7.7.3 Designing for Algorithm Engagement
While users benefit from the right level of disclosure about why an ad is tailored to them, currently,
the icons to access ad explanations are usually buried or hardly visible in the interface—only five
participants in our study had ever interacted with these explanations. Previous work has also shown
the failure of the current ad disclosure mechanisms in communicating the algorithmic process [151].
Another reason for this failure is users’ reluctance to click on these icons because “how many times
am I going to click on that? So it’s also a waste of time” (P11). Some also argued that they “don’t
trust [advertisers] enough to even do anything via these AdChoices. It was just another like pseudo
engagement that they were getting out of [the ad].” So, with these challenges, how can ad designers
provide users with more engaging ad explanations?
When the Explanation Becomes a Part of the Ad
One solution, as P25 suggested, could be to add an explanation as the fine print to the ad itself
because “I don’t think that you should have to go out of your way to click on ‘why am I seeing
this ad.’ Rather than you having to go out of your way to search why, why don’t they just tell you
why directly?”. However, an ad explanation could be too long to fit without dominating the ad and
distracting the user. Another option is to show only the reason with a recognizable link to the user’s
identity and offer a “more” option if the user was interested in more detail.
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When the Explanation Becomes the Ad
Rather than having an ad explanation in fine print, the ad explanation could become an integral or
central focus of the ad. I saw this when some participants (n=11) designed their own ad explanations
and started “writing it like an ad”(P5). Their ad explanations became the motivation for purchasing
that product/service. For example, P6, wrote: “Because you’re interested in fashion trends, here is
the latest summer dress collection from French Connection. Read more about it on their website.”
Via these explanations, “why I’m seeing [an ad] would become like the ad” (P31).
Such designs could not only help users understand why they saw an ad easily, but it might
also engage them with the ad if the ad includes a recognizable link to a part of their identity. For
example, if an ad is targeted to a “frequent traveler,” rather than having the reason in fine print on
the ad, the main ad message could read “visit our travel website because you travel frequently.” I
believe, if designed carefully, such ads could also gradually increase users’ trust and preference in
their personalized ads; as P31 said, “transparency could actually be helpful as a marketing tool.”
However, evaluating such designs remains for future work.
Control over the Algorithm
Besides disclosing to users why they are seeing an ad, providing them with control over the
ads they see is also of great importance. Several participants (n=12) mentioned that they liked
an ad explanation that “gives me the most control at first glance” (P30). These controls come
either in the form of ‘preference management” so that users could “give [advertisers] feedback
that they train the algorithms better [chuckle], so that’s good” (P6) or an opt-out option from
tailored advertising so that “if it bothered me, I could go to settings [...] to make changes to those
settings”(P10). Observing these options, participants also started to add these controls to their own
desired explanations. I, therefore, encourage ad designers to add control options directly into the
ads, as it could increase users’ feeling of agency over their personalized ads, and accordingly their
satisfaction with their ad experience.
7.8 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I studied how revealing parts of the algorithmic process in online behavioral
advertising affects users’ perceptions towards ads and platforms. The results showed that users
preferred interpretable, non-creepy explanations about why an ad is presented, along with a recog-
nizable link to their identity. I further found that exposing users to their algorithmically-derived
attributes led to algorithm disillusionment—users found that advertising algorithms they thought
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were perfect were far from it.
While the results of this study showed that adding transparency into how an ad is tailored to
a user improves the user’s experience, it is still not clear that how much transparency is enough
or even feasible to provide to users. Making a system completely transparent is usually neither
possible nor desired. Algorithms are complex, dynamic, and unpredictable. Even if a designer
can gain enough technical literacy to analyze an algorithm, it is often impossible to recreate the
complicated and embedded internal processes of an algorithm via design. So what I advocate
is the study of “actionable transparency” whereby designers with knowledge of their system
communicate pivotal algorithmic process cues in the interface. In the next chapter, I explore this
idea of actionable transparency by evaluating the impacts of different levels of transparency (from no
to full transparency about an algorithm’s operation) on users’ perceptions of algorithmic decisions.
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CHAPTER 8: THE VALUE OF ALGORITHM TRANSPARENCY
While transparency can provide users with more informed interaction with algorithmic systems,
it is still not clear at what level transparency improves users’ perceptions of an algorithmic decision.
In this chapter, in two studies, I evaluate the value of increased transparency about a) who made a
review filtering decision (the operator) and b) how it was made (the operation) when users agreed
or disagreed with the decision.
8.1 INTRODUCTION
Throughout this dissertation, I have tried to show the benefits of adding transparency into opaque
algorithmic socio-techincal system. However, it is not always clear when transparency about
algorithmic decisions can improve users’ interactions with algorithmic systems, and when it cannot.
Previous work argued that transparency can be useless or even harmful, if not carefully designed [91].
For example, as I discussed earlier, it has been shown that not only does not transparency sometimes
increase trust, but too much transparency may erode trust [90]. Designing transparency into a system
can become particularly challenging when users perceive an algorithm’s decision to be flawed,
regardless of its actual performance. Recent studies as well as the Chapter 7 of this dissertation
showed that although users usually approve of algorithmic decisions due to perceived algorithmic
authority (“algorithm appreciation”) [87, 166], as they observe algorithmic mistakes or what
they perceive to be mistakes, they start avoiding algorithmic decisions considerably (“algorithm
aversion”) [173, 174]. This has resulted in an imbalance in users’ perceptions of algorithmic
systems: they usually either under-accept or over-accept algorithmic decisions, depending on
whether they observe (perceived) mistakes in algorithmic systems. However, little is known about
whether transparency can mitigate the imbalance in users’ perceptions of algorithmic decisions by
facilitating an informed interaction between users and algorithmic systems.
This chapter takes a step towards addressing this gap by investigating the interaction between
transparency and users’ agreement with an algorithmic decision. I studied whether different levels
of transparency about an algorithmic decision can improve users’ perceptions of that decision,
particularly when users perceive the decision to be a mistake. I conducted this study in the context
of online reviewing platforms, specifically Yelp, which employ rating algorithms to filter fake
reviews. As Chapters 3 & 4 showed, while these algorithms are quite powerful in determining the
success or failure of a business, they are usually opaque in their operation, and sometimes even in
their existence [175, 110]. This has resulted in concerns about these algorithms’ potential biases
and calls for transparency to keep review filtering algorithms accountable and to provide users with
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a more informed interaction with the system [176].
I evaluated the effects of increased transparency about the Yelp review filtering decision in two
studies: Study 1 compared how users perceived a review filtering decision when I added transparency
about who made the decision: a) a human, b) an algorithm, c) a human with algorithmic support,
and d) an algorithm with human support. Study 2 varied the level of transparency about how an
algorithm made a review filtering decision by exposing users to a) no explanation, b) a low-detail
explanation, c) a medium-detail explanation, and d) a high-detail (complete) explanation about the
decision-making process. In order to investigate the interactions between transparency and users’
agreement with a review filtering decision, I varied the level of agreement between users and the
decision about review authenticity in both Study 1 & 2.
Study 1 showed that regardless of who made a review filtering decision, users perceived the
quality (accuracy, fairness, and trustworthiness) and understandability of the filtering decisions to
be similar. This was because they relied on their developed theories about the authenticity of a
review to evaluate the filtering decision, not the nature of the decision-maker. However, whenever
algorithms and humans made a decision collaboratively, users considered the algorithms as the main
authority, even when humans were the final decision makers (I call this “algorithmic dominance”).
In study 2, I found that while increased transparency about how an algorithmic decision is made
did not impact users’ perceptions of the decision’s quality, it did affect users’ understandability
of that decision noticeably; users understood medium-detail and high-detail explanations better,
and therefore engaged with these explanations and used them to either reason or argue about the
decision.
Adding transparency into how an algorithmic decision was made, however, did not play the main
role on users’ perceptions of the decision. Instead, the findings from both Study 1 and Study 2
showed that users’ agreement with a review filtering decision (i.e. if they considered the decision
a mistake or not) had a significant effect on their perceptions of the decision: if users generally
considered a filtering decision wrong, they perceived the decision’s quality and understandability
to be significantly lower than the other decisions that they considered correct. I find this effect
regardless of the level of transparency about who made the decision or how it was made. Based on
these findings, I lay out potential design implications for algorithmic decision-making systems.
8.1.1 Algorithm Appreciation and Aversion
While transparency has been proposed as a way to improve users’ perceptions of an algorithmic
system, that is not the only factor that could impact users’ perceptions of algorithmic systems.
During recent years, a line of work has focused on determining when users accept algorithmic
decisions and when they avoid them. Previous research has shown that users tend to overtrust
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algorithms, even trying to justify algorithmic decisions that they do not fully understand [166, 174,
177]. This trust in algorithmic authority, however, fades away when users start noticing mistakes in
algorithmic decisions, or at least what they perceive as mistakes. This phenomenon has been called
“algorithm disillusionment” [174] or “algorithm aversion” [173]. However, whether algorithmic
transparency, at any level, can mitigate this aversion or not is still not clear. That is, if users perceive
an algorithmic decision to be wrong, can adding transparency to how this decision was made
improve users’ perceptions of the decision? In this chapter, I address this question by evaluating the
interaction between transparency and users’ agreement with algorithmic decisions.
8.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
I situate this work in the context of rating algorithms, specifically the Yelp review filtering
algorithm that decides which review is fake or authentic on the platform. As we saw in Chapter 4,
While the Yelp review filtering algorithm is quite powerful in determining the success or failure of a
business [97], not only is this algorithm opaque in its operation, but its existence is also hidden from
users. This opacity, along with some concerns about potential biases, has resulted in calls for adding
transparency into this algorithm. Users particularly argue that many of the algorithm’s decisions to
label a review as fake are wrong, and adding transparency would keep the system more accountable
[113, 111]. But does transparency also improve users’ perceptions about the algorithmic decisions
that are perceived to be wrong? To understand this, I looked at the impacts of adding transparency
into the existence (who makes a review filtering decision) and the operation (how a review filtering
decision is made) of the Yelp review filtering decision by asking:
RQ1: What is the value of transparency about who made a review filtering decision, when users
agree or disagree with the decision?
RQ2: What is the value of transparency about how an algorithm made a review filtering decision,
when users agree or disagree with the decision?
8.3 METHOD
I designed one pre-study and two main studies (Study 1 and 2) to answer our proposed research
questions. In the pre-study I selected a set of three reviews that had varying levels of agreement
between users and the review filtering algorithm about review authenticity. In Study 1 and 2, I
used the reviews selected in the pre-study and designed a mixed-factorial experiment to test the
interaction between two factors: a) the agreement level between users and the algorithm (in three
levels) and b) the level of transparency about a review filtering decision (in four levels). In particular,
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I added explanations about the algorithm’s existence (i.e. who made the filtering decision) in Study
1, and explanations about the algorithm’s operation (i.e. how the decision was made) in Study 2.
Figure 8.1: The three reviews selected in the pre-study. Participants judged the perceived authenticity
of 31 Yelp reviews on a five point scale from “definitely real” to “definitely fake”. Three reviews
were chosen: one review that was perceived to be the most fake (fake-looking review), one review
that was perceived to be the most real (real-looking review), and one that was considered to be most
controversial (controversial).
8.3.1 Pre-study: Evaluating Agreement Between People and the Filtering Decision
In order to collect reviews with different levels of agreement between people and a review filtering
algorithm about review authenticity, I used a set of 31 Yelp reviews which were used in Chapter 4,
for which the users gave the permission to use the reviews in future research studies 1. All of these
reviews were filtered by the Yelp review filtering algorithm. I first defined real and fake reviews for
participants (based on the Yelp definition) and then asked them to rate a review on a five point scale
1Although all Yelp reviews are publicly available, I aimed to use the reviews for which I had explicit permission
from the user since removing the meta information, such as name and picture, from reviews will not completely
anonymize them.
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from “definitely real” to “definitely fake”. When rating reviews, participants were not aware these
reviews were from Yelp (to avoid any biases against or for the platform) or the reviews had been
filtered.
Based on users’ ratings of the perceived authenticity of each review, I selected three reviews for
use in Study 1 and Study 2: one review that the majority of users labeled as fake (“fake-looking
review”), one review that the majority of users labeled as real (“real-looking review”), and one
review that had the least consistency between users’ labels (“controversial review”). Given that
the Yelp review filtering detected all these reviews as fake, the “fake-looking review” and the
“real-looking review” had the highest and the lowest agreement between the users and the algorithm,
respectively. Both Study 1 and Study 2 used these reviews to evaluate the impacts of transparency
when users perceived a review filtering decision to be right or wrong. I should note that for the
pre-study, I didnt use fictitious reviews to ensure ecological validity–we would not know what label
a filtering algorithm would assign to a fictitious review.
Participants
112 participants were recruited for the pre-study using Amazon Mechanical Turk. The participants
consented to participate at the beginning of the study, and were debriefed before finishing the study.
The participants had to be at least 18 years old, have completed at least 100 HITs (MTurk’s task
unit) with HIT approval rate of 98% or higher, and live in the US. Among the participants who
answered demographic questions, the age ranged between 18 and 64 years old, and around half
of the participants’ annual income was less than $50,000 and the rest were between $50,000 and
$150,000. 41.03% of them identified as females. The participants were 79.48% Caucasian, 2.56%
Hispanic, 7.70% Asian, 7.70% African American, 2.56% Native American, and x% other. Finally,
49.71% held a bachelor’s degree, 15.38% held a higher degree, and the rest some high school
education or diploma.
Each participant was shown and asked to evaluate five reviews that were randomly chosen from
our pool of 31 reviews. I excluded participants who had failed an attention check at the beginning
of the survey, leaving us with 108 participants. This resulted in each of the 31 reviews being
evaluated by at least 17.41 participants on average. Finally, the participants were paid $1.50 for
their participation, which was higher than the US Federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour given
that almost all participants finished their survey within 5 minutes.
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8.3.2 Study 1: Adding Transparency into Who (RQ1)
Study 1 addressed how users’ perception of a review filtering decision differs when transparency
is provided into who makes the decision (RQ1). As I discussed in Chapter 2, past work has looked
at users’ perceptions of algorithmic decisions when the decision-maker is an algorithm or a human
[85, 86]. However, it has not addressed how having both algorithms and humans help each other
make a decision alters people’s perceptions of the decision. I therefore considered four conditions:
• Algorithmic decision: the algorithm alone makes the decision to label a review as fake.
• Human decision: paid moderators alone make the decision to label a review as fake.
• Human decision with algorithmic support: an algorithm suggests possibly fake reviews, but
human moderators make the final decision to label a review as fake.
• Algorithmic decision with human support: moderators suggest possibly fake reviews, but an
algorithm makes the final decision to label a review as fake.
These four conditions allowed us to establish whether users prefer human or algorithmic decision-
making or some hybrid. I evaluated these conditions in a three-by-four factorial design experiment:
participants were randomly assigned to one of the three chosen reviews from the pre-study which
differed in users’ agreement with the filtering decision. All these reviews were flagged by the Yelp
filtering algorithm as fake. I then randomly assigned one of the above four decision-makers to
that review, and measured participants’ perception of the decision using 5-point scale Likert scale
questions, and a brief free-form question (will be described later).
Data Validation
In order to ensure that our participants provided thoughtful responses, I conducted commonly
used integrity and attentiveness checks for the participants and their evaluations of the review
filtering decision. I removed the evaluations from any participants who failed to correctly answer
an attention check at the beginning of the study. Any evaluations that had an empty or meaningless
free-form response, or that had a free-form response that completely contradicted the participants’
Likert-scale response, were removed. The decisions for validating the participants’ responses were
carefully made in consultation with the statistics department at the researchers’ academic institution
prior to analyzing the data.
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Participants
A total of 607 participants were recruited for Study 1 using Amazon Mechanical Turk using the
same procedure as the pre-study. Among the participants who responded to demographic questions,
age ranged between 18 and 64 years old, and around half of the participants’ annual income was
less than $50,000 and the rest were between $50,000 and $150,000. 40.19% of them identified as
females. The participants were 75.64% Caucasian, 3.60% Hispanic, 5.93% Asian, 13.35% African
American, 0.21% Native American, and 1.27% other. Finally, 42.48% of the participants held a
bachelor’s degree, 12.02% held a higher degree, and the rest some high school education or diploma.
Each participant evaluated one to three reviews (in random order) for the study, resulting in 1,475
evaluations on the review filtering decisions. After removing the responses that failed our validation
process, I were left with a total of 1,339 responses for our analysis. The participants’ payment was
prorated between $1 to $1.50 based on how many questions each participant answered. On average,
the participants finished the survey in 7.56 minutes and were paid at least the US Federal minimum
wage of $7.25 per hour for their participation in the study.
8.3.3 Study 2: Adding Transparency into How (RQ2)
Study 2 addressed how users’ perception of an algorithmic decision differs when transparency is
provided into how the algorithm made the decision (RQ2). As stated in Chapter 2, past work has
suggested that explanations can increase people’s satisfaction with algorithmic decisions [90, 84].
However, it is not clear how much transparency is enough, particularly when users perceive an
algorithmic decision to be wrong. Therefore, I tested four levels of transparency:
• No explanation: the control condition.
• Low-detail explanation: this explanation is typical of those that might be found on algorithmic
decision making platforms (such as Yelp): “the algorithm looks at dozens of different signals,
including various measures of quality, reliability and activity.”
• Medium-detail explanation: the medium-detail explanation adds some details about the
factors that the algorithm uses in the decision-making process. However it still does not
reveal the exact reasons for filtering the review: “the algorithm looks at dozens of different
signals, including: 1) Unusual reviewing activity, 2) Limited profile information, 3) Similar
reviews were found to be fake in the past.”
• High-detail explanation: an explanation that describes precisely why a particular review was
labeled as fake: “The review was flagged by the algorithm due to suspicious user activity,
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including that the user: 1) Wrote many of their reviews in a short period of time, 2) Does not
include a photo or location information on their profile, 3) Has a strong positive or negative
slant in most of their reviews.”
The descriptions were written to be true of all three reviews, so participants saw the same
explanations. I developed these descriptions by following prior reverse engineering research on the
Yelp review filtering algorithm [178] as well as previous work about folk theories elaborated by
Yelp users regarding the operation of the Yelp review filtering algorithm [110].
These four conditions allowed us to establish whether users prefer as much information as
possible in explanations, or whether low-detail explanations can be more satisfying. Similar to
Study 1, I evaluated these conditions in a three-by-four factorial design experiment: I randomly
assigned participants to one of the three chosen reviews from the pre-study as well as one of the
above four levels of transparency to evaluate participants’ perception of the decision using the same
metrics as Study 1 and a free-form question.
Data Validation
I conducted the same integrity and attentiveness checks as in Study 1 in order to ensure that the
participants’ responses in the final dataset were thoughtful.
Participants
A total of 665 participants were recruited for Study 2 on Amazon Mechanical Turk using the
same procedure as the pre-study and Study 1. The custom survey for the study took 6.99 minutes on
average to finish. For those who answered the demographic questions, the age ranged between 18
and 64 years old, and around half of the participants’ annual income was less than $50,000 and the
rest were between $50,000 and $150,000. 30.07% of them identified as females. The participants
were 76.48% Caucasian, 5.48% Hispanic, 7.76% Asian, 9.36% African American, 0.68% Native
American, and 0.24% other. Finally, 43.67% held a bachelor’s degree, 10.92% held a higher degree,
and the rest some high school education or diploma. As in Study 1, each participant evaluated
one to three reviews (in random order) for the study, aggregated to 1,306 responses to the review
filtering decisions. After removing the responses that failed our validation process, I was left with a
total of 1,128 responses for analysis.
127
8.3.4 Evaluation Metrics for User’s Perceptions
To develop the metrics for evaluating users’ perceptions of an algorithmic decision, I turned to
literature that has examined the impacts of increased transparency on users’ perceptions. Lee used
fairness, trust, and emotion as the evaluation metrics of users’ response to algorithmic management,
when varying the decision maker between humans and algorithms [85]. Rader et al. evaluated
different forms of algorithmic transparency by measuring users’ awareness, correctness (accuracy),
interpretability (understandability), and accountability (includes fairness) [84]. In another study,
Kizilicec focused on accuracy, fairness, trust, and understandability to evaluate the impacts of
adding different levels of transparency into how an algorithmic decision was made [90].
I used these metrics as a guideline and built a base scale for evaluating users’ perception of a
review filtering decision by measuring its a) quality (accuracy, fairness, and trustworthiness), and
b) understandability. Previous work, however, suggested that using only one metric to evaluate a
concept might not measure that concept properly; e.g. using only “trustworthiness” to understand
how much users trust a review filtering decision might not reflect their opinion accurately [179].
Therefore, I developed a multi-item scale in which each of the evaluation concepts was measured by
four items describing the same concept (including one reverse coded item for each measure). For
example, “trustworthiness” was measured with the following items: trustworthy, well-intentioned,
honest, and deceptive, with each rated on a 5-point scale (e.g., “totally ...” to “not at all ...”). I
asked users to rate “the decision to flag this review as fake” on each measure. The same scales were
shown in both Study 1 and 2.
I did a pilot test to evaluate our developed scale for each concept of accuracy, fairness, trustworthi-
ness, and understandability. I measured the correlation between the four items used to describe the
construct. However, I did not find any significant correlation between any of the constructs’ items;
e.g. for “trustworthiness”, there was no significant correlation between trustworthy, well-intentioned,
honest, and the reverse of deceptive in users’ responses. Due to this lack of correlation, I did not
establish a multi-item scale for each concept, and therefore, used the base scale I originally built by
using the exact wording of the concepts I aimed to measure (i.e. accuracy, fairness, trustworthiness,
and understandability). Although I could not find a significant correlation between the constructs’
items, I still argue that it is worthwhile for studies like ours to try building and testing a multi-item
scale. I hope that this experience could be a guideline for future evaluation scales.
Transparency Metric: In addition to the base scale we developed, I also added a manipulation
check metric for “transparency” to evaluate if users really thought that transparency differed between
transparency conditions. In particular, I hoped to see a significant difference between the four
transparency conditions in the How survey, mainly between “no explanation” and “high-detail
explanation” conditions as the lowest and highest level of transparency in how a decision was
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made. I find that there was a statistically significant difference between the “no explanation” and
“high-detail explanation” conditions in terms of their “transparency” metric (p=0.001), showing that
our manipulation was effective.
Free-form Response: Finally, to complement our metrics, I also asked our participants a free-form
question on why they provided the response they did for the evaluation metrics. This free-form
question allowed us to understand the thought process and reasoning for our participants’ perceptions
of the filtering decision.
8.3.5 Data Analysis
I analyzed our data in two parts. In the first part, I analyzed the participants’ response to the
quantitative metrics for their perceptions of the filtering decisions using statistical methods. In the
second part, I qualitatively analyzed the free-form responses that participants provided to justify
their response to the metrics.
Quantitative Data Analysis
I conducted a two-way ANOVA for both Study 1 and Study 2 to evaluate the main effect of
our study on participants’ perception of the decision for each decision scenario, and a multi-level
analysis on the main and interaction effects of increased transparency and agreement level between
users and the system. In cases where our two-way ANOVA model was significant, I proceeded
to conduct a Tukey’s Honestly Significant Difference (HSD) post hoc test to see which pairs of
conditions exhibited a significant difference in the users’ perception of the filtering decision.
Qualitative Data Analysis
In order to analyze the free-form responses that participants provided to justify their response
to the metrics, two researchers in the team performed qualitative analysis on the participants’
responses. I open-coded data at the response level in conjunction with participants’ survey ratings
to identify emerging themes, and I grouped different themes to explain how participants responded
to and judged the decisions depending on which review and which transparency condition they
interacted with. The coding process was collaborative and iterative, and we continuously reviewed
our categories and data throughout the process in order to capture patterns within our data, and
examine the emerging themes. Finally, I numbered each responses in order; the qualitative responses
quoted in the subsequent sections will be denoted as R followed by the response number.
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Fairness
F(11, 1463) = 25.759
p < 0.001
Accuracy
F(11, 1463) = 21.612
p < 0.001
Trustworthiness
F(11, 1463) = 18.735
p < 0.001
Understandability
F(11, 1463) = 21.708
p < 0.001






























R2 *** R2 *** R2 *** R2 ***
Table 8.1: Results from Two-way ANOVA for each perception metrics, followed by Tukey’s HSD
post hoc test between different types of reviews for Study 1 (Adding Transparency into Who). Note
that across all metrics, the mean value for R2 (Real-looking) review was the lowest, indicating that
the users found the decision to filter R2 to be the most unfair, inaccurate, untrustworthy, and hard to
understand. *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05
8.4 ADDING TRANSPARENCY INTO WHO (RQ1)
I did not find any significant difference of types of decision-makers on users’ perceptions of the
decision quality and understandability. Our qualitative analysis showed that it was partly because
users relied on their folk theories to judge a filtering decision, not who made the decision. I also
observed a dominant effect of algorithms in the decisions that were made collaboratively between
algorithms and humans; users recognized algorithms as the main authority in the decision-making
process, even when humans were the final decision makers.
While I did not observe any significant effect on the type of decision maker, I found a significant
effect on users’ agreement with the filtering decision on users’ perceptions of the decision’s quality
and understandability; users perceived the decision of labeling the “real-looking” review as fake
significantly less accurate, fair, trustworthy, and understandable than the other two “fake-looking”
and “controversial” reviews. Below, I describe these results in detail.
8.4.1 Transparency about Who
I found that algorithm, human, algorithm-advising-human, and human-advising-algorithm de-
cisions were perceived as equally accurate, fair, trustworthy, and understandable. This result
corroborates previous findings by Lee [85] and Jakesh et al. [86] regarding the equality of users’
perceptions of human- or algorithm-made decisions. In addition, it adds to this line of literature
by showing that users’ perceptions of a decision don’t change, even if algorithms and humans
work together to make a decision. To understand the reasons behind these findings better, I turned
to users’ qualitative responses about the reasons for the way they felt about the review filtering
decisions.
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Folk Theories of Review Authenticity
When users were evaluating a review filtering decision, they started developing folk theories
about the authenticity of the reviews – the differences between a fake and a real review. They
then used these theories to judge whether the decision to label a review as fake was accurate, fair,
trustworthy, and understandable. These theories matched the users’ folk theories from Chapter 4 on
the way users think about how the Yelp review filtering algorithm works. These theories consisted
of two main categories: 1) The reviewer engagement theory: this theory argues that when a reviewer
is active on the reviewing platform, their reviews are going to be considered more authentic by the
system. This engagement includes having reviewing experience (writing many reviews), having a
large friendship network, a complete profile (such as photos and bio), and providing or receiving
feedback (e.g. voting on other users’ reviews). 2) The review format theory: this theory was about
the features of the review such as its length, inclusion of details, and using extreme language/rating,
and how each of these features increase/decrease a review’s authenticity. While this chapter does
not explore each of these theories in detail, I use them to understand users’ behavior, and to explain
the reasons for the lack of difference between different types of decision-makers.
I found that users did not look at who the decision-maker was when they were developing folk
theories to evaluate the quality and understandability of the review filtering decision. Instead, they
assessed if the decision made sense based on their own theories. For example, when participants
were evaluating the decision of labeling the “real-looking review” as fake, most of them argued that
the reviewer had many friends (Friendship Network folk theory) along with a history of reviewing
(Reviewing Experience folk theory), and the review itself was long (Length folk theory), with plenty
of details (Details folk theory) which together made the review sound authentic: “The reviewer
has an established record of posting reviews as well as several friends on the site. The review itself
is quite lengthy and detailed, and it referenced a prior visit. It sounds pretty real to me” (R1868).
Overall, participants mentioned between one to six folk theories in their responses in order to
evaluate the authenticity of a review. We, however, did not see this trend with the decision-maker:
there were only 37 responses mentioning the decision maker in users’ evaluations of the filtering
decision. This shows that when users evaluate a decision made by a system, they look at the system
as a whole, regardless of who has made the decision, and mainly focus on the decision itself to
evaluate its validity.
Algorithmic Dominance: When Algorithms Take Over
Although there were only a few responses (n=37) which mentioned the decision-maker when
evaluating a filtering decision, there was a noticeable difference between the number of responses
131
Fairness
F(11, 1116) = 23.384
p < 0.001
Accuracy
F(11, 1116) = 25.764
p < 0.001
Trustworthiness
F(11, 1116) = 22.433
p < 0.001
Understandability
F(11, 1116) = 26.971
p < 0.001






























R2 *** R2 *** R2 *** R2 ***
Table 8.2: Results from Two-way ANOVA for each perception metrics, followed by Tukey’s HSD
post hoc test between different types of reviews for Study 2 (Adding Transparency into How). Note
that across all metrics, the mean value for R2 (Real-looking) review was the lowest, indicating that
the users found the decision to filter R2 to be the most unfair, inaccurate, untrustworthy, and hard to
understand. *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05
that mentioned the “algorithm” and “human/moderators” as the decision maker: users referenced the
“algorithm” (n=31) many times more than a “human” (n=6) as the decision maker. This trend was
particularly noticeable for the two transparency conditions, in which algorithms and humans worked
together to come up with a filtering decision; even though the users were told that the decision
was made collaboratively between the algorithm and human, they only referred to the algorithm
as the decision maker regardless of whether they were criticizing or acclaiming the decision. For
example, R2465 disagreed with a decision that moderators made with the support of the algorithm,
but only called out the algorithm for the perceived mistake: “It seems like the algorithm is labeling
reviews as fake based on the number of friends a reviewer has. This doesn’t seem fair. From what I
can tell, the review seems legit.” In another example, R1359 agreed with a decision made by the
algorithm with the support of moderators, but complemented only the algorithm for making the
right decision:“The way that the review was written was very commercialized. Parts of it seemed it
like it could be real, but ‘they will have a style that appeals to you’ stood out to me as very fake
seeming, so I believed the algorithm was fair and accurate.”
This finding, which I call “algorithmic dominance,” shows that users generally see algorithms as
the main authority in making a decision even in the cases in which algorithms are only supporting
humans to make a decision. This could come from users’ general assumptions about algorithmic
agency, believing that algorithms are all-powerful [174, 147].
8.4.2 Agreement between People and Decision-Makers
While there was no significant difference in users’ perceptions of a review filtering decision
among various decision makers, I found a significant difference in users’ perceptions of a filtering
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decision between “fake-looking,” “real-looking” and “controversial” reviews; that is, regardless
of who made the filtering decision, users perceived the decision to filter the “real-looking” review
significantly less accurate, fair, trustworthy, and understandable than the other two reviews (Table 1).
This means that if users generally perceived a filtering decision to be a mistake, they considered the
decision’s quality and understandability significantly lower than other decisions, and transparency
on who made that decision did not make a difference in the users’ perception.
8.5 ADDING TRANSPARENCY INTO HOW (RQ2)
In contrary to Study 1, I found a mostly significant effect on transparency about how an algorithm
made a filtering decision on the decision’s understandability; users perceived the high-detail
explanation (fully transparent) condition significantly more understandable than no explanation
(non-transparent) condition. Qualitative analysis of users’ opinions showed that in conditions with
no or low-detail explanations, users questioned lack of transparency about how the decision was
made. However, when they were provided with medium-detail or high-detail explanations, the calls
for transparency faded away, and users rather started engaging with explanations to either reason or
argue with them.
Similar to Study 1, I again found a significant effect of users’ agreement with the filtering
decision, showing that users’ opinion about the validity of an algorithmic decision plays the main
role in shaping their perception of the decision.
8.5.1 Transparency about How
I found results similar to those of Study 1 regarding the impacts of different levels of transparency
on users’ perceptions of the decision’s quality: users perceived algorithmic decisions with no,
low-detail, medium-detail, and high-detail explanations equally accurate, fair, and trustworthy.
However, contrary to the who study, I observed a mostly significant impact of increased trans-
parency on the understandability of the algorithm’s decision: adding more detailed explanation to
an algorithmic decision made the decision more understandable and interpretable. This effect was
particularly clear between no explanation (the least transparent) and high-detail explanation (the
most transparent) conditions (p = 0.061, eta-squared=0.2, where > 0.13 denotes a large effect)2.
To understand the reasons behind this effect, I compared and analyzed users’ qualitative answers
between different levels of transparency that I describe below.
2While the p-value was a little higher than the usual threshold (0.05), I consulted the statistics department at the
researchers’ academic institution and they suggested to still consider this marginally significant if the effect size is quite
large (which was) and the qualitative data is also supportive of this finding.
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From Lack of Transparency to Engaging with Transparency
I found a common change of themes in users’ reasoning for their ratings when transparency about
how a filtering decision was made increased: as I added more details about how a filtering decision
was made, users questioned the lack of transparency less, and engaged with the explanation more.
This increased transparency helped users understand the algorithm’s decision better so that they
could use it to either argue or reason about the decision.
Lack of Transparency: Participants who were assigned to the low transparency conditions
(no and low-detail explanation) noticeably questioned the lack of transparency about how the
filtering decision was made (n=46), while only very few participants (n=3) in the high transparency
conditions (medium-detail and high-detail explanation) had this complaint. When users were
exposed to no or a low-detail explanation about how a filtering decision was made, they stated
that “The algorithm’s decision process is not at all transparent” (R484), arguing that “It’s hard
to judge the algorithm without knowing the dozens of different signals that are examined” (R306).
Therefore, that “if there were an explanation as to how its known to be fake, that would have been
helpful, otherwise its[sic] hard to know if the algorithm just arbitrarily marked it as fake” (R310).
This lack of transparency introduced uncertainty in judging the authenticity of a review: “I don’t
have access to all the signals considered by the algorithm, so it’s hard for me to tell from this one
review whether the account or review might be fake. The review is vague and not well-written, but
have you read most of what’s posted on the internet? That’s not automatically a tell. [...] so I’m
unwilling to agree with the algorithm on this unless I can access a little more info.” (R122).
Engaging with Transparency: When the transparency of an algorithmic decision increased, the
critiques about the lack of transparency decreased Many participants (n=170) started engaging with
explanations about how a filtering decision was made. They used the explanations to either reason
or argue about the decision. Those who agreed with a filtering decision accompanied by a medium
or high-detail explanation stated that “the given guidelines that the algorithm follows makes a lot of
sense” (R326) and they used these guidelines as a part of their own reasoning. For example, R232
borrowed a part of the high-detail explanation about “a reviewer writing many reviews in a short
period of time” in their reasoning: “I think that the fact that the person hides their location and has
strong positive or negative views definitely makes them seem suspicious. Plus, who is going to sit
down and write several reviews at a time?” (R232). Some also agreed with the algorithm, but not
for the reasons mentioned in the explanation: “I actually agree with the algorithm on this one - I
think the review is fake - but not for any of the reasons the algorithm flagged it. I simply think it’s
too general and consists of things that could be known to people who have never been there. It also
just sounds like a salesperson talking.” (R461).
On the other hand, those participants who disagreed with a filtering decision used a medium or
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high-detail explanation to argue with the algorithm: “I can see the logic in the algorithm, but the
[...] review seemed genuine in it’s [sic] speech and tone.” (R95). Therefore, while they understood
that “there is reason to be suspicious [to a review] due to the factors listed [in the explanation]”
(R298), they still used their own folk theories (similar to what participants developed in Study 1) to
justify the decision: “I understand the algorithm’s reasons, but I don’t think it can be determined
as to if that’s fair or accurate just from this review. It could be someone who registered and then
completed many in a short period of time” (R872). These findings show that regardless of agreeing
or disagreeing with the algorithm’s decision, providing transparency into the decision helped users
to understand the decision better, and then use their judgement to come up with a decision.
8.5.2 Agreement between People and the Algorithm
Similar to Study 1, I again observed a significant difference in terms of agreement between users
and the algorithm about a review’s authenticity: when users perceived an algorithmic decision
to be mistaken (i.e. the “real-looking” review), they found the decision’s accuracy, fairness,
trustworthiness and understandability to be significantly lower than the other filtering decisions (the
“fake-looking” and “controversial” reviews) (Table 2). Exploring users’ free-form responses showed
that when a review looked real to users, they used their own folk theories to oppose the algorithm’s
decisions: “I did not think the algorithm got this one right and I don’t believe that the article review
is fake. It might look sloppy and or the reviewers as being picky or just rude but the way I see it is
that every person reviews and explain their experience differently.” (R148). These findings indicate
that while transparency can help users to understand a decision better, the (perceived) correctness
of the decision plays an important role as well.
8.6 LIMITATIONS
The findings presented here are based on the participants’ answers to self-report studies, and does
not take into consideration the behavioral aspect of the participants’ experience with platforms that
employ systems like the one presented here. For example, would users interacting with a human and
algorithm hybrid decision-maker place higher-than-reality authority on the algorithm as described
by algorithmic dominance in a more natural settings? It would also be worthwhile to consider the
effect of transparency and users’ agreement with an algorithmic system on the users’ perception
longitudinally where the users interact with the system more than once. Also, while the metrics for
measuring the users’ perception about the algorithmic decision (accuracy, fairness, trustworthiness
and understandability) were carefully chosen and tested in the pilot studies, and was supported by
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the qualitative responses, it is still possible that they did not fully capture the intended dimensions
of the users’ perception.
8.7 DISCUSSION
I started this chapter by talking about the possible opportunities and challenges algorithmic
transparency can bring, particularly when there is an imbalance in users’ perceptions of algorithmic
decisions–that they either under-accept or over-accept algorithmic decisions, based on whether they
perceive a decision to be mistaken. What I learned in this study is that while transparency can help
users understand an algorithmic decision better, it alone can’t necessarily resolve the imbalance
of algorithm appreciation and aversion. Here, I discuss how much transparency can be helpful
in practice, and what other strategies we need to employ to build an informed and satisfactory
interaction between users and algorithmic systems.
8.7.1 How much Transparency?
While I found that increased transparency can improve users’ understandability of algorithmic
decisions, it is still not clear if we should always provide users with full transparency (a high-detail
explanation). Here, I argue that full transparency can be detrimental in several cases. Given
that we found both medium-detail and high-detail explanations to increase algorithmic decisions’
understandability, I suggest medium-detail explanations as a substitute for high-detail explanations
when full transparency can be harmful.
User Confusion: One of the cases where full transparency can be detrimental is when revealing
all the details distracts users from the most important information they should receive and confuses
them with unimportant pieces of information. Some might even use this mechanism to conceal
central information that should be easily visible to users [91, 180]. Previous work has also shown
that users do not usually want full transparency, even when they can have access to it because it
can overwhelm them with information they don’t need [174]. This suggests providing users with
not too much information, but rather a medium-detail level of explanation to help them receive the
information that they need to have for a more informed interaction with the system.
System Gaming: Another case in which full transparency can be harmful is when there is the
potential for malicious gaming of the system. Many algorithmic systems have used this as a reason
for housing their algorithms in black boxes [3] (such as Yelp [93]). However, while a high-detail
explanation can increase the likelihood of system gaming, it does not mean that we cannot provide
users with some level of transparency. As our findings in this paper and previous work indicate,
users develop folk theories about how algorithms work, and they use those theories to adjust their
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behavior [165, 117, 110]. Even when a system doesn’t provide any transparency into its algorithmic
decision-making process, users still have self-constructed ideas about how the algorithm works.
Based on our findings, I argue that designers of algorithmic systems should strive to find the right
level of transparency for algorithmic systems so that they can facilitate informed behaviors from the
users while withholding just enough information to prevent them from gaming the system.
8.7.2 Designing for Contestability
In this study, users adhered to their opinions about the validity of a review filtering decision,
regardless of the level of added transparency about who made the decision and how it was made.
They, however, did not have an opportunity to express their opinion in the actual system if they
believed an algorithmic decision was wrong. Observing algorithmic mistakes, along with a lack
of control over the system, can cause algorithm aversion. Previous work showed that if a human
and an algorithm make the same mistake, people are more likely to abandon the algorithm than
the human for future decision-making [173]. This can become costly as algorithmic intervention is
inevitable in today’s world when human power is not enough for processing large-scale data.
These issues call for “contestability”– allowing users to voice their arguments and disagreement,
and appealing algorithmic decisions – via a form of human-algorithm dialog. It has been shown
that if users are able to impact and modify an algorithmic decision, they are more likely to use it in
the future, even if it’s imperfect [173]. In addition, contestability can improve users’ perceptions
of fairness and accountability of algorithmic systems [181]. I argue that while transparency can
empower users to build a more informed interaction with algorithmic systems, it is not effective
alone without contestability: knowing the reasons behind an algorithmic decision without the
agency to affect it makes users feel powerless. However, designing transparency and contestability
into algorithmic systems and evaluating their use remain for future work.
8.8 CONCLUSION
This chapter reveals the interaction between transparency and users’ agreement with algorithmic
decisions. In two studies, I evaluated the value of increased transparency about a) who made a
review filtering decision and b) how it was made when users agreed or disagreed with the decision.
The results showed that as we increase transparency about how an algorithm makes a decision,
people engage with the added explanation, and could understand the decision better. This, however,
does not change users’ opinion about the validity of an algorithmic decision. These results show
that while transparency in opaque algorithmic systems is needed, it does not mean that it is enough,
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particularly when users and algorithms disagree. What users need for an informed an satisfactory
interaction with a system is a sense of control and contestability in addition to transparency.
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
I started this dissertation with a comparison between cars and algorithms: we don’t know how
our car engines work, but we still drive them, and we’re fine. So why do we need to know anything
about the internals of opaque algorithmic systems that we’re dealing with daily? While this question
sounded pretty reasonable to me at first, during my PhD, I found that there are two main differences
between our cars and our everyday algorithmic systems. First, when a car breaks, we know it’s
broken because it’ll give us a signal (e.g. not starting, creating noises or maybe even catching on
fire!). But this is not necessarily true for current algorithmic socio-technical systems: many of these
systems employ opaque algorithms that might cause biased and/or misinformed behavior among
users, and such issues might stay hidden for a long time while the system is still (mal)functioning.
Second, when a car breaks, we take it to a mechanic to fix it. But who/what are the mechanics of
our everyday algorithmic systems? Where/who should we go to when we see Booking’s rating
algorithm skews ratings upward or the opacity of Facebook news feed curation algorithm creates
miperceptions about users’ interaction with their friends?
These questions motivated this dissertation: I investigated users’ interaction with opaque al-
gorithmic socio-technical systems and built designs to improve this interaction. I showed that
communicating pivotal algorithmic process cues in the interface can build a more informed, sat-
isfying, and engaging interaction between user and system. Here, I conclude this dissertation by
revising each findings, discussing the challenges of this work and outlining some paths for future
work.
1. Algorithm Sensemaking in the Wild
• In Chapter 3, I detected and quantified a rating algorithm’s bias using a cross-platform
audit technique. I found that users oriented towards and adapted their behavior around
this bias: they tried to look into the algorithm’s black box, correct the bias, and demon-
strate a trust breakdown with the platform. These findings bring many opportunities
and challenges. Designers of algorithmic systems can use users’ collective power in
auditing algorithms to shed light on potential existing algorithmic biases. Resolving
these biases, however, is not easy. I argue that adding (enough) transparency and “ac-
tionable transparency” to algorithmic systems can rebuild users’ trust in a system. As
more algorithmic processes curate online content, they are more prone to bias user
experiences. This work is a first step towards understanding the effects of such biases
on user behavior. I hope these findings inspire future designs to better accommodate
bias awareness among users.
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• In Chapter 4, I found that users challenge or defend a potentially biased algorithm in its
existence, operation, and opacity; and their stance depends on how engaged they are
with, and how much personal gain they get from the algorithm. Adding transparency
into the algorithm, however, can change users’ attitudes towards an algorithm. These
findings uncover many opportunities and challenges in designing the opaque algorithmic
systems that might be biased – or might simply be perceived as biased. I argue that as
more algorithmic systems exert power to shape users’ experiences, system designers
need to communicate the existence, operation, and the impact of opaque algorithmic
processes. However, finding the right level of transparency to avoid complicating users’
interactions or providing opportunities for gaming is a challenging task which needs a
careful design process. I hope these findings can drive future research into the design of
opaque algorithmic systems, particularly when their opacity can cause concerns over
potential bias or deception.
2. Designing around Algorithm Sensemaking
• Chapter 5 sheds light on how algorithms are much more than simple filters to users. Most
Facebook users in my study did not even know a News Feed curation algorithm existed
on Facebook. Once this algorithm made visible, however, awareness of algorithm
outputs were found to impact users’ actions and feelings toward the interface as well
as their social relationships. Given that millions of people use Facebook News Feed
daily and are satisfied with it, and that exposure to the algorithm empowers people, I
believe understanding when and how to inform users of a hidden algorithm’s existence
is a fruitful new avenue of research.
• While earlier work has stressed the use of folk theories for sense-making, Chapter
6 compared folk theories derived from a popular public-facing algorithmic interface,
Facebook’s News Feed, to an alternative interface that incorporated seams into basic
algorithmic feed function, FeedVis. I found that participants could morph folk theories
effectively and rapidly using seamful interfaces that reveal glimpses into algorithmic
process. I also found that theories generated by less aware users were remarkably con-
sistent with those developed by long-term users of the Facebook interface. I argue that
as more algorithmic processes provide curated information, structured seamful design
approaches will benefit not only algorithm awareness but overall human-algorithm
interaction and human agency in complex systems.
3. Designing around Algorithm Transparency
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• In Chapter 7, I contribute to understanding how communicating aspects of the algorith-
mic ad curation process affects users’ perception of their ad experience. My analysis
highlighted misperceptions about algorithmic omniscience which subsided when users
were exposed to the inner workings of the system. This illustrates that as more ads
are tailored to users via algorithmic processes, advertisers should provide users with
interpretable explanations about these processes. Advertisers also need to increase the
visibility of such disclosure mechanisms as the current practices fail to do so. Com-
municating algorithmic processes not only benefits users by providing them with a
more realistic understanding of how their information is processed, but could also help
advertisers to regain or increase user trust in and satisfaction with their ad experience.
• Finally, Chapter 8 takes a further step in understanding the benefits and challenges
of algorithm transparency by investigating the interaction between transparency and
users’ agreement with algorithmic decisions. I found that while increasing transparency
about how an algorithm made a decision improved users’ understandability of the
decision, it still could not change users’ agreement or disagreement with the decision.
These findings bring many opportunities and challenges in designing transparency for
algorithmic decision-making systems. I argue that while it is valuable, transparency is
still inadequate for building a satisfactory interaction between users and algorithmic
systems. This inadequacy calls for other design strategies to complement transparency,
and allow users to have an informed interaction with a real sense of agency over
algorithmic systems.
Throughout this dissertation, I discussed many challenges including ethical considerations I
had when investigating and re-designing current opaque algorithmic systems. However, ethical
considerations are a moving target. For example, what was ethical while I was working on my thesis
might not be considered ethical next year. Conversely, something I thought was unethical while
writing the thesis, might be an accepted norm in the future. In the long term, what is important is
that while we are doing this work, we reflect on the outcomes to our study participants, society, and
systems. And in doing so, we also help stakeholders understand the ethical concerns we faced.
This dissertation has shown that users participate around opaque algorithms to make sense of
the system, they build theories about how algorithms work, and they become more informed and
intelligent users via a seamful design along with enough transparency. While these findings present
interesting points, they also raise interesting questions: How can we add transparency into an opaque
algorithmic system when even the developers of the system cannot understand how a machine
learning algorithm generated the outcomes? How can we incorporate both transparency and control
into a system design at the same time to empower users?
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